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BDI.  Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie.  E. V.    
 
BMWA.  Bundesministerium für Wirschaft und Arbeit.    
 
BNP.  Banque National de Paris.    
 
BGW.  Bundesverband der Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft.   
 
CFM.  Compagnie française du Méthane. 
 
CGT.  Confédération Générale du Travail. 
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Commission. 
 
ECJ.  European Court of Justice. 
 
EDF.  Éléctricité de France. 
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GDF.  Gaz de France. 
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MLG.  Multi-Level Governance. 
 
NIE.  New Institutional Economics. 
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VIK.  Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft. 
 
VKU.  Verband kommunaler Unternehmen e.V. 
 
VV. Verbändevereinbarung 
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 Chapter One Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This study is founded on theoretical and conceptual models of institutional 
change.  I attempt to chart the institutional changes placed on the French and German 
gas markets as a result of the European Union’s liberalization policies in the gas 
market in the period 1998-2003.  I ask how the current market structures diverge 
from the simplified institutional arrangements of corporatism in Germany and state-
dirigisme in France.  My theoretical framework rests on New Institutional Economic 
Theory and I employ its main concepts in identifying my dependent variables.  My 
methods of analysis are based on the multi-level governance perspective, which allow 
me to chart institutional dynamics at the supranational, national and subnational 
levels. 
 
This study’s central research question asks: 
What transformations have occurred to the institutional structures between the gas 
industry and governments of the French and German gas sectors as a result of the 
European Union’s liberalization of the energy market in the period 1998-2003? 
 
In answering the study’s central research question, I attempt to address two 
subquestions: 
 
1.  Do the relationships between governmental and gas industry still function as 
corporatism in Germany and state-dirigisme in France?  If not, how can the new 
functioning relationships be described? 
 
2.  Do the transformations characterize complete unified changes in France and 
Germany?  Or has the Europeanization of gas policy decomposed the nation-state so 
that differing transformations have occurred at the European, national and regional 
levels? 
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 I claim that in terms of this study, there appears a unifying tendency of 
Europeanization of large institutions both governmental and industrial at the 
supranational and national levels, however when viewed from lower levels, regional 
governments and companies change more according to local needs that to an 
attachment to European-wide transformations. 
 
1. 2 Background 
The Germany industrial complex has been traditionally thought of as an 
exemplary corporatist state in which industrial actors, banks and the state corroborate 
to form national economic policy geared to high productivity while sustaining a solid 
social welfare system.(Herrigel 1996; Vitols, 2000)   The French system has also 
been traditionally labeled state-dirigiste due to the government’s overt presence and 
ownership of major industrial concerns.(Schmidt 1999; Feigenbaum 1986)  Both 
corporatism and state-dirigisme have been structures present in the gas industry.  Gaz 
de France has been a publicly owned enterprise with all of its business strategies 
dictated by the state.  German gas companies have functioned in cooperation with 
governmental institutions in order to develop their interests and protect their areas of 
operation. 
Gas has not traditionally been an important energy source for European 
states.(Matlary 1997)  Up until the 1980’s, the gas market had been characterized by 
access to small local gas fields, short-distance pipelines, and forecasts of low gas 
reserves.(Stern 1990: 2-5)  Coal, oil and electricity, and even nuclear power in the 
case of France, had been far more important energy sources before 1980.  Gaz de 
France was created as a national champion to accelerate post-WWII economic 
rebuilding.  In Germany the decline in coal extraction was compensated by gas 
extraction.  The increase in gas consumption has been the product of supply-led 
policies.  New larger sources of gas due to access to Eastern Europe gas supplies after 
1990, required new supply lines tied to long-term supply contracts.  With supply lines 
in place and a growing number of gas market companies, a supply-driven gas market 
was in place during the early 1990’s.(Stern 1998: 33-34) 
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 Legislative work had also been a piecemeal response to growing gas supplies.  
In France discussions surrounding the denationalization of public utility companies in 
order to respond to the growing need for energy began in the late 1990’s.  Germany 
did away with the system of regionalized demarcated gas markets located in its 
largest regional governments, or Länder, in the late 1990’s in order to increase 
pipeline access to the German gas grid.  At the EU level, work on the gas market has 
been tied to that of the electricity market.  It was believed that knowledge gained in 
liberalizing the electricity market would aid in assessing challenges in liberalizing the 
gas market.  Although the creation of a general internal European market began with 
the White Paper on a Common Energy Policy in 1985, only two documents contain 
the requisite provisions to instigate institutional or structural transformations on the 
internal gas market.  This study is concerned with those two documents: 
 
First, Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 
1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
 
and second, Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and 
repealing Directive 98/30/EC. 
 
1.3 Choice of Case 
The focus of this qualitative comparative case study is institutional 
transformations in the French and German gas sectors in response to EU gas-market 
liberalization policies.  Much of the literature since the 1990’s regarding the internal 
European gas market has: elaborated on the policy formation for EU policy specific 
purposes (Eldevik 1999; Matlary 1997), expanded the field of energy studies 
(Geradin 2001; Estrada 1995; Stern 1990 1998), established an economic view 
(Austvik 1996), explored the legalistic readings of legislation (Moen  2001), or 
broadened a sociological-organizational perspective (Andersen, Svein 1993, 1995, 
2000).  France and Germany have been chosen because they represent not just two 
key European states but are also often cited as central member states that define and 
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 form general momentum in the EU.  Environmental policy has also been a crucial 
component of gas policy at the EU level used to explain why gas is a cleaner 
alternative to coal, incineration and oil - especially in conjunction with broader policy 
statements through energy green and white papers.  This study will not address those 
considerations, although they could offer a fascinating study of how one policy area 
affects another in a European context. 
Of the literature discussing the development of the gas market through EU 
policy, Andersen (2000a , 2000b), Estrada (1995), Eldevik (1999) Matlary (1997), 
and Stern (1990, 1992, 1998) are closest to the discussion in this study.  However my 
study highlights a period after the identification of the gas market by the EU as a 
major liberalization policy initiative.  In addition my study adds to prior discussions 
of positions at the EU level by investigating policy formation at the national and 
subnational and testing for convergence or dissimilarity between EU, national and 
regional positions. 
Andersen (2000a, 2000b) claims that the creation of gas policy in the EU is 
not the result of EU member states promoting their interests, but rather through 
cooperative efforts of member states in arriving at a common goal.  Neo-institutional 
sociological theory explains that countries’ positions shift because member states’ 
delegates establish relations through common work in Brussels.  Their positions 
become a mixture between promoting national agendas and attaining a common goal 
through understanding and partially incorporating other countries’ positions into their 
own national positions.  Andersen claims that the growth of a common gas policy 
was motivated not by a competition policy, but by an international development of a 
new global market economy and market ideology which tugged away at the system of 
enclosed national markets.(Andersen 2000b:14).  The enlarged competencies of the 
EU in other areas brought on a spill-over affect in terms of gas policy from other 
policy areas such as competition and privatization EU policies, and also of 
overlapping interests between other member states.  (Andersen 2000a) 
Matlary (1997) charts the creation of a common EU energy policy from 1985 
to 1995 in spite of the wishes of member states.  She argues that a common energy 
policy resulted from cooperation and negotiations at the EU level.  Governments bind 
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 themselves to agreements at the EU level which would then later be pushed through 
at the domestic level.  Energy policy had no legal basis in EU charters and was tied to 
other matters lacking legal basis; deregulation, the environment and security of 
supply.  In her study, there exists supremacy of power of EU organs - mainly the 
Commission over the authority of member states, an issue progressed in my study.  
However by 1998, environmental concerns had receded in importance. 
Eldevik (1999: 80-82) uses three variables to explain the content of the 1998 
gas liberalization directive: First, a country’s energy policy interests.  Second, the 
policy decision-making system in the EU.  Third, the negotiation process of the 
directive in 1997.  The informal policy decision-making system exerts more 
explanatory power than the formal decision-making system in her study.  In the 
negotiation process, common EU results were placed in preference to member state’s 
agendas. Lastly, countries positions were most dependent on the level of public and 
private ownership of gas companies, with countries with publicly owned gas 
companies most negative to a liberal version of gas policy in the 1998 directive. 
Estrada et al. (1995) charts supply-driven institutional change.  According to 
him, the economic interests of private actors drive the liberalization of the gas market 
more than policy considerations of individual governments.  Economic considerations 
are boosted by new discoveries of gas, better technologies, new opportunities to gain 
money on the gas market and more efficient transport lines.  These result in lower 
energy prices for both companies and utilities. 
Stern (1998) also looks at economic reasons for the change in the gas market.  
However, he claims that the EU process was weak and a partial failure in the 1990’s.  
Local markets, regional consumption, increased competition and access to the Eastern 
European market after 1990 explain the end of national governments as gatekeepers.  
He claims that liberalization efforts were located in the national state rather than 
pressed by the EU.  He points to individual changes and laws in individual countries.  
Competition is a result of international energy markets, and not pressed by EU 
liberalization politics.  In whole, he views liberalization efforts as not an evolution of 
already established markets and principles but rather a devolution of former models.  
To him market developments are primary to EU liberalization policies.  Regulation is 
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 the only method by which to ensure true TPA, as competition will push out new-
comers and smaller companies.  (Stern 1992; 119-123) 
My study focuses on institutional changes that have occurred from 1998 to 
2003, affecting relationships between gas companies and national governments.  
Although gas companies have not exerted major influence at the supranational or 
subnational levels, their policy influencing capabilities have increased at the national 
levels.  To understand the transformation of the European gas market, one must 
understand institutional dynamics at not just national levels, but at the European, 
national and regional levels in investigating where institutional change has occurred.   
 
1.4  Multi-Level Governance. 
I base my analytical approach on the Multi-Level Governance (MLG) 
conceptual model.  I also divide the empirical analysis into three chapters according 
to three MLG levels: supranational, national and subnational.  I have found that the 
regional level has not been incorporated into any aspect of liberalization decision-
making, being rather marginalized.  The supranational level has clearly dominated the 
entire process decision-making process, whilst the national level has acceded more to 
the EU than incorporated itself into common policy pronounced by member states’ 
policy prerogatives.  However it is at the national level where most institutional 
change occurs in order to fit into EU gas market liberalization policy. 
MLG attempts to outline the EU institutional system in a policy formation 
context.  Multi-Level Governance, although not a theoretical perspective, explains 
how policy formation and implementation function in a paradigm where the state is 
no longer the sole repository of influence.  Whereas all policy decisions traditionally 
occurred through the national level, MLG explains that political mechanisms and 
decision-making may occur at the supranational, national and subnational levels.  
Actors and organizations at those levels may or may not interact with each other.  
There also exists no system for proportional sharing of policy decision-making.  
MLG explains simply that in order to understand the current institutional structure of 
the EU system, a political scientist should research all three levels and possible 
interactions when approaching a policy area analysis.  According to Kohler-Koch 
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 (1999:5,14-23), the EU has created a governmental model based on networks, in 
which governmental authorities may cooperate at all levels with the rise of stronger 
institutional arenas and the lessened central importance of national governments.  
Governments with stronger core statist institutional structures will most change in 
order to fit into the network governance in the MLG conceptual model.  Perhaps the 
most interesting contribution of the MLG approach is the inclusion of the EU regions 
as possible actors in the enlarged EU paradigm. (Hooghe 1996; 8-19) (Jeffrey 2000) 
My MLG analytical approach is better discussed in chapter 3. 
 
1.5.1 Macro-Economic Models 
Since this is a study in institutional change, it would be natural to ask how the 
institutional arrangements have been transformed and then characterize their 
appearance.  When taking the core three countries of the EU, Great Britain, France 
and Germany, we see three distinct macro-economic models: the British neo-liberal 
model (Freeman 1989; Stern 1990,1998), the French state-dirigisme model (Jones 
2000; Schmidt 1992,1996; Feigenbaum 1985) and the German corporatist model 
(Freeman 1989; Herrigel 1996).  The EU has attempted to push gas liberalization 
towards deregulation and liberalization in the direction of the British model.   The 
degree of influence between industrial economic models and governmental social 
interests determine these models.  The neo-liberal model is preferred and advocated 
through the Commission’s work and certainly in the case of the gas market.  A 
general European shift towards the British neo-liberalist model has coincided well 
with policies creating an internal market.  In the neo-liberal model the government 
allows business the open environment to act according to mechanisms present in 
economic sectors.  Neo-liberals see government intrusion as an impediment to 
economic growth, therefore barriers must be removed.  The gas markets of Great 
Britain and the United States have often been promoted as models of liberalization. 
A state may concur with economic integration up to the level that its political 
or economic system requires adjustment.  Liberalization of the gas market incurs 
costs that transcend the energy policy sphere.  One expects that state-dirigisme 
models most poorly fit in a larger neo-liberalism system and that corporatism systems 
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 are slightly more welcome to the process when the corporatist model of information 
distribution and consultation continues between government and industry.(Eldevik 
1999: 37-39)  The shifting position of Germany from advocator to resistor to the 
Commission’s gas directives bespeaks of the purpose of market liberalization 
demanding a revision of traditional national institutions such as public service or 
federalist demarcation. 
 
1.5.2 State-Dirigisme 
In a traditional state-dirigisme system the government and its bureaucracy 
exercise authority over industrial policy without consulting societal interests.  
(Schmidt 1996)  In opposition to a pluralist society where national policy is produced 
through the input of interest groups both in and outside of the governmental 
apparatus, in a state-dirigisme model, the government produces national policy with 
the limited participation of interest groups.  Therefore, while an environmental group 
might partake in decision-making process in the various German governmental 
levels, a common policy influencing choice in France might involve the input of only 
parliamentarians and ministry officials. (Schmidt 1996:49)  By promoting industrial 
national champions, the state-dirigiste government can see that its policies are well 
implemented thereby increasing the legitimacy of its bureaucracy and its policies. 
To Feigenbaum (1985), state-dirigisme is more apparent through ‘public 
enterprise’ or government ownership in which the government is either a major 
shareholder or the exclusive owner.  He grounds the activism of the French state 
through a historical elite view.  An intellectual tradition stresses that collective 
interests are best conducted by a small group of enlightened technocrats who have 
been groomed to promote the functioning of the state.  A national cultural pattern has 
been formed through centuries of reverence to authority, the importance of guilds, 
and the centrality of the state in promoting societal freedoms after the revolution. 
According to Jones (1999:63-65), state-dirigisme in France began to take root 
in the late 1940’s as the government was the largest source of investment funds and 
grants to growing firms.  Therefore the French government had an undeniable control 
over firms’ strategies.  The government preferred to promote large national 
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 companies to order to create an independent inner market raising tariffs blocking 
foreign competition.  Post-War planning convinced the government to concentrate on 
key large-scale industries to complement an otherwise fragile medium- and small-
scale business sector that paled in terms of international competition.  Through a 
‘national champion policy’, the government pressed for horizontal and vertical 
integration in order to fund expensive national ventures, research, infrastructure and 
national employee compensation initiatives.  In the case of fledgling industries or 
newer large-scale sectors requiring large amounts of technical expertise and capital, 
the state believed itself better equipped to supply initial capital than a handful of 
nascent companies.  However according to Feigenbaum (1985) political rather than 
economic interests guided domestic economic policy.  As long as industries remained 
profitable, it was far easier to reap profits than restructure taxation.  The idea of 
public protection supported by the French government has a long revolutionary 
tradition.  The power of a strong state acts as a social stabilizer guarantying that 
French citizens are properly taken care of.  The French state protects personal 
liberties and social concerns for the working class while elitism is contained by 
ensuring that the upper classes serve the state. 
Dirigisme has long been the pattern of organization in the French gas market.  
Gaz de France has been ceded a practical monopoly on the French gas market with 
the government as its main investor and strategist.  Being a groomed nationalized 
company allowed GDF almost unlimited access to the French market, stable work for 
its employees and universal service to French citizens.  Because the state-dirigisme 
model is most unlike the liberalization model of the EU’s gas policies, the French 
market stands to undergo more encompassing institutional transformations than 
Germany. 
 
1.5.3 Corporatism 
A corporatist model is marked by the involvement of non-governmental actors 
in the policy forming process.  There exists a habitually expected integration 
mechanism in which non-governmental interest groups are encouraged and often 
expected to partake in the political process, even more so than in a neo-liberal 
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 model.(Anderson 1992:26-31)  The boundaries between bureaucratic and industrialist 
ambitions are often blurred in the political process.  Decisions are produced in 
participatory and power-sharing processes.  For example the drawing of national 
German laws requires: legislative negotiations between parties, regional labor and 
industrial interests, talks between the Länder and the national government, and not to 
mention municipal governments vested with discretionary budgetary power of over 
local matters.  This mechanism is a component of the federalist structuring of the 
German government, however the introduction of interest groups and industrial actors 
lying outside of the political apparatus is a key facet of all corporatist states. 
As an institutional model, corporatism is marked by a decreased importance of 
the state in performing policy formation in the governmental and industrial sectors 
and monitoring compliance through strict governmental oversight.  The federalist 
structure of the German government offers a comfortable fit for a corporatist model 
of governance.  Offering an industrial account of the German economic system, 
Herrigel outlines the German corporatist system through what he terms the 
decentralized industrial order. (Herrigel 1996)  The fragmented nature of German 
corporatism is a result of the strength of regional governments with differing taxation 
systems and infrastructures such as railroads and regional industries.  In industrial 
matters economic actors and their interests precede the state and bureaucracy in 
promoting economic policy.  Herrigel claims that the decentralized industrial order 
predates the founding of a German state.  The fragmented nature of various 
principalities other than the military prowess of Prussia left no large state to oversee 
and fund industrial expansion.  No colonies could fuel early industrialization with 
raw materials and forced labor.  Therefore bankers pragmatically understood their 
lucrative position of providing capital by pooling together short-term deposits to offer 
long-term investments and consultation to the industrial sector. 
Freeman (Freeman 1989:98-99,106-111,122-127) distinguishes European 
economic models between pluralist and corporatist: mixed political economy and 
private enterprise political economy.  In a corporatist-private enterprise economy the 
political process directs the level of influence between public and private interests for 
economic growth and public revenue.  However the private sector is acknowledged to 
 16
 best understand the functioning of a healthy economy, growth stimulation, avoid 
economic downturns, and when necessary, mitigate market failures.  Unions are more 
liable to negotiate with private sector officials than public bureaucrats.  Active 
government involvement in economic matters is seen as a barrier to growth, therefore 
the social planning involving the industrial sector attracts cooperation at the policy 
formation stage. 
In a corporatist-mixed political economy, industry is not always assumed to be 
best capable of economic policy formation.  Political considerations and election 
results set the cooperative agenda between public and private interests by an 
electorate more intent on improving and withholding welfare standards of living than 
capital creation.  Organized labor plays a constant role in negotiating on their terms.  
When labor finds negotiations with employee groups unsatisfactory, they readily turn 
to public channels of resolution. Whereas in corporatist private-enterprise economies, 
the government sees its intervention capabilities necessary to stimulate capital growth 
and economic stimulus, in an a corporatist-mixed political economy, the 
government’s role lies in balancing the same economic considerations with welfare in 
a Pareto optimal curve based on social rather than macroeconomic stability.  Without 
detailing its transformations, the twentieth century charted the transformation of the 
German model from the corporatist-private enterprise political economy to that of the 
corporatist-mixed political economy. 
Herrigel further decomposes the German form of corporatism as a 
decentralized industrial order which includes the risk-taking middle and small sized 
firms which had to compete against each other through flexibility and 
entrepreneurialism and the autarchic national order composed of large companies 
with strong connections to German banks and governmental apparatuses.(Herrigel 
1996:1-2)  He claims that the two-layered nature of German industry was a result of a 
post-Weimar arrangement in which the state could not offer enough support to 
German industry, thereby sharing economic policy with non-governmental actors  
Periods of economic stagnation swayed Germany towards the autarchic national order 
to sparking policies of national growth in opposition to the decentralized industrial 
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 order with its entrepreneurial potential during periods of economic health.(Herrigel 
1996:256) 
 
Level of Governmental Influence: 
Low      Medium                     High 
Level               High Neo-Liberalism   
 Corporatism  
  State-dirigisme 
Of         Medium 
Corporative                Low 
Independence 
 
1.6 Further Contents 
 
Chapter 2. Theory:  The differences between regulation, deregulation, liberalization 
and privatizations are outlined.  I discuss why I have chosen a theory based on 
institutional change, New Institutional Theory.  Lastly I introduce the key concepts of 
NIE which I use as my dependent variables in my empirical chapters: transaction 
costs, reductionism and property rights. 
 
Chapter 3.  Methodology:  I discuss my methodological structure based on the Multi-
Level Governance perspective and introduce it as my intervening intermediate 
variable.  After considering the limits of my comparative case study of the 
liberalization of the gas market in France and Germany, I discuss the research design.  
I conclude with the operalization of all variables. 
 
Chapter 4.  Supranational Level:  I begin with my overall argument that policy 
formation power has gravitated to EU bodies from other both regional and national 
levels.  I discuss the background of EU gas market policy.  My discussion is divided 
according to key actors and subdivided according to the 1998 and 2003 directives.  
The key actors discussed are the European Union – more precisely DG Tren and DG 
Comp of the EU Commission, German delegation, the German gas industry, the 
French delegation, the French gas industry, regions, and interest groups 
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Chapter 5.  National Level:  At the national level, I compare the transposition of EU 
gas policy in France and Germany.  I posit that national discussions are not focused at 
the supranational but at the national level.  At this level I discover gravitation towards 
neo-liberalist policy, and search for the extent of this transformation.  The actors 
discussed are: in France, the Prime Minister, the Minister of energy, the General 
Assembly, the Senate, French gas operators, interest groups; in Germany: interest 
groups – particularly the representatives of the gas industry and gas consumers, the 
minister of industry and labor, the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, large gas companies, 
and the Bundeskartellamt. 
 
Chapter 6.  Subnational Level:  I find that too few structural transformations have 
transpired at the subnational level to conclude that any true institutional changes have 
occurred.  I discuss what changes have occurred due to EU gas liberalization policy.  
I also investigate whether the subnational level has any influence on gas policy 
formation. 
 
Chapter 7.  Summary and General Conclusion:  Summarization of the three empirical 
chapters is employed: to evaluated the central research questions, the utility of the 
Multi-Level Governance paradigm and how macro-economic models of state and 
industrial relations in the gas sectors of France and Germany may be characterized. 
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 Chapter Two Theoretical Basis 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Political Economy Framework 
This study is motivated by transformations in institutional structures.  By the 
end of chapter three I will have introduced and have rendered operational all key 
concepts of institutions used in analyzing institutional change in this study, 
specifically: corporatism, state-dirigisme, reductionism, transaction costs, property 
rights and the Multi-Level Governance perspective.  In my empirical chapters I 
search for evidence of institutional change from state-dirigisme in France and from 
corporatism in Germany.  
In this theoretical chapter I begin by discussing the choices governments have 
in sector dynamics when applying EU common market policies through the key 
concepts of privatization, liberalization, deregulation and regulation.  I discuss how 
institutional change can be used to achieve these transformations by defining 
institutions and organizations.  I continue by explaining why I have not chosen public 
choice and European integration theories in formulating my theoretical basis.  I then 
discuss why I have chosen New Institutional Economics Theory(NIE).  I thereafter 
employ the central NIE theoretical concepts that add analytical order to my study – 
namely, transaction costs, reductionism, property rights.  These central concepts are 
the dependent variables which I employ in analyzing change at each methodological 
level in the empirical chapters.   
 
2.2.1 Choices in sector dynamics  
Liberalization is often not clearly explored and presented in the scholarly work 
of EU policy.  The term is deceivingly enmeshed in notions of privatization, 
denationalization, deregulation and regulation.  In part, the Commission is vague in 
defining liberalization, as it would imply tactical requirements, which would 
transcend the non-national provisions of directives as outlines for market integration.  
Liberalization also provokes divergent debates at the national level.  While in France 
liberalization is understood as implying privatization and thus a fundamental attack 
on principles of public service and ownership of GDF, in Germany fears extend to 
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 regulating an industry that should be self-equilibrating.  The EU increasingly 
relegates liberalization to quantitative benchmark measurements of how the new 
entrants quantitatively and qualitatively enter energy markets.  With complete market 
opening, the EU is able to remold internal markets by changing rules that impose 
increased transaction costs. 
 
2.2.2 Privatization 
Privatization is not an explicit parameter of EU policy because outlining the 
transferring of public property to private hands transcends the liberalization strategies 
of EU directives.  Privatization policies thus originate at the national level.  A 
company may experience complete privatization, or gradual partial privatization that 
may be termed private transferring of ownership, or as in the case of France, opening 
of capital.  There exist various variants to privatization including contracting, 
majority public ownership, unbundling, and partial privatizations.  A partial opening 
of capital may signal that resistance to privatization exists amongst various actors, the 
government is not certain that privatization is the correct strategy, the government 
expects to internationalize its sector, or that foreign competition is seen to threaten an 
industrial sector.  A government’s choice to privatize underscores its belief in the 
private over the public-sector model. 
 
Private Sector Model    Public Sector Model 
1. Individual choice in the market    1. Collective choice in the polity 
2. Demand and price    2. Need for resources 
3.Closure for private action   3. Openness for public action 
4.The equity of the market    4. The equity of need 
5.The search for market satisfaction  5. The search for justice 
6. Customer sovereignty    6. Citizenship 
7. Competition as the instrument of the market 7. Collective action as the 
    instrument        market 
8.”Exit” as the stimulus    8. Voice as the condition 
(Hodge 2000: 54) 
 
The argument that private sector enterprises are more efficient in profit 
maximization fails to account for the structural institutional aspects of why the 
change from public to private ownership occurs.  In many cases state enterprises are 
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 more profitable and competitive than their private competitors and a loss in profit 
may be of a considerable loss to the national budget. (Vickers 39-43)  Decisions to 
privatize are culled through policy making decisions reflecting: constraints presented 
by the international system of competition and regulation, structure of state 
companies, the governmental theoretical approach and public choice theory of the 
political process.(Hoope 1997:7)  Vickers (1990:chp 2) grounds the distinction 
between private and public sector companies in ownership and incentives, 
competitive forces and theories of regulation.  According to principal-agent theory, 
the public agent ceases to function efficiently when the welfare-maximization and 
distribution duties are trumped by agents’ personal interests.  In this case, market-
control mechanisms such as monitoring by powerful and wealthy principals 
shareholders, the fear of bankruptcy, and takeovers induce the agent to share 
transaction costs with the principal, thereby pushing for privatization.  In developing 
the principal-agent theory, there may exist many principal-agent relationships, 
privatization is assumed to scale down the links from voter to government to firm by 
tightening the relationship between the monitoring capabilities of the principal, which 
may be a shareholder to the enterprise.   
The French experience with privatization has occurred in waves with the 
government bargaining politically to avoid civil disruptions.  Initially privatization 
ideology centered not on an Anglo-American philosophy of neo-liberalization as 
much as a Gaullist concern towards participation by all sectors of French society. 
(Dumez 1994:88-89)  Privatization encircles an increasingly European integrationist 
perspective.  The French argument for privatization initiated with: a desire to 
disengage unprofitable companies in the mid-eighties, a drive for efficiency in the 
late nineties, and in 2003, preparing companies to compete on a European level.  
Perhaps the most decisive reason of a government’s decision to privatize is 
attempting to balance the national budget through lucrative sales of public sector 
companies. (Interview 05.06.2003)  
Conversely, Germany traditionally has had a smaller public sector.  Also 
unlike France, Germany never experienced large-scale post-war nationalization 
schemes.  The public-sector may rest in the hands of the Länder or of other regional 
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 authorities instead of the federal government.  With the exception of the reintegration 
of Eastern Germany, privatization philosophy has never been a clear prerogative of 
the federal government as important large and import export-driven private industries 
have always been more profitable while at the same time aware of labor-sector 
considerations.(Esser 1994:116)  In addition, welfare issues, public service and social 
responsibility are not addressed through industrial policy and therefore are not the 
responsibility of firms.  It is the state that must provide for the well-being of its 
citizens.  The stability of the German economy has not provoked any prolonged 
privatization discussion at the federal level.(Interview 02.06.2003)  The federalist 
structure of the governmental system in Germany has not experienced noticeable 
reorganization of its public sector.(Harrinvirta 2000)   
 
2.2.3 Regulation and Deregulation 
Regulation and deregulation are not necessarily antonyms; neither are they 
opposing processes.  In many cases deregulation may simultaneously include 
regulation.  Deregulation refers to the easing of rules governing industrial behavior.  
Competition allows for market forces instead of social considerations to dictate 
priorities.  Ideally the industrial sector creates more wealth for society through 
taxation and employment than through government participation and intervention.  
Oversight may not completely disappear, yet instances of abuse are transferred to a 
limited single-basis concept investigated through adjudication instead of enforcement 
by standard administrative procedure.  Deregulation can also signify a clearer 
division of responsibilities between the market and the public sector.(van Bergeijk 
1996:8-9)  This separation may be due to technological or intellectual advances that 
the public sector may not be swift enough in comprehending;  Its intervention may be 
viewed as counterproductive.  In certain instances, uniformly applies standards by a 
particular industry may satiate a government’s need for regulation. 
Regulation may indeed be introduced to ensure market liberalization.  
Unsurprisingly, regulating is the central component of regulation.  An ideal regulator 
in a neo-liberal context is impartial and independent; ensuring that the optimal 
balance between supply and demand is maintained.  Regulating bodies should be 
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 more competent than the companies embedded in a particular industry because they 
should possess knowledge over the entire industry.  In the French context, the CRE 
gas regulator is minimally attached to the government and but endowed with the task 
of ensuring that customers pricing is held at a socially premium level.  In Germany 
the regulator may be indeed be so independent and the corporative compromise 
system between supplies and consumers be so entrenched, that the regulator can often 
sidelined to ministerial decisions.  Whereas deregulation is mostly used to increase 
self-controlling mechanisms of the market, regulation according to its paradigms and 
the wishes of the government may press for control as well as advocacy of market 
mechanisms.   
Newbury (1999: Chp 4) distinguishes between normative, positive as well as 
interest group theories of regulation.  The normative theoretical dimension informs a 
regulator to base action according to welfare maximization and public interest which 
may not represent the wishes of all actors.  The positive dimension is akin to public 
choice theory in which the considerations of all actors, consumers as well as 
suppliers, are considered to inform actions that protect all parties.  The notion is that 
the level of governmental insight is proscribed by an optimal situation for all 
suppliers as well as consumers.  The interest group dimension promotes the notion 
that certain interest groups are weaker than others and therefore must be protected 
through regulation that may be deleterious to stronger interest groups.  An optimal 
situation is never attainable and not all suppliers or consumers are treated according 
to sector or individually.  Like the form and level of privatization, the Commission is 
unclear what the optimal form of regulation is to be created at the national level. 
 
2.2.4 Liberalization 
Liberalization in a purely EU context is thought of as the ‘free movement of 
goods, capital, labor and services’ between member states as outlined in the 1957 
Treaty of Rome.  This may be interpreted as: partially dependent on public support 
for integration, and concurrent with increasing European sentiment at the national 
level(Gabel 1998), introducing competition into sectors easily disposed to monopoly 
or oligopoly (Newbury 1999), or elimination of trade barriers, allowing for sectors to 
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 integrate themselves through internal inertia (Tsoukalis 1992).  Standard references 
portray liberalization as a voluntary expansive policy.  Yet liberalization requires a 
reworking of markets structures in order to instigate free movement, and often 
through negative integration in which the EU bodies play an overtly regulatory role 
over the liberalization process.  Liberalization is more encompassing than regulation, 
deregulation or privatization because it requires a fundamental reworking of amongst 
others: legislation, regulatory bodies, breaking of monopolies, restructuring industries 
through unbundling or privatization, development of new infrastructure, tarification, 
and principals contradictory to social principals.  EU liberalization policies can 
increase the number of companies such as in the telecom sector or decrease or 
marginalize companies such as in the airline sector.   
Liberalization has become the central policy concern of the EU since the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Institutions affect decision-making, but not uniformly and strictly.  
It is actors who weigh benefits and interests, along with transaction costs in order to 
form decisions that propel institutional change.(Knill chp 2).  Liberalization politics 
in the form of directives are propelled more by individual motives than by 
institutional inertia.  However this applies to changes in macro-political directions or 
application of specific cases than liberalization politics over long periods.  This 
reductionist aspect directs my case study’s inquiry into directive formation and 
application at all MLG levels.  If applying the Nash equilibrium, liberalization occurs 
to a degree that is not optimal for an individual party but to all negotiation members, 
stability trumps individual interest maximization.  In the following visual model a 
control gap exists between inputs and outputs.  A government or the EU defines the 
goals of is liberalization process through various measures, tools or inputs.  Because 
liberalization requires redefining rules and paradigms, the process is more complex 
and encompassing than a narrow policy initiative such as adjusting trade barriers.  In 
the case of EU liberalization, readjusting policy on an incremental basis at success 
stages occurs.  Outputs do not necessarily match input goals due to the control gap 
which comprises negotiation at the EU level and translation and implementation of 
liberalization policy at the sub-EU levels.  
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 Inputs   Control Gap           Outputs 
 
 
 
Evaluation and necessary adjustments to inputs 
 
2.3 Theoretical Implications   
Proper methodology requests that theory define the interpretational 
mechanisms of empirical data.  Theory and empirical data test validity reciprocally 
and offer points of contact with other case studies observing differing phenomena.  
As mentioned, transaction costs, reductionism and property rights become the 
empirical chapters’ variables.  Transaction costs are not limited to the production 
costs of reorganizing distribution.  They involve the imposition of new inter-
European frameworks and transferring competencies appropriately as desired by the 
Commission.  Gathering information to function in a larger market, adding legal 
capabilities to handle new regulations, lobbying at all MLG levels, and redefining 
industrial relations offer sizable transaction costs as a result of EU liberalization 
policies.  Because NIE, unlike other institutional theories, has been inspired by 
economic dynamics, institutions are not progressions of statically-mind groupings or 
organizations.  There are specific actors who wield transformative authority and 
fashion the direction of institutions.  Gas policy does not receive the public scrutiny 
of European citizens.  There exist only few central actors who exert the will and 
influence to mold institutional transformations.  The crux of NIE lies in the negation 
of rational static equilibria.  Institutions are constantly transforming entities.  These 
are the theoretical implications with which the variables are applied. 
 
2.4 Choice of Theory 
2.4.1 Integration Theories 
European integration theories such as neofunctionalism (Keohane 2001; 
Hoffman 2001) and neo-sociological theory (Andersen, Svein 2000c) respond to the 
problem of the limits posed by more classical theories such as liberal 
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 intergovernmentalism (Ruggie 1998) and such as realism (Moravcsik 1993, 1998; 
Mearsheimer 1994) by inquiring into the purpose, nature, identity and existence of 
the EU as a non-state institution and organization.  The EU can be thought of not 
fitting into the classical definition of statehood yet is concomitantly more powerful 
than a multi-national organization such as the OSCE for example.  In addition the 
European Union is still not easily depicted as it is sui generis, its future expansion is 
unknown, and academics play a vital role in directing the formation of the EU 
through theoretical work.  European integration theories explain the continuous 
formation of the EU as found in ‘multiple interactions as it is about developing 
feelings for the play of collective European governance and polity-building, as well 
as the inevitable normative and ethical questions to which these processes give 
rise’.(Chryssochoou 2001: 8-9)  However European integration theories do not offer 
sufficient explanatory elegance for the research questions posed.  My case study’s 
explicative purpose is not only the relationship between state and the EU at the 
supranational level, but also the transforming relationship between industry and 
national government at national and regional levels.   
 
2.4.2 Public Choice 
Theories of public choice in political science are more adept in accounting for 
economic perspectives at any governmental level.  Public choice’s weakness lies in 
strictly applying neo-liberal economic principals to political phenomena while largely 
neglecting transformations and costs that cannot be explained through rational 
models.(Mueller 1997;McLean 1987;Dunleavy 1991;Heap 1992)  Its focus on 
endogenous factors lacks a mature institutional perspective to incorporate intangible 
goods and the role of public goods. 
 
There exist four general components of public choice: 
1. Individuals form the basis for decisions and behavioral patterns for institutions 
and political entities. 
2. Individuals possess specific tastes and identifiable preferences that they 
attempt to maximize. 
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 3. Individuals are selfish and individual gains trump collective interests. 
4. One can understand and predict behavioral patterns if once preferences, tastes 
and desires. 
 
Obsessions with rational decision-making in certain variants of modern political 
science, whether game theory, public choice, or institutionalism render useful within 
theoretical limits or assessing outcome possibilities.  However it is too narrow in 
entertaining possible outcomes not at all interpreted through rational choice, 
especially in complex political arenas where a plethora of ideas, preferences and 
choices are not always the result of individual behaviors and tastes.  At times the 
action of policy-making may be haphazard due to vague knowledge of preferences or 
self-interests.  Inversely, the inputs considered to weigh upon decision-making may 
be so complex and detailed, forcing uncertain decision-making on the part of political 
actors.  Public choice believes in an optimal state such as found in the balancing of 
supply and demand in economics or Pareto-optimality.  New Economic 
Institutionalism although initially cumbersome when interpreting empirical data, 
offers the elegant explanations in understanding sector dynamics occurring at all 
governance levels. 
 
2.5 Defining Institutions  
A major weakness of NIE (Demsetz 2000;Mäki 1993;North 
1990,1993,1995;Williamson 1984, 1985, 1986) in opposition to older institutional 
economic theories counterparts (Commons 1934;Schumpeter 1943,1968;Veblen 
1914, 1923) is its normative deficiencies.  Older institutional economic theorists 
focused on the specific defining attributes of institutions; how they produced 
decisions; how they effected economic change.  NIE theorists are more concerned 
with how institutions function in terms of more abstract variables such as 
reductionism, transaction costs and property rights.  There appear to be varying 
conceptions of what constitutes an institution even amongst scholars of the same 
theoretical schools in New Institutional Economics.(Ankarloo 1999) (Rutherford 
1994) (Stettler 1999)  Institutions can be claimed to be regimes, rules, physical 
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 entities and groupings of like-minded individuals.  The frameworks set by institutions 
guide systems’ preferences and rules.  In addition, one cannot calculate the costs of 
operating empirically or theoretically in an institutional prism through mere demand 
and supply; even transactions have costs in themselves and are not evident or 
transparent.  One point of clarity among both old and new institutional economic 
theories is that institutions allow transactions in the form of collective decisions to be 
more efficiently conducted.  NIE is bound in the idea that institutions gain legitimacy 
because they reduce the uncertainty of conducting transactions due to their 
institutional logic of appropriateness.  I base my understanding of institutions by 
defining organizations distinctly from institutions. 
Initially I claim that institutions are generic and replicable whereas 
organizations are specific to a polity or culture.  In terms of this study corporatism 
and state-dirigisme are institutions.  Institutions are composed by rules, both informal 
and formal.  Formal institutions are legislatures, juries or firms and informal 
institutions such as democracies, due process, and international trade are not bound to 
specific cultures.  They may be abstractly decomposed, studied, improved and 
reorganized.  Institutional permanence is determined by the ability to present 
diminishing transaction costs in political or economic relations.  Informal institutions 
are the result of interactions between organizations or actors such as corporatism and 
dirigisme, and how actors relate to each other.  The challenge for institutional 
theorists is placing the EU in an appropriate institutional category because it is 
neither a multilateral institution, but rather a unique phenomenon.  The EU is an 
organization.  How the EU behaves and functions in its institutional structure is still 
baffling as it is a sui generis organization.  Organizations are static and more abrupt 
in their appearance and disappearance.  The dismantling of one organization does not 
directly affect the abstract or normative existence of other organizations.  
Organizations relate to each other as organizations.  The Bundesrat, the Commission, 
BWG, the city of Frankfurt, Ruhrgas, the Bundeskartellamt, etc are organizations.   
 
2.6.1 New Institutional Economics 
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 My use of NIE responds to my need in understanding how EU energy policy 
from 1998-2003 has affected institutional change in the relationships between 
governments and gas companies of France and Germany as a result of the 
restructuring of the European gas market.  I have culled the three relevant NIE 
concepts into my variables: 1. transaction costs, 2. reductionism, 3. property rights I 
apply these variables in the comparative case study in order to test which variables 
explain the institutional transformations occurring in the framework of this case 
study.   
 The largest cause of disagreement in NIE literature is whether economic 
growth fuels institutional innovation or whether institutional innovation fuels 
economic growth as a catalyst of change.  I contend that economic growth fuels 
institutional innovation as the French and German governments have become more 
willing to institute the requirements of the 2003 directive allowing their national 
companies to profit from larger trans-European gas markets.  Douglas North 
(1993:254) accords institutional transformations to political or economic 
entrepreneurs who identify personal gains through institutional change, and in many 
cases technical change.  Others believe that institutions evolve in their environmental 
context.  Hodgeson (1993) and Williamson (1996) posit their arguments in a 
framework transaction costs.  Demsetz (2000,1985) points to resource endowments 
and the transfer of property rights.   
According to Harriss in a broadly acceptable manner, “New Economic 
Institutionalism starts from the reality that information is rarely complete, and that 
individuals have different ideas (or mental models) of the way in which the world 
about them works.  Transactions thus have costs associated with them which are 
assumed not to exist in the neo-classical model: these are the costs of finding out 
what the relevant prices are, of negotiating and of concluding contracts, and then of 
monitoring and enforcing them.  Institutions are broadly defined as means of 
reducing these information and transaction costs.”  (Harriss et al. 3: 1995) 
 
 
2.6.2  Analytical Basis of NIE 
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 Neo-liberal models best explain how a rational elastic market devoid of 
governments function without accounting for the organizational and social 
dimensions of various economic systems and their idiosyncrasies which are not 
mathematically fungible.  In many respects, neo-liberal economics proposes an ideal 
market devoid of rules beyond the purely economic.  NIE attempts to incorporate the 
various factors that portray economic systems as a formation of accepted rules and 
the reasoning behind rules’ transformations.  For example in institutional absence, 
information on national pricing would not exist, rather left settled between buyer and 
seller during every new transaction.  Companies would not know how to furnish their 
markets effectively.  Disagreement would occur over the possession of property.  A 
chaotic market burdened by expensive transaction costs would not supply markets 
according to expectations - neither profitable for consumers nor for suppliers.  
According to Coase (1937), institutions exist because they contain and decrease 
transaction costs.  Because information gathering is costly and difficult to compile, 
nationally accepted economic rules mitigate economic confusion.  Yet, even with 
complete information it is difficult to act rationally.  Institutions respond to the lack 
of rationality by providing uniformity and order, allowing organizations to function 
horizontally.  NIE claims that economic structures are reflected through their 
institutional arrangements.  NIE scholars look at how institutions inform economic 
activity and how institutions are consciously arranged to take advantage of economic 
development. 
 
2.6.3 Institutions in NIE 
According to NIE, institutions are formed because they offer greater economic 
rewards through cooperation, efficiency and more rational decision-making.(Stettler 
1999:3-6)  Institutions are created and formed because they decrease the transaction 
costs of conducting transactions on an individual basis.  The ordering of institutional 
frameworks is refined to interact with the changing possibilities offered by the 
liberalization of the European gas market.  France and Germany have traditionally 
had different institutional frameworks ordering their national gas markets because 
transaction costs were dependent on the national frameworks not on a larger EU 
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 framework.  However the liberalization of the gas market has placed new transaction 
costs on the gas industry therefore a different institutional framework is required.  
One would expect a movement towards similar types of institutional frameworks as 
both countries increasingly respond to similar transaction costs.   
There is an important difference between organizations and institutions in NIE 
literature.  Institutions are thought of as rules or guidelines that bind organizations 
together.  Institutions can be thought of formal rules exposed in laws and regulations 
or informal rules establishing behavioral patterns regarding how organizations or 
individuals relate to each other, such as between governments and gas companies.  
Institutions are accompanied with oversight or regulation to ensure their functioning.  
Organizations are thought of as the results of the entities allowed or outlined in 
institutional rules.(North 1993)  Therefore the orderings of corporatism and state-
dirigisme can be thought of institutions embodying both informal and formal rules 
whilst governmental bodies, gas companies and other entities such as regulatory 
authorities or interest groups involved in the functioning of the gas market can be 
understood as organizations. Organizations also can be thought of containing 
individuals within the institutional framework.(Furubotn 1997;7)    
According to Kasper (1998; 28-31) institutions require a common sanctioning 
in order to attain applicability, not all institutions expose positive effects to their 
members.  Kasper makes two further important distinctions between internal 
institutions and external institutions.  Internal institutions are the informal institutions 
that have evolved from human experience, where as external institutions are imposed 
and enforced from a higher authority.  Finally institutions in addition to normal neo-
classical price constraints affect the choices taken by organizations.  Williamson 
(1984:195) tell us that organizations and firms are the results of governmental 
structures.  The question once again becomes whether institutions affect individuals’ 
behavior or whether individuals guide institution choices.  I have found in this study 
that institutions transform themselves according to transaction costs until a key 
individual or a group of key individuals decides to consciously rework institutional 
frameworks.  Shifting property rights are more the effects than the causes of 
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 institutional transformation.  This is an important point in understanding whether 
institutions are the ‘made order’ or ‘spontaneous growth’.   
 
2.6.4 Institutional changes according to NIE 
 My variables, reductionism, transaction costs and property rights are proposed 
as the most important reasons for institutional change within the context of New 
Institutional Economic Theory.  Efficiency is interpreted by Stettler (1999:82,97) to 
be the motivation behind all institutional change.  When rents or production can be 
made more efficient, institutional change occurs.  This could be thought of as lying in 
a public choice or even a neo-liberal economic direction; however New Institutional 
Economics stresses the bounded rationality of its actors bounded by the information 
constraints of operating within their own institutions.  Institutions exist to allocate 
resources more efficiently between large groups of people willing to cooperate with 
each other, therefore the choice of property rights requires institutional change so that 
individuals can cooperate more efficiently and minimize external effects deleterious 
to efficiency.  The choice of governmental structures is the optimal solution in overall 
systemic efficiency.  In addition, when hierarchies occur, institutional structures 
become focal.  External institutions require political entrepreneurship by political 
agents as explicit rules must be changed if the existing rules are not able to adapt in 
increasing efficiency.  
Another catalyst to change is the force of globalization where competition at 
the economic level forces governments to impose institutional changes, termed by 
Kasper as ‘institutional competition’.(Kasper 1998:395-397)  NIE theorists often 
speak of equilibrium which can be equated to optimal movements towards efficiency.  
Bromley (1989:12-34) finds the overall camps of institutional change to be motivated 
by four differing view points.  I place those points in terms of relevance as reflected 
through my empirical research:  First, a hierarchical level in which institutional 
change is sifted from policy levels to organizational levels and then further to the 
operational level.  Second, the North model in which overall institutional 
environments affects change.  Third, a property-rights view in which principal agents 
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 attempt to increase their share of property rights.  Fourth, induced institutional change 
by as a result of technical change.   
Williamson (1996:324) stresses that governance structures tie individuals to 
their institutional environment.  Institutional reform ultimately affects the fairness of 
property rights for all those involved.  NIE theorists generally emphasize that 
institutions are neither perfect nor complete.  Strong institutions are marked by 
pliable mechanisms allowing them to internally adapt to external influences, from 
mundane rules to violent irrational occurrences.  This can be extended to notions of 
attempted efficiency in an irrational universe that refutes the possibility of pareto-
equilibrium. (Furubotn 11:1991), actor-driven initiatives in opposition to the ‘rules of 
the game’ (North 1990:8; Pejovich 1995:37), game theory purists (Aoki 2000:12), 
Smithian ‘invisible-hand explanations’ (Rutherford 1994,1983), competition and 
efficiency (Anakarloo 1996:29), change driven by external changes due to economic 
growth or in Schumperian terms of technological improvements (Yeager 1999:47), 
and social value. (Tool 1997:843)  My empirical conclusions as discussed in my final 
chapter sway towards the notions proposed by North and Pejovich of institutional 
changes most clearly molded by actor-driven initiatives. 
 NIE theorists are often criticized for not taking a holistic view of institutions 
and for not being able to provide enough statistic modeling to describe institutional 
evolution.  Pejovich (1995) proposes that information gathering is more akin to a 
knowledge-creating competitive process.  In relating information gathering to 
opportunity costs, new information allows actors to reform old systems through 
changing rules and frameworks in order to exploit new opportunities.  “Innovation 
could be the development of a new good, the opening up of a new market, a new 
source of supply, a new method of production or a new method for reducing 
transaction costs.  Innovation explicates the meaning of economic development into 
the expansion of choices” (Pejovich 1991:159).  Furthermore, an actor’s freedom to 
innovate is defined by an institution’s rules and spontaneous rather than 
evolutionary.(Rutherford 1994:83)   
 Many NIE theorists such as North, deny that merely rational actors and 
technical efficiency are the most decisive factors in causing swift institutional 
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 evolution.  Because cognitive limitations do exist, and the gathering of information 
presents a heavy transaction cost, institutional evolution occurs due to instructionist 
mechanisms replacing the Darwin selectionist proposals of institutionalists during the 
early twentieth century.(Drobak 1997:349)  North believes that institutional changes 
are adaptive to external transaction costs in addition to being allocated by third 
parties with agents taking advantage of opportunities.(North 1993: 257)   My research 
is in accord with the case that the liberalization of the gas market is due to strong 
entrepreneurs and external transaction costs.  More than transaction costs, legislation 
penetration is most effective in instances where strong actors are close to the EU 
legislative process, thereby causing abrupt transformations in policy.  Information 
gathering affects the nature of institutional change in a functional manner where new 
information is added to actors’ prior knowledge, unlike the supposition of neo-liberal 
economics which depict economic decisions based in short-term information on cost 
and technology.  I found that the concepts of technological efficiency and its benefits 
discussed in NIE literature to not be a relevant variables in institutional dynamics.   
 Imperfect reality shows that transaction costs are never zero, preferences shift 
and individuals are constrained by bounded rationality, lending the possibility of 
mathematical modeling in proposing a preferable system rather than normative 
shifting realities.(Furubotn 1991: 359 -360)  Because institutional dynamics respond 
to containing transaction costs, following the transformation of formal and informal 
rules empirically explain organizational changes.  Costs such as larger distribution 
demands, increased competition, and new post-ante rules can be contained through 
vertical and horizontal integration, which also have their own costs.  Because of these 
larger decisions are reasons lying outside of neo-liberalist paradigms based on 
concepts external to the functioning of governments such as globalization, 
information-gathering, and technological innovation, governments continuously adapt 
their institutional structure to benefit from changes in the market.  In sum, NIE is 
valuable to my study because it proposes that institutional changes are not 
unintentional and may occur in response to a plethora of tertiary conditions lying 
outside supply and demand considerations.  Once again I concentrate on the 
transaction costs, reductionism and property rights variables. 
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2.6.5 Reductionism  
 In NIE, individual actors become concerted agents for institutional change.  
Underpinning the notion of institutions is a sense of cooperation between individual 
for collective gains.(Stettler 1999:chp 1)  The principle-agent theory outlines the 
duties of a agents acting on behalf of their principles.(Knudsen  1993:275)  Also 
embedded in NIE is the notion of bounded rationality.  Because there exist too many 
individual precedents, the agent makes public choices according to his best 
knowledge.  The agent is also entitled with the power to control common property 
rights through either formal and informal contracts.(Richter 1998:285-292)  
Williamson calls these formations of agents, bureaucracies or hierarchies with each 
head agent responsible for the decisions of a particular division. (Williamson 
1996:17-18)   
 Scharpf (1999) explains that institutional change in an NIE context occurs 
through the desires of actors imbedded in institutions who define their own 
advancement with that of institutional change.  Therefore entrepreneurial actors are at 
the core of institutional change.  Bounded rationality is the outcome of institutional 
frameworks and the impossibility of all possible information.  However those agents 
who affect institutional change possess more information than their counterparts.  
Because not all individuals possess influence capabilities in larger organizational 
settings, there exists a division between entrepreneur-coordinators and 
implementation agents in policy-making.  Capable decision-making actors are aware 
of this constant knowledge deficiency and attempt to collect only relevant 
information.  
 The interests of key individuals may often trump collective will.  To Oliver 
Williamson, “atmosphere implies that changes to exchange relationships can 
encourage or discourage altruism, trust, and cooperativeness, and that organizational 
effectiveness has to be viewed more broadly than the usual efficiency calculus would 
dictate.”(Rutherford 1995:49)  The NIE individual’s maximization tendencies are 
limited by rules and closeness to the goods being transacted.  It could be assumed that 
an individual in a public organization would exhibit less maximization 
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 characteristics, but as we shall see in the supranational leval, a public actor is closer 
to and therefore seek influence and information instead of money and physical goods.  
Rules may also inform the interests of individuals rather than conversely.  An 
individual who conducts contractual negotiation identifies personal maximization 
according to institutional rules and transaction costs decision considerations.  Lastly, 
individuals enter institutions with formed biases and competencies that may explain a 
sudden change in organizations’ decision-making patterns – as shown through the 
change of governments and governmental posts at the national level.  Therefore 
governmental and industrial positions are often better explained by understanding 
factors of an individual’s decision-making and the organizations in which they are 
embedded rather than purely charting holistic and exogenous institutional 
transformations.  
 
2.6.6 Transaction Costs 
 Transaction costs are the costs surrounding economic, political or social 
exchanges.  Furubotn (1997; 42-47) identifies the following seven transaction costs as 
most important: search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs,  
supervision and enforcement costs, managerial transaction costs, the costs of setting 
up an organization, the costs of maintaining an organization and political transaction 
costs.  For example, how communal energy is supplied is dependent on the political 
organization of the municipality, how information regarding energy supply is 
organized, the time placed in negotiations, the strength of the institutional 
endowment, what parties are present and how effectively they relate to each other, 
what political exchanges are sacrificed to conclude energy supply - in addition to the 
costs identified through neo-classical modeling.  The sum of conducting these 
transactions costs individually is superior to the efficiency of conducting transactions 
through institutions.  At the microeconomic level, transaction costs should be added 
to production costs and “define, protect and enforce the property rights to 
goods”.(North 1990:28).  Institutions’ forms and sizes are the result of responding to 
these costs.  Vromen (1995:50) speaks of selection mechanisms by political actors in 
replacing the ‘invisible hand’ with the ‘visible hand’ to perpetuate abrogated 
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 institutional rules invariably increasing short-term costs in order to not jeopardize 
long-term transaction costs.  Institutional changes are very costly and only occur 
when exterior parameters change thereby relegating former institutions too weak to 
respond to new costs 
 Williamson (1995: 20-22) distinguishes between ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs in contract forming.  Ex-ante costs surround those costs in forming a 
transaction or contract, such as negotiation, deliberation, or each time a MLG level 
prepares gas liberalization legislation for ratification.  Ex-post costs denote the costs 
of ascertaining the legitimacy of those transactions or contracts, such as regulation, 
anti-trust persecution or other legal action.  Contracts specifying formal rules in NIE 
are thought to work well in complex institutions, especially public institutions with 
many actors and transactions where credible accountability is a basis for long-term 
stability.  However adherence to informal rules is also vital in filling the gaps 
between formal rules that may in fact be cumbersome or unnecessary.  For example, 
to gas companies, long-term take-or-pay commitment are dependent on the proper 
contractual mixture of formal and informal rules in instances of deregulated markets 
in which exogenous changes affect the shape of future contracts.(Masten:1985)  
Therefore a change in formal ex-ante costs due to EU liberalization policy eventually 
alters the ex-post contractual nature of gas supply to consumers and governments 
because new transaction costs arise and others become redundant: Once again 
pointing to my overall empirical finding that institutional change occurs within a 
hierarchical structure in which institutional change is sifted from policy levels to 
organizational levels and then further to the operational level.   
 NIE explains that institutions shift, transform or are replaced not by rational 
demand and supply calculations, but by transaction costs formations which are better 
explained by differing sets of rules, informal and formal constraints and property 
ownership.  Institutional shifts occur in minimizing these transaction costs because 
information is limited yet necessary to produce efficient economic systems.  Rules 
exist informally and haphazardly until they are codified formally.  Large entities such 
as institutions produce contracts to both decrease transaction costs and systematize 
rule cognition.  Therefore the EU, impeded by irrational prior knowledge does not 
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 impose a tailored system on the political economic institutions of France and 
Germany, but by adjusting the rules and shifting transaction costs, allows for a self-
guided transformation of national economies.  The Commission does not demand 
political reformation at the national levels, however according to NIE, economic 
systems are results of shifting political rules and political parameters rather than 
rational cost calculating societies.  The directives of 1998 and 2003 explicitly 
describe formal rules leaving the actors to create the informal rules present through 
acknowledged practices in the gas industry affecting institutional change.   
 
2.6.7 Property Rights 
 In my study, property rights denote shifting property rights in terms of gas 
company ownership.  However property rights tend to be of little importance.  
Negligible institutional transformations have occurred at the regional or subnational 
level where the largest shifting of property rights has occurred.  Conversely no 
property rights have occurred at the EU or supranational level and the national level 
where institutional change has occurred.   
 In neo-classical economics it is assumed that the market is best equipped to 
divide goods amongst citizens regardless of property rights ownership.  Marketing, 
transportation or extraction of gas can be protected against harmful external affects 
by shifting the property rights of gas to more competitive actors.  The transfer of 
property rights occur when transaction costs or external affects weaken the 
distribution of the gas, which, is in fact a common good or common property right.  
According to NIE, property rights transfers do not denote exclusive rights of goods 
considered to belong to the public domain - even though profits are no longer 
reverted to the government.  When private ownerships goods are defined as public 
domain, public actors may still define how they allow the public to access their goods 
through private concerns.  The rights of profit, how effectively the good is produced 
and decisions affecting its distribution are transferred along with a good’s property 
rights.  Property rights also define the ownership of a good and how that good is 
shared among individuals residing outside and inside of the ownership group.  
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 Therefore property right transfers occur under concerted efforts with much prior 
discussion between public and private actors.  (Stettler 1999:34, 39, 50)    
 In the case of the liberalization of the electricity market in the EU, institutional 
structures define the characteristics of differences between member states.  In 
responding to the reworking of electricity markets, states can either reevaluate their 
regulatory system or when necessary property rights. (Glachant 2000:322-333)  The 
state adds legitimacy to property rights by introducing a system of property that can 
be broadly accepted and legally regulated - for example deciding to what extent gas 
in France is a public or private right and how it is to be parceled among end 
consumers of gas, or in Germany the privatization of Stadtwerke.   
 Even though EU energy liberalization policy does not outline how gas rights 
are to be reordered, the internationalization of the system along with introduction of 
regulation render older systems not as effective to capitalize on larger gas markets, 
thus causing a reevaluation of property rights in both France and Germany.  
According to North the appropriation of property rights demands ‘legal rules, 
organizational forms, enforcement, and norms of behavior – that is, the institutional 
framework.’(North 1990:33)  The issue of property rights offers the most succinct 
understanding of institutional change occurring in Germany and France, extending 
beyond merely private or public ownership, or even a mixture between both.  This 
extends to including what expectations the state is allowed to retain from former 
public institutions – reverting us to the distinction between privatization, 
deregulation, regulation and liberalization in the beginning of this chapter, in addition 
to guarantees of public service and third party access which will reappear in the 
empirical chapters.    
 Although a private actor usually divides common goods in order to increase 
his profit he may not be coerced to act in such a matter.  Private actor with relative 
rights under the liberalization politics of the Commission could be expected to be 
present in all member states.  Explicit contracts become the key between state and 
industry along with sufficient oversight, because gas is a common good.  Increased 
competition, larger demand and supply, and increased service have become the 
reason for property rights transfers.  Structural uncertainty may also explain why the 
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 reallocation of resources may be more effective than recontracting.(Maki 1993:281)  I 
would expect this to occur in instances of large overall institutional change occurring 
in the European gas market.  Therefore it would be reasonable to assume that the 
liberalization of the gas industry would promote a general transfer of gas property 
rights in countries that are attempting to exploit larger European gas markets such as 
with traditionally public-owned companies such as GDF or smaller Stadtwerke in 
Germany. 
 Property rights are generally divided into two categories in NIE, absolute and 
relative.(Furubotn 1997:77)  A general trend that I have found in the European gas 
market is a movement from absolute to relative property rights in order to enable the 
free movement of gas.  Absolute property rights empower complete ownership and 
the power to exercise complete decision-making over a particular national or regional 
gas market.  Relative property rights are based on agreements describing limitations 
of ownership enabling a multitude of options in the EU’s drive towards the free 
movement of gas in Europe.  In many cases property rights are issued to develop 
infrastructure and ensure long-term contracting.  Governments may assign relative 
property rights to avoid market failure.  (Furubotn 1997, 122)  Accordingly, in 
considering relative property rights governments have the possibility of specifying 
site, physical asset, human capital and dedicated assets.  Not all rights are transferred 
with property right transfers (Williamson 1985:85)   The transferring of ownership of 
gas companies can be understood as residing in relative property right as energy is 
defined as a common good vital to industry and citizens’ wellbeing - even if the profit 
might ultimately belong to private actors.  A problem of overexploitation of common 
pools of goods such as gas in a market extremely defined by private actors often 
demands regulation.  Borrowing briefly from regulation theory (Eisner 2000; 5, 19-
22), the EU has inserted regulation clauses in the 2003 gas directive because as a 
relative property right, gas has been considered by the Commission a common good 
in the public’s interest with bureaucrats more adept than legislators in exercising their 
technical knowledge over the gas industry.   
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 2.7 Conclusion 
 In this theoretical chapter I have presented NIE as the basis for understanding 
and analyzing institutional change for the rest of this study.  I have singled out the 
relevant theoretical NIE concepts of reductionism, transaction costs and property 
rights as independent variables in identifying the non-spurious factors behind 
institutional change in the French and German gas markets.   
 Because differing strategies are possible to member states applying EU 
policies in national markets, I presented choices that governments may take in 
applying the 1998 and 2003 EU gas directives – namely privatization, regulation, 
deregulation and liberalization.  I then discussed the uniqueness of NIE to be found in 
its discussion of transaction costs, as institutions exist and are constantly dynamic 
because they adapt to constantly transforming transaction costs.  In the case of this 
study, transaction costs are tied to liberalization pressures posed by EU energy policy 
through the 1998 and 2003 gas directives, thus effecting institutional change.  I 
concluded this chapter by presenting the independent variables of reductionism, 
transaction costs, and property rights which analyze the empirical information 
presented in chapters 4-6.  The three variables are employed to qualify the type of 
institutional change in the gas sectors of Germany and France in the final summary 
and analysis chapter.  In addition to the variables based in my theoretical approach, I 
use the multi-level governance approach in my methodological structure.  Therefore 
it is necessary to introduce the multi-level governance approach in the following 
chapter – along with its usefulness to this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
 Chapter 3 Analytical Basis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I discuss the methodological approach of my study.  I begin 
with a discussion of the qualitative methodology used in this study, which includes 
the comparative case study, and research control parameters.  Thereafter I present the 
general concepts of the multi-level governance perspective.  I cull the MLG concepts 
most beneficial to this study and employ them as my intermediate variables - namely 
the supranational, national and subnational levels.  Lastly the information discussed 
in MLG and NIE is presented through three dependent variables and one intermediate 
variable. 
 
3.2 Methodological Considerations 
3.2.1 Qualitative 
My units of analysis, France and Germany, render the study’s MLG data pool 
a small n study most appropriate to qualitative methodology.  A quantitative approach 
would be more effective had this been a study comparing institutional dynamics 
among a plethora of regions and communes where actors number considerably more 
than those at national and supranational levels.  The qualitative method allows me to 
shift through large amounts of varying material: secondary, statistical, oral, archival 
and documentary evidence in a periodically unstructured or haphazard manner in 
order to uncover information that can be overlooked through quantitative research 
documentary.  Processing the data in a structured mathematical method would require 
increasing units of analysis in order to control the independent variables instead of 
drawing logical inferences through my explicative models.  This study also 
incorporates a historical presentation of the empirical data thickly bound to a 
theoretical model analyzing how institutional changes may have occurred in an 
unanticipated and heteroscedastictic process that renders the quantitative method 
weaker in examining minor incongruities. (Maxwell 1996:17-20).  Understanding 
how events affect and identifying independent variables common to the France and 
Germany’s competing economic systems would raise doubts of spuriousness in a 
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 quantitative study.  Lastly a qualitative method allows for analytical depth instead of 
breadth, in understanding the connections between structures than accounting for 
distinct variables. (Madsen 1979:67) 
 
3.2.2 Comparative Case Study 
There exist two possible inadequacies with my research design.  First, in 
choosing standard EU national economies, it would be logical to also include the 
United Kingdom and its neo-liberalist model.  However I choose to exclude the 
United Kingdom because its gas market, which had already been liberalized before 
the first gas directive, is used as the Commission’s example in forming directives.  
Second, due to research economy and resources, conducting research of all French 
and German communes and regions at the subnational level would exceed the 
parameters of my qualitative research design.  Therefore I have searched for 
representative subnational level units charting transformations of regional gas policy.  
I rely on an isolated clinical case analysis (Smelser 1973:59-60) in which I searched 
for exceptional cases isolated from the general patterns found at the subnational level 
in order to control for spuriousness. 
Because this is a multiple case study involving only two units, Germany and 
France, I use the comparative method to isolate variables in a historical context and 
relate them to phenomena in piecing together a causal analysis. (Smelser 1973; 
Andersen, Svein 1997, 1990;373)  Lijphart (1971:686-690) believes that the 
comparative method can compensate for small numbers of units in four steps.  First, 
when possible, increase the number of cases.  Unfortunately only Germany and 
France suffice as isolated cases in the context of EU gas market liberalization 
implementation failure.  Second, reduce the property space, or number of variables of 
the analysis if the number of cases cannot be increased.  Therefore I draw my 
independent variables from NIE and my intermediate variable from MLG.  Third, 
focus the comparable analysis on ‘comparable cases’ or countries with comparable 
systems or situations.  Even though France and Germany represent dissimilar 
macroeconomic structures, they have been resistant to the liberalization of the gas 
market, and represent central states that normally push for European integration.  
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 Lastly, chart positive and negative comparisons and focus on the variables that 
explain dissimilar variance - in which MLG is a valuable structural tool. 
 
3.2.3 Validity and Reliability 
Cases studies require vigorous structural attention because the open structure 
does not provide researchers with a standard approach in analyzing data.  All data, 
variables and empirical information must be integrated to produce one result or 
conclusion.  A researcher of organizations, according to Andersen (1990:121) is 
rarely able to work in an experimental fashion since the possibility of controlling 
variables or factor is difficult and not fruitful.  According to Yin (1993:33-38) all 
solid qualitative studies must meet: construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity and reliability.   
 
3.2.4 Construct Validity 
Considering construct validity, the researcher first defines which phenomena 
are to be observed and described.  Then the researcher designs a data collection 
process dependent on multiple sources of data.  The researcher then places the 
evidence in an organized pattern known as triangulation that decreases the probability 
of personal interpretations or skewed documentary analysis arising from using few 
documentary sources.  Literature regarding the liberalization of the gas market 
expounds mostly on institutional dynamics at the supranational level, whilst assessing 
industrial and technical changes at the national level and ignoring transformations at 
the subnational level.  I have relied on multiple sources of data.  I have searched the 
archives of Le Monde, the Economist, the Financial Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
other newspapers and energy policy newsletters along with documents of the French 
senate and parliament and the German Bundestag, French energy regulator, German 
Monopolkommission and others.  I have approached statistical data as a general 
reference and compared results with those of other organizations.  Most of my 
primary information derives from 21 personal on-location interviews ranging from 30 
to 120 minutes that I conducted through fieldwork in Brussels in November 2002 and 
in Paris, Germany and Brussels in May and June 2003.  I also conducted over 55 
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 telephone interviews of varying lengths and over 42 email exchanges according to 
empirical need.  I conducted all interviews, conversations and emails in the 
informants’ native languages in order to provide for stimulating exchanges of 
information and accurate understanding of empirical data collection.  I found that 
conducting interviews in informants’ native languages added to the pleasantness in 
the collection of empirical data.  
 
3.2.5 Internal Validity 
Internal validity requires ascertaining whether conclusions can be drawn through 
repeated analyses of data and whether spurious or irrelevant evidence has skewed the 
analysis from the initial inquiry to the conclusion.  Ottar Dahl (1997: 10-15) advises 
critical empirical observation by confronting theory with concrete observation 
material and the interplay of systematically resurfacing components of  theoretical 
research design with hypotheses in mitigating instances of merely interpreting 
research as a documentary investigation for positivistic purposes instead of theory 
testing.  Presenting analysis in a time-series analysis is itself a dialectic process in 
which logical choice instead of haphazard descriptive rhetoric reflects the author’s 
explanation. I have therefore charted institutional transformations against the 
following key documents: 
 
1. Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 
1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 
 
2. Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
 of 3 February 2003 concerning common rules for the internal  
 market in national gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC.  
 
3.2.6 External Validity 
Because this case study is based on the qualitative method, generalization as a 
component of external validity is analytically rather than statistically based.  As a 
general rule, when applying the same theoretical basis to the same or similar case 
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 study, other researchers should through a replication of logical and empirical data 
arrive to similar conclusions.  A more ambitious study tests the strength of the theory 
and aids the theoretical school in reassessing the internal validity of the theory itself.  
This study does not generalize the transformations of other state-dirigisme and 
corporatist systems within the EU, however it can be used to for comparisons to other 
studies that apply a three level MLG structure and a NIE framework in assessing their 
explanatory value.  Additionally I discuss the empirical fruitfulness of both NIE and 
MLG in the concluding chapter. 
 
3.2.7 Reliability 
Reliability behoves a clear presentation of the research method and the 
procedural structure of data collection so that later investigators can arrive repeatedly 
to the same conclusions.(Yin 1994:32-38)  My research was conducted during 
discussions of a new EU constitution, the Commission’s ECJ cases against France 
and Germany, and the last formations of reworked gas directive.  I have therefore 
conducted anonymous interviews, which I have transcribed for later verification and 
analysis.  In addition strikes against the French government’s pension reforms left 
many of my French interviewees uncomfortable in formally discussing changes to the 
gas market.  Regional actors were also initially unwilling, or thought themselves 
incompetent to speak of public sectors changes.  My German interviews expressed 
very partisan positions and were less willing to reveal information that would 
compromise their organizations’ views.  I systematically sought out opposing 
informants, but also unbiased third parties.  Data collection from the subnational level 
posed a major hurdle without resorting to quantitative methods.  I contacted Länder, 
exemplary communes and prominent gas companies in Germany.  In France there are 
hundreds of communes, of which most have no gas policy competence, allowing me 
to search for variance between communes.  All of my data collection exchanges were 
conducted confidentially.  I do not reveal the identities, dates or locations of my 
interviewees in this printed text.  I may be contacted through the Political Science 
Department at the University of Oslo for data-gathering control, as I retain copies of 
all interviews and exchanges. 
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3.3.1 The Multi-Level Governance Approach 
In order to strengthen my qualitative comparative case study, I embedded my 
three NIE variables in the multi-level governance levels in order to investigate where 
institutional change has occurred.(Hooghe 1996; Jachtenfuchs 1996; Kohler-Koch 
1998, 1999, 2003; Scharpf 1999)  MLG functions as my methodological structure.  
MLG does not explain how the EU evolves nor how policy development functions, or 
even which levels benefit from an expanding European system.  However it does 
explain that in an EU context, traditional policy-making structures centered around 
the national level have been expanded to include actors and organizations found at 
the subnational and supranational.  As a methodological perspective, MLG does not 
portray how much influence the supranational and subnational have gained over the 
decision-making process.  I use my research to see how the power divisions have 
shifted from the national level to the supranational and subnational levels in terms of 
the liberalization of the gas market from 1998 to 2003. 
MLG explores how traditional governance and economic systems originating 
from the nation-state have devolved, opening for the entrance of new actors and 
legislative processes from the supranational EU and subnational regional levels.  The 
post-Westphalian state-centered model which arose due to commonalties in religion, 
language, war or evolving political structures no longer offers an effective 
governance model.  Because no supranational state has become superior to EU 
member states, the new arrangement coordinates a new constellation of actors at 
various levels connected through common policy issues and institutional procedures.  
The MLG perspective does not apply only to decision-making structures.  It applies 
to the entire constellation of governance between citizens and officials and ultimately 
to the preferences of civil society.  Interaction between differing levels of governance 
increases as the EU system is developed through joint decision-making.(Kohler-Koch 
2003:11, 13)  Pooling resources and economies-of-scale that promote power sharing 
between all three levels are more beneficial than either conflictual interstate policies 
or formal negotiations between governments, allowing for diffusion of the goals of 
governance among all actors.  Although MLG does not propose that an overarching 
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 European state will emerge, actors representing unique European identities can more 
easily influence other states in economic policy without having to depend on 
traditional state-to-state diplomacy.  EU integration taxes new demands on the state-
centric conception of: 1. negotiation capabilities and responsibility of politics.  2. 
transformation of political structures and processes, and 3. transformation of 
statehood.(Jachtenfuchs 1996:22)  Although MLG scholars disagree whether the 
state-centered model will be trumped by a new governance structure marked by a 
supranational European government in collaboration with a Europe of the Regions - 
in an ideal MLG perspective, all three levels apportion policy-making according to 
policy networks rather than hierarchical structures. 
There is little agreement between governance scholars as to the appearance of 
the novel EU system.  Since this study relies on MLG’s analytical strength in 
comprehending the totality of institutional dynamics in light of European integration 
(Benz et al. 1999; Jeffrey 2000; Kassim 2000; Hooghe 1996), the multi-level 
governance perspective is imposed on the division of chapters to explore the 
empirical transformations at the supranational, national and subnational levels.  The 
introduction of other actors along with coalitions sharing similar political preferences 
as opposed to a closed number of ruling authorities tugs away at strict national 
groupings in Brussels.(Marks 2000:808-810)   A governmental official often 
constrained by national interest groups or party affiliations may find that allowing 
decision-making capabilities at the EU level become a elegant solution in tacitly 
promoting legislation that would meet resistance at the national level - in a sense 
exploiting the failure of citizens to acknowledge that the EU is a relevant 
participatory and decision-making institution.(Marks 1996:349)  Also, increasing 
informal rules participation in the political process or, agenda setting, can lead to the 
exclusion of actors who do not comprehend the new institutional rules and structure 
of MLG.  Economic interests groups and regional governments are more likely to 
collude with the supranational level in expanding policy areas, whereas citizens’ 
interest groups lag in shifting attention from an exclusive national arena focus.  Just 
as the concentration of power in the state is decreased, so is that is that of central 
domestic actors who must share their authority with actors at other levels.   
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 Other governance perspectives ask how overlapping competencies or interests 
have transformed bureaucracies, social policies and industrial institutions.  The MLG 
term overlapping competencies explains that actors are no longer tied to their area of 
immediate operation.  They may be present in other institutional structures at other 
levels in order to promote their interests.  For example, while Gaz de France exhibits 
strong political visibility at all levels, regional gas companies such as CFM are 
apparent only at the subnational level.  In MLG, policy networks form decision-
making structures (Scharpf 1999; Marks et al 1996a, 1996b, 2000; Ansel et al. 1997) 
in which actors form interest bonds or negotiation parties according to EU relevant 
issues regardless of level embededness.  The decreased centrality of the state allows 
for a distributive policy formation scheme in which various interests groups and 
actors are able to influence policy at all levels and circumvent national governments 
when necessary.  Rhodes (Rhodes et al. 1996:381) explains that an actor’s success in 
controlling agenda-setting depends on his understanding of negotiation through 
policy networks and the forming partnerships to reduce transaction costs.    
Kohler-Koch estimates that a system of governance without a core government 
will replace systems such as corporatism and dirigisme in a wider MLG 
perspective.(Kohler-Koch 1998:9)  In the informal and formal institutional setting of 
the MLG model, levels become interconnected according to formal and informal 
rules so that policy making becomes more fluid and legitimately deliberative when 
necessary.  Without the institution settings of the EU, state actors would be required 
to rely on their nested interests in less frequent formal settings.  Consequent directive 
implementation is mandatory at all other MLG levels regardless of states’: objections, 
divisions of between governmental branches, prior legislation, constitutional 
separation between national and regional authorities, or the sanctity of national 
sovereignty.   
 
3.3.2 Supranational Level 
Unlike actors at the national and subnational levels, supranational level actors 
have been confronted with constructing a governmental structure and a common 
identity from no prior institution basis by gradually gravitating power from the 
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 member states.  In order for the EU system to function independently and 
legitimately, EU institutions such as the Commission, European Court of Justice and 
the Parliament must be assumed to be at least as institutionally competent and 
knowledgeable as their national counterparts - and even more capable in absorbing 
supranational level transaction costs.  According to Kohler-Koch (1999: 20-23), EU 
governance attempts to guide governance formation at the supranational level 
between the organizing principles of political relations between majority rule and 
consociation: and the constitutive logic of the polity between the common good and 
individual interest.  The problems of governance implied by this division rests on the 
specificity of formal rules spelt out by IOC treaties, transferring authoritative and 
technocratic competencies between DG’s, the growing number of institutions whose 
transaction costs minimizing capabilities would be insufficient at other levels - and 
informal rules for which functionalist theory does not sufficiently account.  These 
flexible informal rules account for the problem-solving capacity and the desire to 
harmonize policy-making at the EU level.  Permanent ‘policy communities’ have 
developed to confront constant negotiation requirements, for example budgeting 
issues.(Heinelt, Hubert et al. 2003:136)  In the EU system, cross-organization 
consultation occurs in a much more informal fashion that at the national level even 
when the formal accountabilities of individual institutions are defined.( Benz 
2003:104-105)  In sum, national and subnational actors are able to interact with 
supranational actors according to policy network needs instead of in a hierarchical 
fashion. 
 
3.3.3 National Level 
Ideally, this new form of governance does not result in a zero-sum loss for the 
state.  Monopolizing agenda setting at the EU level is not in the interests of 
supranational actors who desire to strengthen the EU’s institutional legitimacy.  The 
state may through the Council request that the Commission prepare directives for 
discussion.  Thereafter the Commission sends directives drafts to the working groups 
consisting of national representatives for further acceptance.  The Council is not the 
only national level institution; national gas companies, lobbyist representations and 
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 national consumer groups are also entwined in policy-formation.  European 
integration eventually dictates institutional harmonization between countries affecting 
their policy styles, policy ambitions, conception of co-ordination with the 
supranational level, nature of the political opportunity structure, and administrative 
opportunity structures.(Kassim et al. 2000: 250).  The transaction costs of 
maintaining national infrastructure and economic growth are aided by uniform 
guidelines.  The state still retains competence over strictly endogenous issues in 
instances when national interests are not incompatible to commonly formally defined 
EU policies.  Economic and social actors also benefit from the devolution of national 
politics.  These actors transcend national parameters and channel policy networks to 
their advantage thereby exploring the opportunities of aggregating competencies in 
larger arenas.  In order for national governments to adapt to EU policies, long-term 
structural changes must occur at the national level beyond the immediate policy issue 
area.  National patterns of adjustment occur more readily in corporate systems in 
Germany than in state-dirigisme systems in France.(Kohler-Koch 2003; 15-16)  Also 
national foreign ministers have lost their traditional high influence in negotiations as 
national governments have become more coordinated in involving various other 
ministries in EU policies in order to effectively negotiate specific policy issues in 
Brussels.(Maurer 2003:68,71)   Even tough national parliaments have been 
latecomers in the EU process and are poorly capable in dealing with matters of EU 
policy, both the German and French Parliaments have developed formal reporting 
structures in order to make their positions clear to national representatives in 
Brussels. (Maurer 2003:71; Benz, Arthur 2003:97)   
 
3.3.4 Subnational Level 
MLG has instigated a wealth of literature specifically regarding the 
empowerment of subnational level actors. (Ansell 1997; Benz 1999; Hooghe 
1996:chp 3; Jeffrey 1997,2000; Keating 1995, 1998; Le Gales 1998:19-221) MLG 
portrays regions as occupying a territorial, political and functional space.  In the 
functional space, regional governments enter into power sharing arrangements or 
policy networks within the supranational level and each other as the EU accedes them 
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 authority, money, legitimacy, information and organization. (Balme 1996: 221)  A 
Europe of the Regions is formed because the interests and needs of regions are often 
neglected by national governments, allowing regional actors integration into EU 
arenas of negotiation.  Due to the harmonization of political differences in the Europe 
of the Regions, regions are no longer hampered by their national paradigms and limits 
to their policy-making authority.  The main brunt of the subnational level in the MLG 
paradigm is that regions search for cohesion in order to act as strong bargaining 
clusters negotiating with other groupings in the MLG constellation. (Kohler-Koch 
2000:70) 
 Additionally, in order to equilibrate differences between regions and urban 
areas, DG Regional Policy coordinates technical and economic assistance through 
structural funds according to developmental need.  In this bottoms-up approach, 
regions formally enter the decision-making process through the Council of the 
Regions.  Regions are to explore a common cohesion policy in which regions identify 
each other according to social or economic policy networks outside their national 
contexts and collaborate in order to promote their common interests.  Private 
subnational actors are also able to disassociate themselves from the constraints of 
national policy by promoting their interests in EU arenas.  Regions are institutionally 
integrated into the EU polity at the Council of Regions, including increased lobbyist 
and information exchange capacities through permanent representations in Brussels.  
However as seen in chapter 6, my empirical research reveals at differing conception 
of the subnational level. 
 
3.4 Terms,Variables and Hypotheses 
 
I now present my variables employed in the empirical chapters: 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Changes that  have occurred to the institutional structures between the gas industry 
and governments of the French and German gas sectors as a result of the European 
Union’s liberalization of the energy market in the period 1998-2003. 
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The institutional structures between the gas industry and governments are understood 
in the context of this comparative case study as corporatism in Germany and state-
dirigisme in France as well as France and Germany as unitary state models in terms 
of the liberalization of the gas market.  As state-dirigisme in France and corporatism 
in Germany no longer truly characterize the structures between the gas industry and 
government, I analyze and compare the emerging institutional arrangements 
throughout the empirical chapters as well as the concluding chapter. 
 
I derive the independent variables and the first three hypotheses from key NIE 
concepts and the intermediate variable from the MLG analytical structure:  
 
First variable, reductionism.  I discussed in 2.4.1 that key entrepreneurs in the 
decision-making process are responsible for institutional transformation when they 
identify their own benefits in negotiating institutional rules and transaction cost 
mitigation.  Institutional transformations are expensive and difficult undertakings, 
rarely occurring haphazardly, and can be the results of key actors who take the 
initiative to rework institutional rules. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional transformations have occurred to state-dirigisme in 
France and corporatism in Germany because key entrepreneurial actors have 
exercised their policy-making capabilities.  These key entrepreneurial actors 
are the instigators of institutional change. 
 
Second variable, transaction costs.  Transaction costs are thought of as the rules that 
surrounding an economic, political or social exchange.  When transaction costs 
become too large to bear due to large shifts of institutional rules such those imposed 
by the 1998 and 2003 gas directives, then institutional transformations occur to 
minimize those costs and also to aid organizational existence. 
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 Hypothesis 2:  Institutional transformations have occurred to state-dirigisme 
in France and corporatism in Germany because transaction costs have become 
too costly for the existing institutional structures.  Directive 98/30/EC and 
directive 2003/55/EC have imposed specific transaction costs forcing 
institutional transformation so that the gas industries of France and Germany 
can compete and continue to exist. 
 
Third variable, Property rights.  Property rights affect the ownership of a common 
good, the definition of its distribution – and the role of the state in regulating the 
division between private and public interests.  The liberalization of the gas industry 
demands that national governments reassess the ownership of gas companies and of 
gas as a relative property.   
 
Hypothesis 3:  Institutional transformations have occurred to state-dirigisme 
in France and corporatism in Germany because property rights have been 
redefined or been shifted between actors affecting the ownership of gas 
companies and their mission as either public or private enterprises. 
 
Intervening variable, MLG levels.  A secondary concern relating to the study’s 
central research question is understanding how EU energy policy through the 1998 
and 2003 directives has sifted from the EU level through the national to the regional 
levels.  I employ the intervening variable to analyze how the largely state-centric 
model has been institutionally transformed in response to the 1998 and 2003 gas 
directives.  The MLG perspective explains that the traditional state-centric model has 
given way to one in which a multitude of actors in various levels both public and 
private affect policy formation according to the exercise of specific policy areas.  I 
apply the MLG perspective to specifically investigate for changes in the specific 
levels. 
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 Hypothesis 4:  Institutional decoupling of the supranational, national and 
subnational levels as a result of the 1998 and 2003 EU gas directives are 
responsible for institutional transformation. 
 
Below is a diagram of my conceptual model: 
 
Reductionism 
 
Transaction Costs  MLG Levels  Institutional Transformation 
 
Property Rights 
 
Independent   Intervening  Dependent 
Variable   Variable  Variable 
 
3.5 Operalization of Variables 
I now present what I deem the criteria in evaluating the theoretical aspects of the 
empirical data and the empirical indicators needed to fulfil the definitions of the 
following criteria: 
 
Corporatism: Corporatism is the informal cooperation and dialogue between 
governments and gas companies.  Gas company agents are consulted when legislative 
work is being prepared.  The level of regulation is decided between gas companies 
and governments. 
 
State-dirigisme: A particular government controls and regulates most aspects of 
progress of gas companies.  A major prerogative is the public ownership of gas 
companies.  Gas company employees are understood as governmental servants.  
Legislative initiatives regulating the gas market are initiated and terminated in 
governmental organizations. 
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 Reductionism:  Individual strong actors are concerted agents for institutional change 
in the gas market.  These strong actors or key entrepreneurs identify their duty as 
related to transformations in the gas market and the strengthening of their 
organization.   
 
Transaction Costs: Transaction costs surround economic, political or social 
exchanges relating to the gas market.  When these changes are too costly to maintain 
institutional transformation occurs.  Transaction costs in this study originate in the 
1998 and 2003 gas directives.   
 
Property Rights:  In my study property rights denote shifting property rights between 
public and private domains in terms of gas company ownership and also of gas as a 
public or private good. 
 
Multi-Level Governance: The decoupling of the state-centric model into a model of 
supranational, national and subnational levels as a result of the liberalization of the 
gas market leads to institutional change.  Due to the devolution of the state-centric 
model, the liberalization of the gas market manifests institutional transformations in 
these levels in different times and ways. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter has allowed me to formulate the methodological structure of this 
study through the MLG paradigm.  I have explained why I use the qualitative 
comparative case study in constructing my research and limiting my case to the gas 
industries of France and Germany.  Lastly I present reductionism, transaction costs 
and property rights as my independent variables and the MLG levels as my 
intervening variable.  I am equipped with the necessary theoretical and 
methodological tools necessary in discussing and then analyzing: chapter four the 
supranational chapter, chapter five the national chapter and chapter six the 
subnational chapter.   
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 Chapter 4 Supranational Level  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter I discuss the institutional dynamics at the supranational, or EU 
level.  The MLG perspective has uncovered lacking subnational involvement, whilst 
the supranational bodies of the EU have clearly waxed their authority over gas market 
liberalization policies at the supranational level.  I argue in this chapter that the 
specific institutional dynamics due to liberalization at the supranational level are 
marked by a top-down process, in which the EU progresses its volition at the expense 
of member states’ political prerogatives.  Because the liberalization of the gas market 
is a process emanating from the supranational level, I begin with a background of gas 
policy in order to place the three empirical chapters in context.  Employing variable 
1, reductionism, I divide the analysis into sections marked by specific actors involved 
in gas policy in the EU, Germany, France, the German gas industry, the French gas 
industry, regions, and interest groups.  I begin the discussion of each relevant actor’s 
involvement in the liberalization of the gas market with the implementation of the 
1998 directive, 98/30/EC, and then the negotiations of the 2003 gas directive, 
2003/55/EC.  I conclude this chapter with a summary of institutional changes along 
with a review of each MLG-level actor’s involvement at the supranational level.  My 
general research findings were that the governments of France and Germany were 
initially entrenched to the respective formal structural arrangements of state-dirigisme 
and corporatism whilst the companies of the gas market were disengaging themselves 
from traditional relationships with their governments in Brussels in order to pursue 
competitive opportunities offered through gas market liberalization.  The superior 
institutional authority of EU organizations has made institutional structures 
emanating from the national level inefficient at the supranational level.  Therefore 
state-dirigisme and corporatism have shown signs of weakness at the supranational 
level.   
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 4.2 Framework 
  I propose that the conceptual tool necessary to understand the process of 
Europeanization lies in institutions' possession of superior institutional authority.  The 
current direction of European policies is guided by organizations that exercise 
superior institutional strength.  This strength is developed through technical and 
specialist knowledge, a capable and honest staff, the ability to employ legal 
regulation when necessary, sensitivity to current economic paradigms, a broader 
comparative knowledge of the European constellation normally hampered by the 
bounded rationality of nation-states - and not just agenda-setting, but also the ability 
to decide on policy details and transaction costs.  Superior institutional authority has 
shifted from the member states to the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament so that decision-making capabilities and compliance powers are 
gravitating to the supranational level.  In addition this superior institutional authority 
is especially exercised at the expense of lower subnational levels.  The member state 
is not acquiescing to EU policy due to consensual pressures and an interest in arriving 
to common agreements, but rather because the EU is exploring its institutional 
strengths and ability to require common positions, even though the Council is a forum 
for the member states. 
The Council is only one of various organizations, most of which do not 
represent states’ desires.  The process of including of various non-state actors 
increases the democratic and political fluidity of the EU legislative process.  There 
does exist an exit-option for the member state, even though it has not yet occurred.  
The existence of unique EU competences, EU solutions and EU institutions must be 
understood as independent of states’ will.  If the EU is to be an organization with 
more capabilities and powers than other IGOs, than it must also be superior to the 
nation-state in most respects, thereby affecting former national institutional models 
such as corporatism and dirigisme.  Once the EU reaches maturity, all prior theories 
will be of little relevance.  
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 4.3 Background 
Liberalization of the gas market has been a relatively new policy area for the 
EU beginning with security of supply and environmental concerns forwarded by the 
White Paper (COM (85) 310) on a common energy policy of 1985, and thereafter 
accelerated by the Single European Act of 1986 which pressed for an internal 
market.(Matlary 1997:19)  Energy was a new EC policy area because it had been not 
been included in the Rome Treaty of 1957.  Energy was traditionally considered a 
matter of national sovereignty and an important facet of industrial growth and 
stability, most lately after the oil shortages of the 1970's.  Liberalization has been in 
step with the creation of a gas market through supply-side policies exploring gas, 
electricity and renewable energies exploration and transportation in replacing the 
traditionally more important sources of energy - coal, oil and nuclear power.  By the 
publication of White Paper COM (85)310 “Completing the Internal Market” in 1985, 
gas had already been a well-developed source of energy in Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and Germany.  Gas had also become a large growing energy source in 
other European countries due to EU policy, accounting for increasing consumption, 
better domestic infrastructure, governments' wishes in reducing dependence on 
foreign oil, and the findings of new sources making gas more competitive to 
traditional energy sources coupled with new pipelines connections with Russia, 
Algeria and Norway.(Estrada 1995; 35-38)  197.97 million cubic tons of gas were 
consumed in 1985 as opposed to 302.54 in 1998.  Consumption is expected to reach 
410 million toe by 2010 when imports will exceed internal production. (European 
Commission 2001: 69)  
Work on the gas market has always followed that of the electricity market; 
partly due to cogeneration production efforts and the Commission's belief that both 
markets require similar policy prescriptives.  The Commission has traditionally begun 
liberalization efforts in the electricity market with the notion that the reforms 
achieved in the electricity market would be replicable on the gas market. (Interview 
16.10.2002)   The general idea found throughout the Commission is that a larger 
electricity market must be fueled by a larger gas supply.   
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 A key dilemma is that the EU can not control its gas supply as it is dependent 
on imports originating outside of the EU.  The major source of gas is found in the ex-
USSR which provides the EU of 41% of its gas imports and 17% of its total sales 
through pipelines entering through Europe’s largest gas transport nexus in Slovakia 
and secondarily through Poland.  Norway supplies 29% of imports and 13% of total 
sales of EU gas imports through Emden and Zeebrugge pipelines.  Lastly, Algeria is 
the third largest importer to the EU representing 25% of EU imports through 
Andalusian and Sicilian pipelines.(European Commission COM 2000: 40-42)   
Not a competence spelt out by prior treaties, the Commission began its work 
sparsely by creating new competencies in the gas market under the mantra of 
environmental issues and security of supply initiatives.  Directive 90/377/EEC of 29 
June 1990 concerning a Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas 
and electricity prices charged to industrial end-users had almost no effect on the gas 
market.  The directive was to form a basis for comparing prices between large users.  
It did not provide for any negative or positive integration and detailed no action 
necessary by the Commission in the case of non-compliance.  Council Directive 
31/296/EEC of 31 May 1991 on the transit of natural gas through grids was only 
slightly more interventionist and opened the problematic case of third party access 
(TPA).  It broadly required owners of transport grids to open space to other 
transporters of gas.  However this directive also lacked the power to enforce TPA as 
there was again no compliance authority.  The Commission’s role was to record 
transactions and in rare cases request that community law be pursued.  Lastly, the 
directive was narrowly addressed to applicable gas companies, being large 
transporters.  In rare cases when addressed to specific actors, transposition is not 
required by member states.  Therefore France issued a decree reworking articles of 
prior laws and Germany never transposed the directive into national legislation. 
Apparent that these two directives did little to open the market to 
liberalization, the Commission began the process of acquiring technocratic 
competence and planning for a more specific directive.  The work on a new directive 
began in 1992 but was dismantled in 1995.  In 1995 the Commission decided to 
establish a committee of 20 experts (95/539/EC) composed mainly of representatives 
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 of gas transmission companies.  Their role extended to advising on technical, 
financial and legal conditions of transit, its economic and social factors, along with 
exploring the possibility of TPA.  The Council set aside funds for building long-
distance high-pressure pipelines and made explicit its intent that gas would be a part 
of its security of supply and cleaner energy mandate.  These legislative measures 
gave the Commission and the Council better capacity to progress on a directive with 
appropriate content.   
Work on Directive 98/30/EC commenced in 1992 and was marked by major 
resistance by all member states except for the UK, which was itself used a model for 
liberalization.  France proved to be the country most skeptical to the directive.  
Germany, following the example set by the United Kingdom, claimed to open its 
market completely.  The specificity and extent of the directive can be seen as a 
success for the Commission.  Four conflictual issues characterized the formation of 
the directive: level of market opening, take-or-pay contracts, level of public 
responsibilities, and level of transparency.(Eldevik 1999:35)  Companies were to 
unbundle themselves by splitting their activities and accounts into transportation and 
distribution entities.  Third party access to interregional transportation gas lines was 
to be systemized by easily accessible information.  Oversight was to be decided on a 
negotiated or a regulated basis; that is either informally negotiated between 
consumers and suppliers groups, which fit well into the corporate nature of Germany, 
or by an independent regulator.  The provisions were to arrive in three stages: 17% by 
2000, 25% by 2004 and 33% by 2007.  A consensus passing the directive in the EP 
had been reached in 1998 after 6 years of negotiation between the member states’ 
energy working groups.   
By 2000 Germany and France had not met the minimum qualitative and 
quantitative market opening requirements.  Legal action against both countries was 
brought to the European Court of Justice by the Directorate-General for Energy and 
Transport, or, DG Tren.  In 2001 difficulties arising from transposing the 1998 
directive into national laws, combined with the low level of market opening and 
conflicting levels of liberalization between member states convinced the Commission 
to construct another directive, Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and 
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 of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC.  The Commission was in a different 
position than it was in 1990.  It had not only the sufficient technocratic competencies 
supported by external bodies.  It had proved also that it was willing to adjudicate non-
compliance and that it could specifically identify bottlenecks towards market 
opening.  The liberalization model of the gas market had already been accepted by 
member states.  The directive was once again introduced as a package directive along 
with electricity.  The major differences in the new directive were complete market 
opening, appointment of an independent regulator thereby dissolving negotiated 
access, competition at the at the distribution level for households, legal unbundling of 
activities, and TPA was to be legally defined.  The notion of public service and 
universal coverage highlighted a notion that the Commission was to respect the social 
implications of markets transformations to the point of allowing for derogations when 
necessary.  In the new directive, regulation was made ex-ante with the threat of a 
European regulator if necessary and gas was considered either a good or service and 
therefore made an internal market competence of the EU.   
The expedited process proved so successful that the Commission had sent a 
request for a new security of supply directive to the Council and Parliament in 2002 
in light of shortages in North America and Europe.  This 2002 security of supply 
directive proposal will not be discussed in my text.  The following two sections will 
compare changing institutional dynamics of the implementation of 1998 and the 
negotiation of the 2003 to describe the relationship between industry and state and the 
supranational level. 
 
4.4 European Union 
4.4.1 Implementing Directive 98/30/EC 
The European Union plays an indelible role in shaping the relationship 
between the gas industry and states while careful that its policies not be interpreted as 
explicitly encroaching into the sovereign energy policies of member states.  During 
the implementation of the 1998 directive, the EU’s political work was committed to 
at the very least ensuring that member state transposed the directive at the national 
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 level.  In these implementation matters the European Parliament (EP) and the Council 
had little authority in ensuring compliance.  There exist little legislative procedures 
regarding enforcement of an EU gas regulator.  In addition the Treaty of Rome does 
not contain references to privatization or energy; therefore the 1998 directive did not 
contain references to the reorganization of domestic gas markets.  However, 
monopolistic markets marked by nationalized companies were understood by the 
Commission as inhibitors to market liberalization.(Interview 11.11.2003)   At the 
same time the Commission gauged that the directive’s provisions were sufficient in 
promoting the qualitative measures of unbundling, increased TPA and the appearance 
of competition, and of quantitative measure dictating gradual market opening of 33% 
by 2007.  During the implementation phase, DG Competition investigated companies 
for monopolistic behavior and DG Tren searched for cases of qualitative and 
quantitative non-compliance by countries.  In such a manner the Commission was 
able to increase transaction costs in cases of obstruction of liberalization in the gas 
market.   
DG Competition’s gas, petroleum and electricity section comprises of 8 people 
who have since the adoption of the 1998 directive been closely following 
developments in the gas market.  Setting precedence is the most critical duty of DG 
Comp and its staff has been proactive in examining industrial behavior.  Unlike DG 
Tren, to DG Comp there exists no ideal market as long as there are low entry barriers 
and many suppliers.(Interview 15.10.2002)  DG competition operates on an ex-post 
basis tying its competencies to the Maastricht treaty's articles 81, 82 and 86 which are 
the anti-trust and competition articles dealing with transportation, state aid and 
merger regulation.  Article 81 states that organizations must not practice activities 
distorting the market of member states to the harm of others organization through 
monopolization.  Article 82 states that organizations may not abuse their dominant 
positions in markets.  Article 86 states that a member state may make no laws and a 
company may not apply economic policies not in line with directives and EU treaties.  
Unlike other DGs, DG Comp does not engage itself in the legislation formation 
process.  In certain cases DG Comp can propose legislation to the EP under article 86 
which must then be considered.   
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 DG COMP can open a case as part of an investigation, a formal complaint, or 
ex-officio action to informal market information. Through article 11 letters the DG 
can request information or even plan raids and copy concrete information.  Their 
work has little semblance to incorporating various opinions through discussions 
groups and is limited to investigating anti-trust, mergers, state aid and market control 
their activities become problematic when competition is inhibited.   
Five cases set precedence for the gas market.  First, in 1997 DG Competition 
found in applying article 86 that GDF did not meet its public service obligation as the 
whole French territory was not covered by GDF’s service.  Second, DG Comp 
accepted the merger between Exxon and Mobil (IP/99/708) in 1999 as long as it did 
not weaken competition from smaller companies from the market.  It was understood 
that the Commission was not negative to large companies that could strengthen 
European-wide presence at the expense of national market concentrations.  This sent 
a silent signal to other European companies wishing to merge in order to strengthen 
their international presence.  Third, the Commission settled a case between Marathon 
and Thyssengas in 2001. (IP/01/1641)  The Norwegian subsidiary of Marathon 
complained that a group of gas companies including Thyssengas refused to grant 
sufficient TPA to continental pipelines.  Thyssengas agreed in improving 
commitments in hourly balancing, trade in capacity rights, congestion management, 
transparency and handling of access requests.  Fourth, the 2002 case against the 
Norwegian Gas Negotiation Committee or GFU (IP/02/1084) was more influential.  
The GFU marketed and sold the gas of the two largest Norwegian companies Statoil 
and Hydro on the European market.  The GFU was though to be a barrier to supply 
competition.  The end of the GFU was beneficial to French and German customers as 
the practice of joint marketing was made unacceptable in relation to the direct selling 
of gas.  Lastly, a case involving gas supply contracts between German Wingas and 
Electricité de France Trading in Germany (IP/02/1293) allowed for long-term 
contracts as long as these contracts did not impair other companies’ ability to accept 
contracts with the same wholesalers of gas.  These cases set the precedence for 
individual companies’ behavior, and confirmed the superiority of EU law to that of 
national regulation and law in the area of the internal gas market. 
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 DG Tren’s main interests were ensuring that member states transposed the 1998 
directive and more importantly that they met qualitative requirements and 
quantitative requirements.(Interview 05.2003)  The opening of gas markets coupled 
with transposition of the directives without the requisite quantitative measurements 
were not considered sufficient.  The period between 1998 and 2001 was used to 
observe which provisions of the 1998 directive were not sufficient and to identify 
which member states acted as inhibitors to gas market liberalization.  At the same 
time DG Tren was careful to appear judicial and considerate. Therefore member 
states were given 2 years to transpose the directive and the possibility to begin 
dialogue with the Commission when encountering difficulties.  For a country to 
derogate, it would have to inform the Commission of appropriate TPA cases and wait 
four weeks.   
The period 1998-2000 was used to convince member states of the benefits of 
market liberalization.  In addition DG Tren stated that it never specified what type of 
unbundling it preferred as it has been consistently clear in not wanting to reorder 
national infrastructures, preferring to leave it a topic better decided at the national 
level.  The Commission had taken a view allowing the mergers of VIAG and VEBA 
into Eon, VEW into RWE. It had also appropriated a billion dollar program towards 
building trans-European pipelines.  During the 1998-2000 period EU competition 
commissioner Karel van Miert made it clear that long-term contracts would continue 
with large customers but that would question long-term contracts that restrict 
competition.  He also made clear that fortified security of supply would result in 
improved consumer protection.  Coaxing Germany and France through discussions 
between energy ministers and DG Tren had little effect in the transposition of the 
directive.  Therefore DG Tren acted by publishing progress reports and threatening 
court cases against both countries for failing to transpose the directive into national 
law.  A two-volume report found that gas carried by TPA provisions reached only 1% 
in France and 2% in Germany.  New entrants to the French market found that 
distance-related transmission tariffs combined with only one practical entry point to 
be serious cost barrier to new entrants, and that the network access procedure and 
payment system were too complicated.  It was reported that high charges and 
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 pancaking were problems in German contracts.  German companies’ rigid and 
bureaucratic handling of grid access requests were often  not processed in time, and 
the absence of concrete information about bottlenecks and availability of capacity 
detracted third parties.(DWI 2001: 41) 
The Commission was skeptical to French public service and public statutes, 
believing that the public service argument was cast too wide.  It allowed however the 
reconfiguration of public service obligations to be settled through the national level.  
In the case of Germany the Commission was outspoken against pancaking and the 
lack of transparency.  EU never spoke of what type of ownership it preferred, but 
advocated unbundling between transportation and distribution entities.  The 
Commission finally accumulated enough evidence to bring court trials against France 
and Germany.  The Commission’s files were approved for consideration by the ECJ 
in December 2001 in prosecuting France in case C-259/01 and Germany in case C-
64/03 for not having transposed the 1998 Directive. (European Court of Justice 2002, 
2004) 
  
 4.4.2 Negotiating Directive 2003/55/ EC 
Apparent that liberalization was not reaching its goals in 2000, the 
Commission set on creating a proposal at the behest of member states for a more 
specific, farther reaching directive that the 1998 document.(Interview 17.10.2002)  
Directive 2003/55/EC, 26 June 2003 “Concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC", or also known as the 
acceleration directive, required 3 years from when the Commission began work on 
the new directive reached a common position in February 3, 2002.  The 1998 
directive required almost seven years.   
The case against Norway’s GFU was taken as a success for the Commission as 
an extension of its competency over putative national monopolies.  The Commission 
began to bring national regulators and energy authorities together for discussion.   
Both the EP and the Commission wanted a gas industry increasing the number of 
companies between producers and customers, so that the EP and the Commission 
would not appear to override their competencies but allow member states to control 
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 their own regulation.  The Commission declared that by 2006 it would research if the 
extent of separate accounts were enough, and that it would in 2007 published a 
progress report on liberalization policy’s effects on the energy market in order to 
readjust policies.  In “A Long-Term Vision of a Fully Operational Single market for 
Gas in Europe", 28 January 2002, the Commission made it clear that it wanted a fluid 
market without long-term contracts. 
During negotiations of the 2003 directive, the European Parliament was much 
more closely involved in pressing for the adoption of liberalized gas market 
legislation.  This was a break with prior policy.  During the early nineties the 
European Parliament was known as a fierce opponent to general market 
liberalization.  Because European Parliament MPs do not represent their countries' 
positions as much as their parties' and interest groups' positions, common party 
positions amicable to liberalization efforts helped in processing the 2003 document 
with relative rapidity through both readings.  Two of the three rapporteurs, rapporteur 
Mombaur of Germany and shadow rapporteur van Velzen of the Netherlands were 
members of the European People's Party, the party most representative of stronger 
liberalizations policies in the EP (European Parliament Com (2002) 488- C5-
0449/2002-2002-020-(COD)).  MP Turmes of Luxembourg, an electricity rapporteur 
of the Green party was indicative of the new positive posture towards internal market 
policies.(Interview 28.05.2003)  TPA was expanded in the second directive from 
accounting to legal unbundling of storage, transportation and distribution.  The EP 
wanted to even include unbundling of pipelines, but did not go that far.     
After the first reading of the 2003/55/EC proposal, the text was expanded to 
include distribution as well as transportation clauses to the displeasure of both the 
French and German delegations.  The Commission was however very headstrong in 
pressing for these expanded liberalization clauses, stating that backlogs posed by 
France and Germany would not delay liberalization of the internal gas market.   The 
Commission wanted to expand its authority to include existing gas contracts which 
however did not meet common approval.  France and Germany were fiercely against 
unbundling, especially unbundling at the level of localities.  Germany did achieve an 
unbundling exemption for companies with less than 100,000 customers.  At the same 
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 time the Commission no longer considered the German Verbändevereinbarungen 
agreements of the negotiated option valid. (Interview 27.05.2003) 
The Luxembourg presidency’s proposal in 1998 already increased the 
Commission's power.  Under the Spanish presidency, gas policy was pushed up to 
ministry level.  The 2002 Danish presidency separated energy and environmental 
issues in order to accelerate discussions.  All member states excluding Germany 
considered giving the Commission the authority to decide on TPA contracts and their 
derogations.  Loyala de Palacio said that a liberalized market would offer a higher 
level of service and universal service, because the customer would be able to choose 
their supplier, type of service, ascertain quality in clear contracting.(Le Monde 
October 7, 2002, Electricité.)   At the Stockholm summit, the Commission along with 
EU ministers pushed for a complete 100% opening of the internal gas market by 
2007.  Further discussions in Lisbon and Barcelona were considered successes 
because of the relative quickness in arriving towards a common position. 
The EP was then forwarded a second text with almost 200 footnotes.  
Decommissioning and waste were discussed in association with liberalization at the 
subnational level.  However the EP declared that such major clauses would hamper 
transparency and the ability to institute regulation.  The only other contentious issue 
was the extent of regulation.  German rapporteur Mombaur of the EP’s Committee on 
Industry, Research and Energy was clear in outlining that effective regulation would 
prove beneficial to both consumers and gas companies.  The EP voted upon and 
passed Directive 2003/55/EC on June 26th, 2003. 
 
4.5 German Delegation 
4.5.1 Implementing Directive 98/30/EC 
  At the EU level, Germany, Europe's second largest gas market, appeared to 
be the least problematic of the member states to be integrated into an open gas 
market, as the German delegation acceded to 100% market opening in 1998.  Along 
with Great Britain, Germany was used by the Commission as a model case of 
liberalization in an open gas market.  However at the EU level, the German 
delegation was promoting the interests of the largest German gas companies, namely 
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 Ruhrgas.  Early on Germany chose the negotiated option, proscribing the 
Kartellamt’s regulatory authority, allowing instead for four parties, two representing 
industries BWG, Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft and VKU 
Verband kommunaler Unternehmen e.V., and two representing consumers BDI 
Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie e.V. and VIK Verband der industriellen 
Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e.V. to regulate market opening, exemplary of the 
corporative model.  The Verbändevereinbarung was a yearly agreement produced 
between German producers and consumers and overseen by the German government 
due to the 1998 directive.  The German government further highlighted laws that had 
already incorporated directive provisions, from anti-monopoly laws to TPA clauses.   
Complaints had been brought against the German gas industry by large 
consumers and gas distributors claiming cases of discrimination, irreconcilable price 
differences and indefensible denials of access to gas grids.  The German government 
also already had a case brought to the ECJ regarding the end of its demarcation 
clauses in the energy clause dating from the 1931 German energy law.  Because 
France had not yet transposed the directive or opened its market, Germany began to 
consciously lag behind with the opening of its own market.  The German delegation 
referred to a clause in the 1998 directive in which countries were bound to 
reciprocally open their markets to other member states.(Interview 10.06.2003)   In 
2000, the European Commission brought a case against Germany for failing to meet 
minimal market opening requirements of 20% by 2000 for large customers 
consuming over 25 million cubic meters, for not splitting gas companies into 
transporter and distributor entities, and for not having transposed the directive into 
national law.  The Commission further denied the German government’s assertion 
that the most important sections of the directive had been established through the 
Verbändevereinbarung fortifying the conditions of a completely open 
market.(Interview 27.05.2003)   The German delegation in Brussels began to defend 
its position by claiming that a ‘fair-playing field’ did not exist, whereby endangering 
the German market if it were to open its market without reciprocal action by 
France.(Interview 2.5.2003)   In 2000 the German government sent a version of the 
new gas law to the Bundestag which was not ratified until 2002.   
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 There were a number of mergers on the domestic German market which DG 
Tren cited as examples of market domination and indicators of anti-competitive 
behavior.  Foremost was the aggressive attempt by E.on in acquiring Ruhrgas.  E.on 
had already been created through a fusion in 2000 between VIAG and VEGA turning 
it into Europe's largest integrated energy concern.  The merger between both 
companies would require permission from the Commission and highlighted 
differences between the Commission and the German delegation in Brussels.  DG 
Comp found that an eventual merger would reduce competition on the European 
market.(Interview 15.10.2002)  However German energy minister Werner Müller had 
given his approval to the merger, exercising a privilege contained in the German 
constitution giving a German minister the authority to override decisions by the 
Bundeskartellamt.     
During the implementation phase of Directive 98/30/EC the German 
delegation demanded reciprocity from France and pressed for a negotiated system 
whilst keen in protecting its gas market from foreign competition.  By 2000 Germany 
along with Luxemburg, Belgium and France had not transposed the directive into 
national legislation.  The Commission, embracing more technocratic tendencies, 
contracted a benchmarking report that outlined France and Germany as having 
witnessed the lowest level of market opening.  At the most, 5% of large customers 
had changed their supplier.(DBI 2000)  Negotiated oversight authority did not 
function properly in Germany.  The market was inhibited by pancaking and 
horizontal transmission companies.  Germany, one of the initial states promoting 
liberalization proved to be a laggard and adamantly opposed to EU oversight.  The 
EU encountered difficulties in reprimanding Germany as the corporatist nature of 
German political system removed culpability from the government’s hands.  There 
was a vacuum of responsibility where no one actor or organization could be 
reprimanded for having prohibited market opening and that its market actors 
portrayed the double talk of lobbyists more than directly responsible discussion 
partners.  The last defiant stance against opening of the gas market was displayed at 
the 2001 EU Barcelona summit of ministers, at which France and Germany agreed to 
set a date for liberalization. Chirac and Schröder supported commitments towards 
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 liberalization timetables but said that the dates for liberalization would take longer 
than wished by the Commission.  This was accepted by the EU, because of German 
and French elections occurring in 2002.  By 2000 swaying Germany to transpose and 
implement the 1998 was overshadowed by the construction of the 2003 directive with 
quantitative and qualitative measures that would force compliance.(Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 24.3.2001)   
 
4.5.2 Negotiating Directive 2003/55/EC 
 During the negotiation phase the German delegation was forced to accept the 
quantitative and qualitative guidelines imbued in the 1998 directive and accede to the 
clauses negotiated for the 2003 directive - thereby curbing the tight representation of 
the gas industries’ interests in Brussels by the German government.   
The German representation displayed three interests during the negotiation of 
the 2003 directive:  First, it looked to France as its main competitor in the gas market.  
GDF had begun to enter the German market without the reciprocal entrance of 
German gas companies in France.  The German government was weary of opening its 
market to GDF and wanted its TPA requirements to not exceed the French level of 
third-party access.  Second, it wanted an industrial environment creating national 
champions into European players, therefore continually pressing for negotiated 
access.  Third, it wanted to protect its national market by stalling for a common 
position within the working groups for as long as possible.     
   The German position was marked by a protection of domestic industries more 
than an interests in lowering gas prices.  The German position during the negotiation 
of the 2003 directive can be best understood as pressing for the comparative 
advantages of its largest gas companies, not on a national basis but one promoting the 
German gas industry in Europe.  Although fitting well with Loyola de Palacio’s 
vision of a market dominated by a few key players, German interests did not allow 
for the entrance for other players.  Due to Schroeder's pro-industry policies promoting 
large companies, the German position was in line with the strategies of the large 
transporters wishing to protect their monopolies.  American energy companies such 
as Enron were viewed with admiration by the German ministry of energy as models 
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 for aggressive acquisitions on the European market.  In a large integrated European 
market, only large companies have been thought to internationally reach the 
economies-of-scale.  The German representation had taken a stance in protecting its 
key gas industries, despite continually rising costs, which were 20% over the EU 
average.  Only 20 large industrial consumers had changed their suppliers, and many 
of the new gas companies had disappeared.(Frankfurter Allgemeine 15.10.2002) 
 The German secondary negotiatory prerogatives were security of supply, 
environment protection and business profitability.  Fortunately these items were 
compatible with the Commission’s wishes to see a few large companies offering a 
stable gas market.  Germany was the member state most adamantly opposed to a 
regulator.  An independent and overriding regulator posed no immediate threat to 
German interests, but rather to the corporatist model in which the federal government 
identified significant interest groups to form economic policy.  The German position 
was that the Germany gas industry was better equipped to plan for a competitive 
market than one regulated by the government.  Germany finally agreed to appoint the 
Bundeskartellamt as national regulator, rather than create a new independent body.  
In addition the German delegation believed that legal unbundling should be 
implemented only when necessary, stating that the ordering of the energy market to 
be a national issue.  It appeared confounding that although the Middelstand represents 
the largest proportion of economic activity, the German delegation promoted the 
interests of the five largest gas companies over large gas consumers or of smaller gas 
companies.  Member of the Monopolkommission, Winfried Haastert stated that 
Germany explicitly wanted national-players to dominate transportation from outside 
the EU, even at the expense of national and regional companies and local 
prices.(Frankfurter Allgemeine 2. July 2002)   
 
4.6 German Gas Industry 
Due to the liberalization of the gas industry, during the 1998- 2003 it became 
increasingly more efficient for the German gas industry to compete aggressively in 
the international gas market in order to promote its interests instead of relying on 
close policy cooperation with the German government in Brussels.  The German gas 
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 industry has in general attempted to retain the structure and pricing of its market, to 
protect its storage facilities and to avoid regulation, and has limited new gas 
companies from accessing the national gas grid.  Even though as of 2002 there were 
approximately 711 gas companies (5 large international gas transporters, 17 long-
distance national distributors, the 687 local Stadtwerke) operating in Germany, the 
German gas market policies are marked by few major European-level gas companies, 
mostly the 5 large long-distance transporters, leading to an oligopolistic 
situation.(BGW 2000)  The small number of European-wide companies is partly due 
to technical reasons as gas is an expensive energy to supply, more costly to transport 
than electricity.  Airtight pipelines must be placed underground whilst high pressures 
are maintained.  The time and capital required to build pipelines is a barrier to new 
companies interested in exploiting the transportation possibilities offered by the 
transportation directive.  Monopolist outpricing are not barriers to market entry as 
much as access to the transportation net.  In addition the fragmented nature of the 
German gas market renders transportation through various regions prohibitively 
expensive under the Verbändevereinbarung agreements.  The German market has a 
very tight oligopoly of foreign suppliers from Russia, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Algeria, which are under state influence or state-owned.  Because there is no spot 
market, gas companies have become accustomed to working cooperatively and 
developing alliances that are difficult to penetrate.  Internationally the German gas 
market is marked by its dependence on Russian gas which lies outside of the political 
reach of the EU.  Lastly, German companies keenly protect their pipelines which are 
positioned at the crossroads of major trans-European pipelines.   
There 17 long-distance high-pressure transporters of gas.  There are also gas 
extractors, yet liberalization is of most importance to the five major distributors: 
Wingas, BEB, RWE, VNG, Thyssengas and Ruhrgas-E.on.  Of these five, Ruhrgas 
has approximately 60% of the German gas market and is the company most 
unenthusiastic to liberalization.(La Tribune 7.2002)  Therefore it is not unimaginable 
that Ruhrgas waxes the strongest influence on the national energy policy of Germany.   
 At the EU level there are few companies out of the more than 700 German gas 
companies with representation and influence.   Ruhrgas, Wingas and Thyssengas 
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 have offices in Brussels along with RWE and E.on.  Long-distance trading brings 
corporate strategy to the EU level where companies with pan-European ambitions 
attempt to affect the legislative process.  The Commission tends to not speak with the 
gas companies, preferring to attain a modicum of transparency.(Interview 9.6.2003)  
Therefore the largest gas companies have the opportunity to make their opinions 
known to the EU either through formal EP discussions or gas conferences arranged 
by DG Tren.  Although the largest German gas companies are located in Brussels, the 
German corporative system has made it more efficient for companies such as Ruhrgas 
to form the political agenda with the Ministry of Economy and Employment 
(BMWA) in Berlin.   
 The negotiated access method under the 1998 directive made it less appealing 
for foreign gas companies standing outside the corporative Verbändevereinbarung 
arrangement to attempt to enter the German market. (Interview 28.05.2003)  At the 
same time gas consumption grew considerably in Germany.  The German market 
became more complex and long-distance transporters became worried about smaller 
margins.  Because gas and oil prices became decoupled, gas and oil became 
competitively priced against each other.  Coal and nuclear electrical cogeneration 
became increasingly replaced by gas.  In addition, most new homes in Germany were 
built to consume gas.  Promoting growth in the gas sector, the German government 
was thought as micro-managing Ruhrgas into a national champion at the expense of 
the Middelstand and other gas companies.    
 The first of the three most notable changes were anchored in the creation of 
larger conglomerates.   Electricity companies VEBA and VIAG merged in 2000 to 
create the largest integrated energy company in Europe, E.on, which in turn 
completely acquired the largest German gas company, Ruhrgas, in 2002.   The other 
large German gas companies took this as a tacit signal that they would be able to 
continue to fuse and expand.  RWE and Thyssengas entered into the business of 
acquiring smaller communal gas concerns.  According to the DG Comp, such 
mergers curbed liberalization efforts as German gas prices rose, and the complexity 
of the Germany gas system furnished by few large transporters worsened.(Interview 
15.10.2002)   
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  Second, the long-distance sector of the German gas industry internationalized 
its portfolios and partnerships.  Schröder's government had been keen in developing a 
global rather than a domestic energy policy for the German market.  Enron was seen 
not only as a new comer and a force for competition but also as a business model for 
other gas companies in the new Europe.  However Enron’s demise signaled that 
security of supply, low prices and transparency were more important than pushing for 
liberalization at any cost.  The overall strategies of the German gas market were 
marked by its position as a net-gas importer.  German market's supplies were 
dependent on access to Russian fields and only large companies can access them.  It 
is important to remember that there are different transportation systems, gas qualities, 
and pressures ranges in the German market.  Only large companies have the technical 
capacity and capital to maintain long-distance transportation nets.  Ruhrgas itself 
considered import and export as two markets requiring differing strategies and 
technical capacities.(Interview 2.6.2003)  Since the seventies, German gas companies 
have worked to establish direct pipelines to the largest export market, Russia and 
Gazprom.  Ruhrgas saw its position of international growth threatened by the lack of 
reciprocity with France and the purchase by GDF of German local utility companies. 
Unlike Ruhrgas, Wingas as well as VNG were very positive to the first 
directive, believing that large customers would benefit from increased international 
competition.  Wingas sought alliances with British companies and along with 
Ruhrgas considered linking its supplies to Norwegian gas fields.  BASF had already 
in 1991 entered into partnership with Gazprom to create Wingas.  VNG and Ruhrgas 
had established partnerships with Gazprom.  RWE had also acquired the British 
energy company Innogy.   
 Lastly unlike the middle and small gas companies, the large gas transporters 
had been more self-reliant.  Depending less on the German government and interest 
groups, the largest five gas companies have themselves promoted their strategies 
through offices and contacts in Brussels and other European governments and 
companies.  Large companies such as Ruhrgas became formally invited to make their 
opinions known through politically independent EU meetings known as the Madrid 
conferences.  Traditionally strong interest groups of the corporative system such as 
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 BWG exert more influence through Berlin than in Brussels.  BWG’s Brussels office 
is rarely staffed and is only one of hundreds of lobbyist organizations.  The EU itself 
has fewer tools to control private gas companies as there exist over 700 in Germany.  
German energy prices, especially electricity prices, had still been considerably higher 
than the EU average.  The EU does not believe that prices will be necessarily driven 
down without the correct regulation of few key companies.   
 
4.7 French Delegation 
4.7.1 Implementing Directive 98/30/EC 
The French government was attempting to retain all of the trappings of state-
dirigisme in Brussels during the implementation of the 1998 directive.  The initial 
French position can be understood as a strict protection of public service 
commitments, a stalling of GDF’s privatization in order for it to compete on the 
European market, and a desire to maintain France’s gas infrastructure which is 
nationally lauded for its low price and high level of public service.  Under the rubric 
of public service lie issues of security of supply, affordable pricing, universal access, 
and control over basic national infrastructure.  In order to balance the national budget, 
the French government has been moving beyond its instinctive policy of public 
ownership and expanding public services to citizens.   Public service obligations are 
only generally spelt out in the constitution of the Fifth Republic.  French public 
service obligations in terms of gas service ensure that gas service is not cut to clients 
who are not able to pay, that the price of gas is equal to all French citizens, that GDF 
is required to furnish service to all citizens regardless of distance from transport lines, 
and that when necessary, the government can conclude supply conditions for 
customers not able to pay.(Interview 6.6.2009)  The French position is generally 
dependent on the political parties in office along the nature of national election 
debates - more so than that of the corresponding German position.  Implementing the 
changes demanded by the 1998 and 2003 directives required major institutional 
changes to the French system.  These changes affected not just the activities of 
industrial concerns; also the social obligations of the government must be reassessed - 
requiring a revision of public service and the operation of GDF as a public enterprise.   
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  The French delegation in Brussels explained that the delays in transposing the 
directives were rooted in a national discussion regarding the privatization of GDF.  
Liberalization and privatization were considered a natural complement to 
liberalization, thereby affecting the government’s ability to ensure GDF’s obligation 
to public service.  The Commission made it clear that it did not care how 
liberalization was achieved, as long as it was achieved, with or without the 
privatization of GDF.(Interview 27.10.2002)  The French government was also 
concerned about long-term investments needed for large and expensive infrastructure 
projects.  Changing the purchase of gas by large gas companies from gas exploration 
companies to a spot-price market instead of long-term contracts would make it less 
interesting for large companies to invest in pipelines. The French representation was 
explicit in portraying this as a public service concern.  In addition the government did 
not want to repeat the experience of Juppé in 1995 who attempted to alter the 
structure of company ownership of the public service companies, provoking long and 
extended national strikes.(European Economic Report 6.9.1995)  Meeting the 20% 
market-opening demanded a different qualitative transformation in France in 
opposition to other member states, because its power generation plants were nuclear-
powered and changing customers would have to appear from the industrial sector.   
 Like Germany, the Commission brought a case to the ECJ against France for 
not transposing the law and for not meeting both qualitative and quantitative 
measures.  The threat of an ECJ trial ignited the parliamentary deliberative process in 
France regarding transposition of the 1998 directive.  For French Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin, it was important to maintain political domestic stability while being 
able to show the Commission that France was capable of following through on its 
promises.   Italy and Spain also brought TPA complaints against France.  Spain had 
already refused Electricité de France access to the Spanish market, claiming that 
reciprocal TPA was impossible due to a transposition delay by the French 
government of the 1996 electricity directive.  In regards to gas, Spain claimed that the 
delay in transposing the 1998 directive forced Spain to rely on expensive LNG 
shipments instead of being able to exploit trans-Pyrenee pipelines.  France was touted 
representing a core EU nation, but at the same time setting a bad example by being 
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 the worst offender of directive transposition due to its insistence on defending public 
services.  The postal, the telecom and the railway directives were also delayed, 
however by 2000 the French government was beginning to show an interest in 
exploiting the new possibilities offered through an open market, and that each 
privatization should be understood in its particularity, not as a dismantling of the 
legal concept public service.  The directive was finally transposed into French law in 
December 2003. 
 
4.7.2 Negotiating Directive 2003/55/EC  
 During the negotiation of the 2003 directive, state-dirigisme could no longer 
define the relationship between the French government and GDF in Brussels.  The 
changing stance of France’s acceptation of liberalization of the gas market at the 
supranational level can be thought of a result of the new prime minister Pierre 
Raffarin’s neo-liberal philosophy, along with the appearance the a new energy 
minister, Nicole Lafontaine, who had formerly been president of the EP, and the 
explicit desire of GDF president Gadonneix of turning GDF into a private company 
independent of public control.  The French government had, especially under the 
socialist governments, been selling off state enterprises to balance its state budget.  In 
light of not defaulting on the EU stability pact, the selling of GDF seeming to be a 
reasonable option in sustaining public sector infrastructures.  The notion of increasing 
effectiveness in the public sector gained currency under Chirac’s rightwing 
government.  French businesses had become more aggressive in international 
markets.  Cross-boarder competition in the gas and electricity markets reached 250 
billion Euros in 2002.(Financial Times March 14, 2002)  Amalgamating liberalization 
and privatization proved untenable domestically.  By 2002 it seemed that the only 
group against privatization was French unions, particularly CGT, Confederation 
General du Travail. 
 At the Stockholm summit in 2001 and the Barcelona summit in March 2002, 
Chirac made it clear that public service was a key concept in French 
politics.(Frankfurter Allgemeine 15.08.2002)   The total opening of the market of gas 
and electricity could affect small customers thus the government’s stance was against 
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 a complete opening of the market.  At the Barcelona summit in 2000, the French 
government was the only government against liberalization.  Succumbing to pressure, 
Chirac defended large public infrastructures such as SNCF and EDF against the 
British model.  He also highlighted the demise of Enron, and electricity blackouts in 
the United States and the European continent as recurrent troubles due to 
liberalization policy in energy markets.   
 In covering public debt, the French government began to prioritize 
international growth over promoting the protection of its domestic market.  The 
French government also had to please industrial gas consumers who did want a 
liberalized gas market.  Even GDF had voluntarily followed the 1998 directive’s 
provisions and opened 20% of its market to competition.  In 1999 Jospin’s 
government proposed a transposition of the 1998 directive which never reached 
parliamentary procedure.  It had become slowly apparent to France that it could not 
avoid Brussels' liberalization policies, and had actually much to gain in a large 
European market and meeting the growing power of the German gas market 
 In negotiating the 2003 directive, France preferred that the Commission be 
present in monitoring derogations instead of exercising an EU-wide monitory 
authority.  Unsurprisingly in discussions regarding take-or-pay clauses, France asked 
that old contracts be viewed differently than new contracts.  In 2001, France decided 
to prepare a text transposing the 1998 directive at the national level without 
informing Brussels of its intentions, hoping to meet the deadline as the ECJ required 
18 months to examine the dossier.  The ECJ tended to look unfavorably on 
transposition delays and found public service arguments unacceptable.  France did 
not want complaints regarding its inability to transpose the 1998 directive to weaken 
its position in the negotiations of the 2003 directive.  The French delegation realized 
that it would have to agree to a less than satisfactory solution.   
 A breakthrough at the Barcelona summit of March 2002, Nicole Fontaine at 
her first ministerial EU meeting stated in opposition to prior French policy that 
France was to agree to a total opening of its transportation and distribution markets - 
if the conditions were positive.  However she did not offer a conclusive date, deciding 
to leave it to national debates.  Fontaine said that if prices did not rise after the first 
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 phase of liberalization she would be in a position to discuss quantitative measures.  
She also said that labor issues were not a commensurate worry, better discussed at the 
national level.  At the same time she emphasized the exceptionality of public services 
as an extension of French culture.  Therefore France needed time to change its culture 
of public service which was embedded in French laws and contracts.  However the 
new economically liberal government represented the only EU member state 
completely against complete market opening at the 2003 Barcelona conference.  
France gave in only with certain clauses protecting the principles of public service 
allowing the government to designate a supplier of last resort.  Fontaine also 
demanded clauses ensuring both supply and controlled tariffs, along with a legal 
unbundling only covering separation of accounting.  Finally in 2003 France acceded 
to 100% market opening and all the contents of the directive proposal for 
2003/55/EC.(Le Monde 7.10.2002)   
 
4.8 French gas market 
 The 1998-2003 period brought tremendous change to GDF’s position as a 
public organization under the representation of the French government at the 
European level.  GDF had in the 1998-2003 period transformed itself into a growing 
international gas company in order to cope with increasing competition and 
opportunities on the European market with ambitions of privatization and a move 
towards independent representation of its policies in Brussels.  Initially GDF was 
negative to the 1998 directive, believing that it would endanger security of supply and 
long-term investments.  France has almost no gas-fired electricity plants.  GDF's 
European ambitions were represented in tandem with French governmental policy in 
Brussels.  The government emphasized that GDF was an issue of national resources 
and that liberalization policies would endanger GDF public duty.  GDF itself was 
worried about take-or-pay distributors being forced to pay for gas which was being 
rerouted from the supplier directly to end customers.(La Tribune 3.21.2002)   
However unlike the corporatist model there exists less flexibility in terms of business 
decisions as a public company.   
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  France, Europe's fourth largest gas market, did not have strategic control of the 
largest European supplies from Europe.  GDF would need to strengthen its links to 
the North Sea and the Russian pipelines, which questioned the efficacy of relations 
with the government.  GDF began formulating independent stances towards EU 
policy when it became apparent that the European market could offer large 
possibilities outside the domestic market.  GDF needed new sources of supply in 
order to sustain its internal market.  In addition future competition would endanger its 
domestic monopoly.  GDF saw its main competitor to be Ruhrgas and sought to 
counteract the strategies of German companies.   
 In 2000, although France had not transposed the directive, GDF sought to 
force the adoption of the directive.  GDF CEO Gadonneix stated that GDF would 
respect the directive opening its national market by 20% to 150 clients having a 
consumption of 25 million m3 of gas.(Le Monde March 16, 2000)  It also abandoned 
its import monopoly.  It wanted to continue its transporting activities.  Even more 
important was exploiting gas production and services.  Gadonneix hoped to fund its 
need for at least one billion euros through a merger with EDF.  GDF new ambitions 
lied in becoming an independent private enterprise allowing the state define the 
technical role and aspects of public service obligations.   
 By implementing key features of the 1998 directive of unbundling and TPA on 
its own initiative, GDF lost 15% of its domestic market.  GDF, in opposition to the 
French government, became therefore less interested in public service discussions 
arguing that the government transpose the directive as soon as possible.  Loses 
experienced on the domestic market were balanced by international activity.  In 2002 
GDF bought 49% of the Slovakian SPP for 2.7 billion dollars, which GDF largest 
investment ever.(Le Monde 3.21.2002)   The most import long-distance pipelines lie 
in Slovakia where both Ruhrgas and GDF compete ownership and development.  
During the 2001-2004 period GDF acquired approximately 21% of Texaco’s 
exploration licenses in the British North Sea.(GDF 2001b)  Statoil and GDF also 
discussed the possibility of exploiting the possibilities offered by the NORFRA 
pipeline, the first direct connection between the Norwegian North Sea and France.  
The lack of directive transposition hampered GDF's ability exploit the Spanish 
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 market as the Spanish government refused to open its northern border without 
commensurate reciprocity.   
 Gadonneix, CEO of the third largest European gas company, stated that he 
wanted to double GDF's size by 2005 and that it would search for partners.(Le Monde 
16.3.2000)  This required reworking Gaz de France’s legal standing as a universal 
supplier of gas since 1946.  In order to see itself as a European-wide company, it 
considered becoming either a multi-energy enterprise or working with EDF or 
TotalFinaElf.  The government realized that it must allow GDF to also grow as a 
partially-privatized concern thereby ending the mode of state-dirigisme control. 
 
4.9 Regions 
 Counter to an ideal MLG paradigm in which all three levels are present in 
negotiations at the supranational level, regions play a diminishing role at the 
supranational level.  The EU’s vision sways towards that of a market dominated by 
large companies and not by small fragmented markets.  In this new constellation of 
powers, regional interests and influences in the gas market are increasingly minor if 
already non-existent.  Article 265 of the Nice Treaty, states that the Committee of the 
Regions is not bound by any rules of engagement in the policy formation policy at the 
EU level.  The Committee of the Regions may at the most, issue opinions at will, 
because there exists no institutionalized mechanisms in legislatively incorporating the 
Committee.  The regions do not have direct influence in the Commission, they relate 
to old partners, namely their national governments through national legislative 
procedures.  In addition regions have little competency in matters of the gas market.  
The minor influence once possessed by regions has been absorbed by interest groups 
and gas companies.  The French regions have an unclear relationship with the 
national government as French regions were established in the 1980's to fill seats in 
the Committee of the Regions.  French regions also do not have any competencies in 
energy matters. The German Länder also do not attain the same institutional role at 
the EU level as through the Bundesrat at the national level.  
 The 1998 directive was of little importance to regions as it affected only the 
largest companies and long distance transport lines.  Regions had little influence over 
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 the formation of the 2003 directive as they were not formally integrated into the 
discussions at the Madrid conferences and produced no common opinion through the 
Committee of the Regions.  The Committee found that the directive’s clauses were 
too technical to merit discussion.  Both French and German communes, which are 
actually are responsible for gas policy, had no ability to enter into deliberations 
regarding the 2003 directive.   
 
4.10 Interest Groups  
The gas industry is contacted by working groups of the Commission before 
drafting appropriate legislation.  Interest groups are more influential than regions 
because they have superior institutional authority over the regions in terms of 
closeness to policy-making in the energy sector.  Only in rare cases can interest 
groups present their opinions to open sessions of the EP or the working groups under 
the auspices of DG Tren.  The Commission has established a formal method through 
which integral third party of the gas market may influence the liberalization process.  
Designated as a forum for discussion, a conference of gas market interest groups 
named the Madrid forum meets formally twice a year.  The Commission sees it as a 
compliment to its own work.  Participants convey technical and specific information.  
Under no circumstance are the forum’s discussion equal in influence to negotiations 
conducted within EU bodies.  The most influential participants of the Madrid Forum, 
Eurogas, Gas Transmission Europe (GTE), Cogen and Efet represent the gas industry 
and European regulators.  These discussions are the most effective method for third 
parties to form an opinion presentable to the EU for consideration.   
 GTE itself represents the largest transporters of gas.  Eurogas represents the 
entire industry with GDF CEO its president.  GTE itself was the most adamant 
interest group against the 2003 directive, believing that the industry would be 
hampered by central planning and regulation.  It pushed for a negotiated and 
regulated access clause instead of a purely regulated option.  GTE furthered 
complained that it was not given the opportunity to present its opinions to the first EP 
reading.(GTE 02SD126- Final)  It also believed that gas and electricity should be 
treated separately and did believe that security of supply to be an important issue.  
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 Eurogas had a more positive position towards the 2003 directive.  At the same time 
Eurogas believed that a legal framework was important, preferring to collaborate with 
the EU through the Madrid forum.  It also urged against excessive 
regulation.(Eurogas Annual Report 2002-2003; Interview Eurogas 21.02.2003)  Gas 
interest groups affect the gas policy area at the supranational level because they 
possess specialized industry knowledge that are periodically requested by the EU 
Commission. 
 
4.11 Analysis of Independent Variables 
 The choice of sector dynamics at the EU level over gas policy from 1998 to 
2003 had been that of overt liberalization.  Deregulation and regulation had been 
partial issues.  Privatization was not a matter mentioned at the supranational level.  In 
terms of EU gas liberalization policy, institutional transformation between the gas 
industries and governments of France and Germany had also never been an explicit 
issue.  The 1998 and 2003 directives had been rather aimed at affecting 
organizational transformations on how the gas industry as a whole should function in 
order to cause liberalization.   
 Reductionism: Key actors have been partially responsible for implementation 
or negotiation of liberalization directives at the supranational level.  The positions of  
Loyala de Palacio, Gerhard Schröder, Jacque Chirac, French and German gas 
ministers’, along with the positions of energy company CEO have clearly guided the 
transformations between how governments and energy companies related to each 
other in 1998 as opposed to 2003.   
Transaction Costs: Increasing transaction costs brought by the 
implementation and the negotiation of both liberalization directives made it 
functionally impossible for the French and German delegates to continue representing 
the interests of their largest national gas companies.  The EU had simply become too 
powerful in its ability to gather information, influence legislation formation and push 
through court proceedings at the ECJ.  Also, the liberalization of the gas market made 
the transaction cost of gas companies in colluding with national representatives in 
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 Brussels far too great, simply rendering competition on the gas market more 
lucrative.  
Property Rights: Property rights transformations simply did not occur at the 
European level, as privatization was not attached to liberalization policies.    
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have discussed the implementation of gas directive 98/30/EC 
and the negotiations on gas directive 2003/55/EC in regards to the institutional 
changes between the gas industry and the governments of France and Germany at the 
supranational level.  As presented in this chapter’s introduction, my general research 
findings were that initially the governments of France and Germany were still bound 
to the respective formal structural arrangements of state-dirigisme and corporatism in 
terms of how they conducted policy relations at the EU level. However companies of 
the gas market were disengaging themselves from traditional relationships with their 
governments in Brussels in order to pursue competitive opportunities offered through 
gas market liberalization through international business strategies.  The MLG 
perspective itself has uncovered lacking subnational involvement, whilst the 
supranational bodies of the EU have clearly waxed their authority over gas market 
liberalization policies.   
 In sum, the liberalization of the EU gas market has caused institutional change 
to German corporatism and French state-dirigisme at the supranational level.  I 
attribute this institutional change mostly to the strong presence of EU bodies over the 
initiatives of French and German gas companies and national governmental 
representatives in the formation and implementation of liberalization policies.  First, I 
found that key entrepreneurs of the gas industry and national governments have 
initiated institutional change by taking policy positions untraditional to both 
corporatism and state-dirigisme.  Second, transaction costs may be simply understood 
as formally originating in the 1998 and 2003 causing informal negotiatory transaction 
costs breaking down how governments and gas companies traditionally related to 
each other.  Third, the liberalization of the European market created large lucrative 
opportunities for gas companies willing to explore their competitive advantages. As 
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 discussed in 4.2, Framework, the new suprantional system can be understood as 
reflecting the momentary policy initiatives of the EU through its superior institutional 
capacity.   
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 Chapter 5 National Level 
 
5.1 Presentation  
 In this chapter I discuss the forces behind institutional change at the national 
level.  My general finding is that because not all parties in France and Germany have 
been positive to the 1998 and 2003 gas directives, institutional change in the form of 
regulated neo-liberalization has occurred at the national level, thereby signaling a 
transformation of corporatism and state-dirigisme at the national level.  In France, 
GDF was the major national force positive to liberalization.  GDF’s interest in 
decoupling itself from the national government control signaled the end of their state-
dirigiste relationship.  In Germany the failure of the Verbändevereinbarung system 
simply made the corporatism systet no longer tenable.   
 In this chapter I begin by discussing what I term regulated neo-liberalism.  I 
continue by discussing the impact of directives 98/30/EC and 2003/55/EC in France 
and Germany.  Regarding France, I discuss French energy law of January 4th 2003 
transposing directive 98/30/EC and most provisions of directive 2003/55/EC.  After a 
brief discussion of public service and privatization as a background, following my 
reductionist variable, I present the following actors as key to the creation of the 
national French gas policy: Prime Ministers Jospin and Raffarin, Energy Ministers 
Dominique Pierret and Nicole Fontaine, the General Assembly, the Senate, French 
gas operators namely GDF and interest groups namely CGT.   
Germany produced the energy law of May 24th 2003 as a result of EU directive 
98/30/EC.  Prior to presenting the impact of key actors, I begin with a background of 
key issues in Germany, namely TPA and regulation.  The actors in German gas policy 
are: the BGW, VKU, BDI and VIK interest groups; BMWA ministers Werner Müller 
and Wolfgang Clement; the Bundestag; the Bundesrat; major gas companies, namely 
Ruhrgas and Wingas; the Bundeskartellamt; and the Monopolkommission.  I end this 
chapter with a brief conclusion.  
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 5.2 Introduction 
 Neo-liberalist theory posits that government involvement in the industrial 
sector hampers domestic industrial policy; therefore businesses should be allowed 
enough self-regulation to stimulate economic growth.  According to neo-liberalist 
theory, the private sector is better positioned to direct economic growth than 
governmental planers.  However as only in anarchical situation are economies void of 
governmental interference, extended neo-liberalism never removes governmental 
involvement in economic matters.  No industrial society could function without a 
working energy supply and this has reached common agreement in the EU.   
The direction of economic neo-liberalism that I have found at the national 
level is based on a modicum of regulation over gas companies, which I term 
regulated neo-liberalism.  Gas companies are allowed to exercise their business 
strategies as long as they do not transcend the legal provisions contained in national 
gas laws transposing directives 98/30EC and 2003/55EC.  The most apparent 
attributes of this form of regulated neo-liberalism is the privatization of gas 
companies in tandem with the appointment of independent and strong energy 
regulators.  In France there is a movement in which GDF and the state are defining 
reasons for partial privatization of GDF.  At the same time the national government 
has appointed CRE the national gas regulator.  In Germany the 
Verbändevereinbarungen is being dismantled along with the creation of a national 
energy market regulator.   
At the national level, as at the supranational level, I found a general break-
down of dirigisme in France and corporatism in Germany in favor of a regulated neo-
liberalist gas market.  Although the government have negligible control over the 
overall planning of gas companies' strategies, national governments still define and 
conduct the terms of regulation and technical and social standards.  This is being 
progressed through the establishment of national regulators, oversight by the EU 
Commission, in addition to storage requirements and unbundling.   
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 5.3 France                    
5.3.1 Background 
 The issues of public service and privatization are the two issues that 
consistently dominate the liberalization process in France.  Public service is espoused 
by both the right and left flanks of the French political spectrum.  It has also been 
used as a reason to nationalize firms in the early 1980's especially those in the 
petroleum sector, banking and industrial sectors.(Schmidt:1992,1996a; 
Feigenbaum.1985)  Public service is tied to the notion of basic civil protection 
embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen from 1789.  Public 
service has been used as a common theme by unions and left-leaning political parties 
during the nineties in order to delay the privatization of major state companies by 
stating that neo-liberal policies: would estrange French citizens from basic 
infrastructure, raise gas costs, lower quality of service and transfer control important 
industry to foreign interests.  In the energy sector, public service is employed to 
control prices, maintain gas service for those who cannot pay, offer universal service 
and centralize infrastructure so that economies of scale can secure supply and 
distribution.  (Secretariat de d'Etat et l'Industrie 1999)  
 Privatization has been a policy equally practiced by the left and the right flanks 
of the French political spectrum.  The French governments of the 1990’s and early 
2000’s has used the selling of lucrative enterprises in order to balance its budget, 
skirting the sensitive issue of public service obligations by characterizing such 
privatizations as necessary steps towards competitiveness.  Privatization strategies in 
France do not always encompass complete privatizations.  In many cases the French 
government still remains a considerable share-holder, if not at least maintaining 
majority ownership.  The decreased competitiveness of French business during the 
nineties has propelled the government to switch strategies from that of nationalization 
of key companies in the early 1980's to the privatizations of the 
1990’s.(Schmidt;1996b)   In 1982 public companies totaled six hundred concerns, 
two and a quarter million laborers, and represented a larger portion of the GDP than 
that of the comparative public sector in Germany.(Dumez;1994)  Privatizations in the 
nineties were neither pressed by an explicit neo-liberal ideology nor a push by the 
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 EU, but a sense that French firms were losing in the share of an open European 
market.  In the case of GDF, liberalization has almost always denoted privatization.  
Although EU member states are not allowed to cover state budgetary weaknesses 
with privatization profits, member states may place privatization profits into national 
infrastructure and social programs.  Since 1993 the French government has amassed 
sizeable profits from the selling of industrial and financial companies.  The selling of 
private enterprises had already begun under Balladur government with the selling of 
BNP in 1993.  
 Public service obligations are not located in a specific statue but rather 
incorporated into the charters of public enterprises.  Public service in the gas sector is 
rooted in the national French law 46-628 of April 8th 1946 regarding the 
nationalization of electricity and gas services.  The law set to improving existing gas 
infrastructure and the building of new pipelines under the authority of GDF.  Yet it 
does not explicitly mention universal coverage and public service.  As a result several 
French communes are not connected to GDF's gas network.  In addition many local 
gas companies do not espouse public service criteria. 
 
5.3.2 Prime Minister 
  Whilst the president is the embodiment of the constitution and the French 
state, the prime minister is the chief administrator of the government.(Baumgartner 
1994)  National energy policy lies within the competencies of the Prime Minister and 
his cabinet.  The Prime Minister does not embroil himself in the specificities of gas 
policy.  He does although set an agenda to be progressed by the Secretary of 
Economy, Finance and Industry and his delegated ministers.  There have been two 
prime ministers during the 1998-2003 period: Lionel Jospin of the socialist party 
from 1997 to 2003, and Raffarin of the conservative UMP party whose office dates 
from 2002. 
 In 1998 Lionel Jospin began discussing the future of public service.  He asked 
whether it was viable to sustain a service that was meant to respond to the lack of 
infrastructure during the post-war period.  The conservatives asked whether the 
public sector was genuinely capable of ensuring public service for all citizens.  Lionel 
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 Jospin was strongly connected to the communist party and labor organizations.  His 
decision-making capabilities were hampered by his need for their support.  During his 
term as prime minister, the French government did not want to take a position 
regarding the 1998 liberalization directive until after the 1998 national elections.  The 
socialist government did not want to create disagreement with the left-wing parties 
and aggravate crucial electoral support even though the selling of public companies 
was actually practiced more under the socialists than by their conservative 
predecessors.  Lionel Jospin planned to privatize GDF along with EDF and 
TotalFinaElf, but was met with disagreement from the communist party.  The 
reminders of the 1995 labor strikes placed the privatization of the GDF and EDF on a 
temporary halt. 
 In May 2001 Jospin along with Laurent Fabius, then minister of economy, 
finance and industry, attempted to convince the socialist party that changing the legal 
status of GDF was timely, all without specifically mentioning privatization.  The 
ministry of energy prepared a text to be sent to the parliament containing changes to 
GDF’s status as well as a transposition of the 1998 directive.  However once again, 
Jospin’s close ties to the communist party made a partial privatization of GDF 
tenuous.(Financial Times June 18 2002)  In 2000, Jospin opened the gas market to the 
minimum threshold of 20%, without pressing for a transposition of the 1998 
directive.  Up to the 2002 elections, Lionel Jospin tried to stay away from 
privatization and renamed the privatization commission the Commission for 
Shareholdings and Transfers.   
 Raffarin ushered in a totally different economic policy as a conservative 
politician.  He called for an invigoration of the French economy to commence with 
privatization in key industrial sectors.  The conservatives dubbed privatization 
opening of capital.  Chirac and especially Raffarin made it clear that the government 
would privatize many businesses in order to balance the budget, stimulate investment 
and meet the euro stability pact to counteract the 5% tax cut by Chirac.  As the 
Communist party lost its key ally in the prime minister, the government could carry 
on privatizations estimated to gain €70bn planned through the selling of Thalys, 
Credit Lyonais and Air France and GDF.  EDF itself was estimated to be worth 
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 €80bn.(Financial Times; 18.6.2002)  The privatization of GDF was to still leave the 
government with at least a 51% majority stockholding.  At the same time the French 
government was careful to ascertain that a different type of privatization would 
transpire distinct from British-style privatization strategies.  
 The Fondation Concorde, a group counseling Chirac, published a note in 2003 
suggesting a merger between GDF and EDF, citing that this would not be in collusion 
with EU monopoly policy, while noting the lack of action of the EU in instances of 
similar mergers in other EU member states.  Raffarin finally called for a progressive 
privatization of EDF and GDF in 2002.(Les Echos; 4.7.2002)  Raffarin declared in 
July 2002 that he would prepare a package of privatization of public companies  
along with EDF and GDF. This action placed strain on the transposition of the 1998 
directive leading to debilitating national strikes during the summer of 2003.   
 
5.3.3 Minister of Energy  
 The Ministry of Energy is a subministry of the Ministry of Economy, Finance 
and Industry.  The ministers of energy have been Dominique Pierret under 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Nicole Fontaine under Francis Mer.  Both Dominique 
Pierret and Nicole Fontaine have been positive towards the liberalization of the gas 
market.  Dominique Pierret saw gas as priced not according to demand but to what 
energies it replaced.  He did not view liberalization as denoting a rise in prices to 
consumers.(Senat project de loi no 358)  Dominique Pierret was very pleased with the 
formation of the 1998 directive and hoped that it would ease inimical pressures 
towards partial privatization after initial market-opening.  The ministry also wanted to 
demonstrate to the EU Commission that it could follow its political prerogatives 
while holding its political priorities in order.  However Pierret's political interests 
were hemmed by the Jospin government's ties to labor unions. 
 Nicole Fontaine was a key figure in transposition of the 1998 directive, 
managing to bring both the right and left flanks in the French government to a 
common agreement.  She guarantied that universal service and public service would 
benefit from a liberalized market where each customer could be connected to the gas 
grid and receive quality service in clear contracts supported by the CGT union.  The 
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 CGT would receive governmental reports on the progress of market opening.  
Fontaine regretted that the 1998 directive had not been implemented.  She 
underscored three points in parliamentary discussions:   First, liberalization and 
public service obligations could coexist.  Second, liberalization would allow EDF and 
GDF to expand internationally.  Third, France needed to expand on all possible forms 
of energy to ensure future security of supply by reporting to the government on a 
yearly basis.  She also made clear that the French state would not allow unhampered 
liberalization.  Gas companies would be controlled for TPA, reasonable tariffs, 
derogations, and accounting separation. (Sénat discussions, 8 October 2002)  
  Both ministers of energy pressed for a competent commission of regulation of 
energy.  The CRE was created in 2000 to counteract arguments that liberalization 
would dismantle public service obligations in the electricity market.  Its authority was 
extended to the gas market under French law in 2003-8.  The CRE ensures: TPA, 
oversees unbundling, looks for instances of market abuse, proposes tariffs for 
ineligible customers, consults on the building of transport lines, and helps the French 
gas industry prepare itself for international consultations.  Fontaine Nicole also stated 
that privatization discussions would be left for later dates in order to push for the 
transposition of the 1998 directive into French law before action by the 
ECJ.(Assemblée Nationale 2002)  Privatization was also made difficult with a 
conflict regarding pension reform and strikes by the CGT, therefore Fontaine held 
back privatization discussions until 2004.   
 
5.3.4 General Assembly 
 The French Parliament is divided into two legislative bodies; the General 
Assembly and the Senate.  The deputies of the General Assembly are elected directly 
and Senators are elected by their departments' legislatures.  The General Assembly 
had early on been skeptical to unregulated TPA fearing that new companies could 
exploit new market capabilities and inflate gas prices.(Rouvière 1992)  Deputies have 
also been weary of alienating themselves from key constituents by pushing for 
general market liberalization.   
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  In 1999, the EU electricity directive sparked the first discussions regarding the 
modernization of public services in energy sector.  The General Assembly published 
a report (CESX9900117V) with the Conseil Economique et Social stressing that in 
order for GDF to be able to develop properly in an EU market, it should be able to 
open its capital to EDF and TotalFinaElf.  In 1999, the only party completely opposed 
to privatization of EDF and GDF was the Communist Party which had close ties with 
CGT.  The socialists and the greens believed that public services were not endangered 
by privatization.    
Gas rapporteur Francois-Michel Gonnot stated that France should not 
reorganize its energy market nor privatize GDF without secure regulation.(Gonnot 26 
Nov 2002)   The issue of regulation stemming from public service commitment 
concerns was covered through the enlarging the duties CRE, Commission de 
régulation de l’energie, the national energy regulator into the gas sector.(Assemblée 
Générale 2003)  The Parliament transposed the gas directive into French law on 19th 
December (Journal officiel January 4th 2003).  The law implemented more provisions 
than outlined by the 1998 directive.  First, the General Assembly was exact in 
pressing for a regulatory body that could ensure public service obligations.  The 
electricity regulator created in 2000 would have almost the same competencies over 
the gas market.  Second, conscious of the 2003 directive, legal separation and 
managerial distribution, with a discussion of storage were added to the law’s text.  
Third, the law allowed industrial consumers consuming more than 25 million m3 tons 
of gas or 20% of the market to choose suppliers.  This amounted to 150 large 
industrial consumers.  Fourth, the law demanded that new companies seeking access 
to the French market fulfill public service criteria based on the type of customers 
served.  Fifth, companies were no longer required to ensure a minimum of 30% 
public funding.  Sixth, companies were required to transparently publish TPA 
conditions.  The law established that the Commission de Regulation de l'Energie 
receive the authority to set guideline tariffs.  The Commission de Regulation de 
l’Energie would be able investigate transport quality but need not approve the 
building of new transport lines.  It would be able request that TPA be made to 
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 particular requests.  Lastly, service to the impoverished, security of supply and 
service to small communes were reinforced.   
Law 2003-8 also transposed most items of the 2003 directive.  Only legal 
separation of transportation and further TPA need to be transposed.  These issues 
were left for later legal negotiation.  The 2003 law was more far reaching than wished 
by the Jospin government and the General Assembly itself.  The more liberal version 
was influenced by both the Energy Ministry and the Senate.  
 
5.3.5 Senate 
 The Senate has been more positive to liberalization and privatization than the 
General Assembly.  In France the delays to the first transposition of the electricity 
directive of 1997 were tied to a project outlining the modernization and the 
development of public services in electricity.  This delay had vocalized the 
misgivings of industrial consumers.  In 2000 a group of 7 senators and 7 deputies 
refused to consider a version of the energy laws defending public services.(Le Monde 
19.01.2000)  The senate was aware that EU law could reconfigure the state of the 
French energy market established in 1946.  After the 1998 directive, the senate 
wanted a sole regulator for gas and electricity.  The energy commission in the senate 
wanted to press for the adoption of the directive already in 1998.  Article 50 of the 
finance law of 2 July 1998 would allow new companies to enter the market with less 
than 30% public funding.(Sénat 1998)  In discussing the 2003 gas law, the senate was 
very clear in stating that electricity and gas must be understood as two different 
markets possessing two different technical requirements.(Révol, 2002)  A regulator 
would regulate the gas market and develop competition.  The senate was also clear in 
differentiating between real and theoretical market opening, by asking that the 
regulator ensure that TPA be achieved.  The senate was careful in discussing take-or-
pay and long-term contracts not wishing to experience energy crises in liberalized 
markets - thereby highlighting security of supply as a major issue.  The senate 
demanded minimum storage requirements by raising minimum stock criteria from 90 
to 120 days. (Courteau, Roland, Avis 75 Tome VI 2003-2004 commission affaires)  
Law No 3 of January 4th 2003 was made into a package law for both electricity and 
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 gas and public service.  It also placed the burden on the companies to convey 
progress reports on a yearly basis to the ministry.    
 
5.3.6 French Gas Operators 
 French gas consumption of total French energy consumption has increased 
from 5% in 1970 to 14,5%.(Gaz de France 2002)  France produces 2% of its own gas 
mostly; from the Lacq site in the Pyrenees.  Of imported gas; 30% is imported from 
Norway, 29% is imported from Russia, and 29% is imported from Algeria. The 
transport grid is 36,000 km of which 90% is owned by GDF and 10% is owned by 
Gaz du Sud Ouest.  The French distribution grid is 170,000 km long.  96% of total 
distribution is performed by GDF and 4% by non-nationalized companies.  Universal 
service is not a reality as 75% of French citizens are connected to gas.  The other two 
large companies operating on the French market are GSO (Gaz Sud Ouest) and CFM 
(Compagnie Francaise du Methane).  GSO was created in 1945 and supports 14 
departments in Acquitaine.  70% of GSO is owned by Total and 30% by GDF.  CFM 
was created in 1956 in order to exploit the Lacq gas field and operates in 25 French 
departements in the center of France.  55% of CFM is owned by GDF and 45 % by 
Total.  (Poniantowksi 2002)   The French market is largely centered on GDF’s supply 
capabilities.  GDF is Europe’s third largest gas company.   
There exist 17 distributors of gas serving 174 communes.  They have never 
been nationalized and do not have enough market capital necessary to enter new 
markets.  In 1998-1999 GDF used 400 million Francs to serve 1200 new communes 
(Beson 1999).  France was the only country to still grant concessions forbidden by 
the 2003 directive.  Article 81 of the finance law of 2001 calculated prices of the lines 
of concession and GDF, GSO and SEAR placed bids for new lines.  GDF was 
allowed 37 of 43 granted concessions in 2001.(DGEMP 2002)  By 2003 GDF had 
lost 15% of the French gas market as standardized authorizations instead of 
concessions were made practice by the 2003 gas law.  However important national 
supply contracts would still be authorized by the energy minister and communal 
supply contracts by prefectures.   
 97
  As a nationalized company, GDF had in 2002 an executive board comprising 
of six representatives of the state, six GDF employees, and six gas industry experts.  
Other subgroups give their opinion to the GDF administration.  The GDF president is 
named by governmental decree.  The government periodically renews three-year 
contracts with GDF in which future strategy is outlined.  Although not abandoning 
public service interests, GDF has been clearly interested in ending ties with the 
government by pressing for privatization and welcoming liberalization.  Through its 
strategies of international expansion, voluntary market opening and a wish towards 
privatization, GDF has had little contact with the Ministry of Energy.  GDF currently 
prefers to work with the government through the senate.(Interview 16.6.2003)  In 
2001 GDF concluded a three-year plan with the government concerning the need to 
acquire capital for acquisitions from 5 to 17 billion Francs.  GDF was also was 
allowed to run a debt and was given six instead of twelve months to adjust to 
international prices.  GDF also intended on increasing customers at the national level 
- approximately 200,000 new customers every year.   
The first electricity directive in 1996 allowed EDF to become a multi-energy 
company contemplating a merger with GDF.  EDF pressured the socialist majority 
government in 2000 for transposition of directive 98/30/EC into French law.  This 
pressure from either GDF or EDF had never before occurred.  In 2000, GDF reached 
a net profit of €11.21 billion.(GDF 2000)  It voluntarily opened its market to 20% or 
25 million m3 tons of gas.  CEO Gadonneix stated that GDF intended to double its 
size by 2005 and that it would separate its transport and selling entities.  In 2000, 
GDF bought 12 exploratory licenses in the British North Sea and in Egypt and 
reached its half-way goal of 15% in-house gas extraction by 2002.  In Slovakia GDF 
worked with Gazprom to exploit the largest European gas nexus.  GDF envisioned 
turning public customers into private clients.   
Due to EU liberalization policy in the gas market GDF as a nationalized 
French company experienced public ownership as a handicap.  First GDF viewed the 
liberalization transformations present in other EU member-states as harmful to its 
international competitive standing.  Second, the French government’s ownership of 
GDF hemmed expansionary strategies in a liberalized market.  Third, because of the 
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 dire financial French budget, GDF could not rely on the government as a secure loan 
guarantor.  Fourth, Spain and Italy have denied both EDF and GDF entry into their 
markets on grounds of faulty reciprocity and advantageous public funding by the 
French state.(Interview 5.6.2003) 
  The 2003 directive allowed 500,000 French customers the opportunity to 
change suppliers, resulting in a loss of industrial customers, especially in 
Southwestern France.  GDF was however adamantly against opening access to its 
storage facilities.   It also did not want to allow access to transport lines which had 
not yet been amortized.  Yet GDF could not afford dismissing large French 
industrials concerns that were positive to the market opening, even more so than their 
German counterparts.  Four large industrial groups, Solvay, Saint-Gobain, Pechiney 
and Rhodia, accounting for 4% of the French market’s consumption invited bids to 
supply of their 19 large French plants, hoping to lower their bills.(Financial Times 
31.8.2000)   Since 2001 five new large distributors appeared on the gas sector 
representing approximately 5%.  The new NORFRA pipeline with a maximum 
capacity of 14 billion m3 yearly represents the total French consumption and the first 
direct pipeline to a foreign source of gas. (Conseil régionale Nord-Pas de Calais 
1998)  Pierre Gadonneix stated that GDF would offer TPA unequivocally to all 
ambitious bids.  He concurrently stated that GDF was considering a privatization in 
order to meet the new demands of large industrial concerns.  GDF planned to borrow 
€1-2 bn in 2002 to fund international expansion and would have preferred to raise 
capital through the selling of shares on the stock market.(Financial Times August 31, 
2000)   
   
5.3.7 Interest Groups 
 There also exist interest groups in France that discuss national economic issues 
with the government.  However unlike their German counterparts, French interest 
groups represent employer and employee organizations discuss labor conditions 
rather than issues of industrial planning.  GDF has 37,800 employees.(Interview 
17.4.2003) The Confederation General du Travail, CGT represents 1,660,466 workers 
in the largest state-owned French companies.  CGT has been adamant in protesting 
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 against partial privatizations in both EDF and GDF.  Yet even CGT has bowed to 
pressure in accepting changes in contract so that GDF and EDF may compete in a 
pan-European market. 
In 1999, labor organizations negotiated a lowering of labor costs with the 
Ministry of Public Functions.  CGT's connections with the government have been 
weakened because Raffarin unlike Jospin does not view labor groups as political 
allies.  Moreover the public believed that that GDF’s and EDF’s union laborers have 
hammered on public service issues not because a desire to continue offering good 
service to French citizens’, but to protect union jobs.  In addition French citizens have 
largely viewed privatizations positively.  CGT remains negative to the privatization 
of EDG and GDF.  However CGT director David Cohen would like see a merger 
between both companies, allowing for broader investments.(CGT 2003)  
 
5.4 Germany 
5.4.1 Background 
 The decentralized federal nature of the German corporatist complex involves 
more actors and more political negotiations than in France.  The German Minister of 
Industry and Labor, 1998 to 2002, Wolfgang Clement and his Deputy Energy 
Minister Georg Wilhelm Adomowitsch had less power in agenda-setting than their 
French counterparts.  Due to the corporatist institutional structure, they were required 
to allow large companies to negotiate in the policy-making process.  Public Service is 
not an issue in Germany as it is believed that the government provides for the welfare 
of the destitute through social programs and not through controlled energy prices.   
Privatization is also not an issue as the government has not been a share-holder in 
large energy companies.  The important issues have been the negotiation of the TPA 
system and regulation.  Gas prices have been a concern of consumers and not of the 
government.  Overall governmental policy during the Schröder government has been 
rooted in stimulating the German economy more than in promoting social issues.  The 
largest transformations have occurred in the breakup of the corporative decision-
making apparatuses of the Verbändevereinbarung system and the creation of a 
national regulator in curbing companies' agenda-setting capabilities.   
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5.4.2 Interest groups 
 The Verbändevereinbarung system or VV was an agreement between four key 
interest groups, two interest groups representing gas suppliers and two interest groups 
representing consumers.  The suppliers were represented by the BGW, 
Bundesverband der deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft, an interest group 
representing German gas companies and VKU, Verband kommunaler Unternehmen 
e. V., interest group representing communal utility companies. Consumers were 
represented by BDI, Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie e. V.,  Union of the 
Germany Industry and VIK, Verband der industrieller Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e. 
V.,  Union of Large energy consumers.  The groups met under the direction of the 
BMWA, Ministry of Industry and Labor, in order to agree on national contractual 
terms for a given year.  VVI and VVII were negotiated from 2001 to 2003.  The VV 
system was to promote the efficiency and flexibility of the German corporative 
system instead of relying on directive transposition.   However it did not function 
because negotiations were time consuming, parties did not agree easily and TPA was 
really not achieve through the VV model.   Furthermore BGW risked its national 
position as it was never democratically legitimated to bear such a strong position on 
consumer prices.   
 The first Verbändevereinbarung required nine months of negotiations and was 
adopted in July 4 2000.   The first Verbändevereinbarung, also known as VVI, 
offered TPA concepts and tariffs, standard connection conditions, storage access, 
hourly balancing prices, capacity management and methods to render different gas 
qualities compatible to each other.  Each gas transport transaction was to be 
negotiated individually.  At first, the consumer groups, VIK and BDI worried that 
liberalization would drive up prices.  The supply groups, BGW and VKU worried 
that liberalization would lower prices.  VVI entailed that the five large gas importers 
open their storage facilities by 30 June 2001.  The weaknesses of VVI were apparent 
as only 3% of consumers or 20 companies changed their suppliers by 2003.(Le 
Monde, March 29, 2003)  German consumers did not change suppliers easily and had 
little incentive to do so.  Even though BGW stressed that the German market was 
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 completely open to competition, the VVI agreement did little to ease the 
complications in concluding new TPA contracts.  Germany was Europe’s largest gas 
market and German gas and electricity prices remained amongst the highest in 
Europe, approximately 20% over the EU average.(Frankfurter Allgemeine 21.1.2002) 
 VVII was termed valid from October 1st 2002 to 30 September 2003.  VVII 
was to present a transparent calculation of TPA costs and rules.  Because regional and 
national tariffs levels were combined, it reduced pricing models from three to two.  
The transport pricing of long-distance gas was to be checked yearly and compared to 
the levels of international tariffs.  In order to dissuade pancaking, a stamp price would 
be placed on transported gas from entrance to exit stations in the gas grid.  Non-
industry customers with large usage would be designated special tariffs under VVII.   
 VVI and VVII did not include all important terms of the 1998 directive; the 
specificities of the 2003 directive made future discussions unnecessary.  With a case 
at the ECJ pursued by DG Comp against the German state, it became apparent that 
the Verbändevereinbarung system appeased the neither EU nor consumer groups - 
thereby sparking a movement towards regulation at the national level.  Consumer 
groups contended that there existed really no substantial negotiations, as the large gas 
companies created their own gas prices immune to competitive prices, and that 
German electricity prices had actually increased after liberalization.  Small electricity 
suppliers criticized the large electricity companies for the slow liberalization of the 
electricity market.  The then Industry and Labor minister Werner Mueller threatened 
all VV partners with the creation of a super-regulator with authority over the entire 
energy market - even though it would be difficult for a regulator to compile all 
necessary information over Germany’s complicated energy market.  VVIII never 
came to fruition as its negotiations reached a stalemate after months of discussion 
leading to a regulated TPA system with a then future unspecified national regulator, 
most likely the Bundeskartellamt. 
  
5.4.3 Minister of Industry and Labor 
The German Minister of Industry and Labor, BMWA, has long been 
dependent on reaching common agreements with large industrial concerns in terms of 
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 national policy.  BMWA cannot be seen as taking a stance inimical to industrial 
interests and opinions.  Government control is seen as an intrusion to growth and 
innovation.  The ministry has a goal of providing for a convivial business structure, 
allowing the energy sector to fuel the country’s economy and offer a framework for 
development through internal market strategies in tandem with the industrial sector.  
Security of supply with a mixture of energy sources and allowing German gas 
companies to achieve the appropriate weight on the supply-buying market has 
traditionally been accepted practice as long as environmental concerns with 
renewable energies and energy-saving being included.   
 Werner Müller was the BMWA’s politically non-affiliated minister who once 
worked for VEBA before it merged with VIAG in 2000 to create Eon.  He was keen 
in ensuring that the VV system functioned by giving its participants many 
opportunities to conclude common agreements.  He established Task Force TPA, a 
group aimed at settling negotiatory difficulties in VV negotiations by offering 
solutions and discussing insufficiencies with VV participants.  Both Schröder and 
Müller were keen in prioritizing the presence of large industries over the 
Middelstand, or middle-sized companies, at the European level.  Müller believed that 
strong German companies would aid in lowering domestic unemployment.  Before 
leaving his post, Müller approved a merger between Ruhrgas and Eon in 2002 
revoking a prior decision by the Bundeskartellamt.  The minister’s approval is a 
distinctive feature of the German law not liked by the EU Commission, in which a 
minister may allow for a merger against the wishes of both the Bundeskartellamt and 
the Monopolkommission.  The approval must be grounded in arguments that a large 
merger due to ministerial approval may in fact be positive for the national economy.  
This right had been exercised only six times in its forty-year existence.(Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 18.2.2002) 
 Werner Müller returned to work for Ruhrgas in October 2002 and was 
replaced by Wolfgang Clement of the Social Democratic Party.  Wolfgang Clement 
wanted to strengthen the economy minister’s authority to allow fusions even through 
the protestations of regional courts.  Yet he also wanted to force TPA onto the gas 
industry following a similar position as Nicole Fontaine at the EU Barcelona summit 
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 in 2002.  Unlike Müller, Clement was critical of the German gas industry’s 
insufficient implementation of the quantitative provisions of EU gas policy.  He made 
it known that the VV system was time-consuming, based on too many short-term 
contracts and inefficient in concluding common agreements.(Pressemitteilung May 
20th, 2003 BMWI)  Because the VVIII discussions stalled in disagreement, BMWA 
developed basic elements of TPA and rules to be applied by the gas 
industry.(Interview 23.01.2004)  The BMWA Task-Force was to discuss transparent 
practices, net access, and standardization of market rules which had not been made 
clear the VV system.  Lastly, Clement believed in a reappearance of the VV system, 
but only with clear rules in place, a national regulatory body and a new 
comprehensive energy law appearing in 2004.(Interview 14.1.2003) 
 
5.4.4 Bundestag  
 Delays in transposing the EU directive were largely due to a belief that the VV 
system could create a competitive environment without governmental regulation.  A 
common position at the Bundestag was that competition was best ensured by private 
regulation and competition offered by a large number of energy companies.(Interview 
23.01.2004)  In addition members of the Bundestag initially explained that the 
German constitution promoted the sanctity of the legal state or Rechtstaat over the 
common-law procedures of the EU.   
The electricity directive was transposed in April 1998 as the Gesetz über die 
Elektrizitäts- und Gasversorgung EnWG.  Gas was incorporated as an elementary fuel 
for electrical production.  Gas companies were allowed self-regulation capabilities 
through Guter Fachliche Praxis, or good professional practices of prices, and TPA.  
However gas companies were to cede the technical inspection of storage facilities to 
the national government.  The German representation in Brussels subsequently 
explained in discussions to DG Tren that the items of the 2000 gas directive were 
sufficiently covered by the 1998 law and the VV system.(Interview 15.10.2002)  
CDU Bundestag leader Hartmut Schärte sparked convergent options by stating that 
the government was badly positioning the economy in terms of competition and 
industrial structure.(CDU 2002)  Allowing monopolies to set the national economic 
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 agenda and dictate terms over medium-sized businesses known as the Mittelstand 
weakened the German possibility to react internationally.  Placing importance on 
taxation did little to strengthen the German economy as outlined by the 1991 Standort 
Deutschland program in creating a competitive business environment.(Interview 
27.5.2003)   
The impulse in creating new German legislation regarding energy was not as 
vigorous as desired by the EU.  There exists no German law guaranteeing universal 
service and prices may vary throughout Germany.  The number of public servants is 
lower than in most EU member states and employees of energy companies are not 
given the right to strike.  Therefore there exists little public servant pressure in 
reforming the German energy market.  Legislative propositions are initiated at the 
appropriate ministries so that laws are agreeable to all governmental bodies - in this 
case BMWA.  Only in December 2000 did BMWA finish a first draft of the new 
energy law which had to be sent to the Bundestag.  The second draft, a revisal of 
German law, or Nouvelle was written for both the electricity and gas markets and 
processed in May 2002.  It was to bring in good technical expertise in opening the 
market further and nullified the Verbändevereinbarungen.  However it was not 
ratified after lengthy and problematic negotiations at the Bundestag.  
A new proposal was then introduced by the SPD and Bündis 90/Die Grünen in 
December 17th 2002.  Both parties exclaimed that there was not enough competition 
in the gas sector and that legal action by the ECJ demanded immediate transposition.  
The proposal was a reworking of the earlier electricity law of 1998.  All regulation in 
the electricity sector would also apply to the gas sector in order to regulate 
discrimination of TPA.  Good business practices became the rules and the standard of 
regulating tariff calculations.  Quantitative technical specifications were also added.  
The publishing of information was made requisite.  The regulation of access to 
storage and nets was to be enforced.  It also made medium suppliers responsible for 
TPA between the long-distance suppliers and consumers.  Tariffs were to be 
published on companies’ websites and universally accessible.  It also gave BMWA 
the power to examine and curb instances of bad TPA.  However the directive did not 
affect the distribution nets.  It also left many items open to individual contracts. The 
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 law was adopted on the 24th of May 2003 and left the important items of the 2003 
directive to later comprehensive legislative action. 
 
5.4.5 Bundesrat 
 Unlike the Committee of the Regions, the Bundesrat has legislative authority 
in the political process as one of the five branches in the federal government.  Each 
law must be passed at the Bundesrat after approval by the Bundestag.  The 69 
representatives of the Bundesrat are not directly elected nationally, but through 
regional parliaments in order to represent their Länder.  The Bundesrat represents 
Länders’ positions nationally along with their positions regarding EU policy.  The 
Bundesrat can appeal laws and deny laws at the Bundestag.  It has an absolute veto 
right in all instances of laws that directly affect the Länder.  The Bundesrat is also the 
first organ that reviews a law and takes a position on it.  Unlike the Bundestag, the 
Bundesrat does not work closely together with national interest groups.  It is rather at 
the defense of regional interests - policy formation and decision occur at the 
subnational level(Interview 14.1.2004)  Because the Bundesrat’s positions emanate 
from regional positions, their energy policy is discussed in chapter 6.   
 
5.4.6 Large Companies 
  Gas consumption as total German energy consumption was 24.4% in 
2003.(AG Energiebilanzen)  Even though there are more than 700 gas companies in 
Germany's three-tiered market, institutional transformations have been stalled due to 
the corporative system.  The German gas market is comprised by three distinct groups 
of companies: the long-distance transporters, regional transporters and the local 
utility companies known as Stadtwerke.  Because gas companies are not controlled 
by the government, changes are difficult to implement if not agreed upon by the 
companies themselves.  Large companies have many of the same strategies as the 
government because their strategies fit into general domestic energy policy.  The 
German gas companies claim that they have no reason to open their private pipelines 
to TPA competitors.  German companies have also tried to increase their downstream 
as well as their upstream positions, and the government has rarely promoted policies 
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 unfavorable to the large gas companies.  The largest transformations to the German 
gas industry are a concentration of ownership, internationalization, and the 
integration of activities.  In 2003, five years after the opening of the market, many 
new gas companies had disappeared, the price of gas had not been reduced, and many 
foreign companies had withdrawn themselves from the German market.  The national 
gas market is clearly dominated by the largest five long-distance transporters, 
especially Ruhrgas, as the market is divided as follows: 50% Ruhrgas, 14.2 BEB, 
Verbundnetz 13.7%, RWE gas 11.7% and Wingas 10.25%.(Frankfurter Allgemeine 
18.2.2002b) 
 TPA was difficult to introduce in Germany due to the large number of: grids, 
gas companies and areas of demand.  Often TPA contracts were inexplicably delayed 
whilst the distribution arm of a transport company paid lower TPA fees.  Germany 
has received several hundred requests for TPA since complete market opening in 
1998, but only 25 requests have been granted representing 1% of total output.  
Germany is the only EU member state without a competent regulator of price and 
availability.  The transposition of Directive 98/30/EC granted the 
Monopolkommission and the Bundeskartellamt little authority over the gas industry.  
The largest gas companies have insisted that VV agreements should be yearly refined 
as the market is characterized by many actors.  They also believed that common rules 
should have emanated from their ranks.  Ruhrgas had always been adamantly against 
the 1998 directive, speculating that it would drive up prices, endanger long-term 
contracts and drive down supply.  It made clear that it would oppose the EU 
Commission looking into confidential contracts.  Ruhrgas believed that it had low 
TPA costs and simple entry fees and rules, therefore leading to no need for 
regulation.  Ruhrgas was the most negative of large five gas transporters towards 
enforced TPA.(Interview 2.6.2003)  Conversely Wingas was the most receptive of the 
large five gas transporters to enforced TPA as long as legal unbundling was not 
imposed.(Interview 16.6.2003) 
 Ruhrgas is the largest German gas company, with a market presence of at least 
50 percent.  Because Ruhrgas believes that regulation affect company strategies, 
Ruhrgas has been very active in all national discussions and meetings relating to the 
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 German gas market.  It has been less dependent on the Verbände since the passage of 
directive 98/30/EC.(Interview 16.01.2004)   Ruhrgas has not been willing to separate 
its transmission, distribution and storage functions.  Even though Ruhrgas' major 
presence in the German gas market had warranted concern at the national level, it has 
been effective in pursuing most of its business strategies.  Eon's acquisition of 
Ruhrgas was not without consequences for Ruhrgas.  Energy secretary Alfred Tacke 
explained that Ruhrgas would have to sell its shares in VNG, regional distributor 
EWE and Gelsenwasser and sell 75 billion kilowatt hours of gas to electricity 
companies in order to merge with Eon.(Frankfurter Allgemeine 5.7.2002) 
 The established companies have had little incentive to change their business 
practices.  The transposition of directive 98/30/EC marked an end to the 1935 
German energy law’s demarcation clause, which allowed large companies to control 
regions legally lying in their markets, thereby inhibiting the entrance of other 
companies.  The new energy German law 24th May 2003 allowed companies to build 
pipelines in other companies’ territories.  It also introduced a stamp tariff outlining a 
simplified standard TPA entry fee scheme.  It is important to note that even though 
the oligopolist nature of the German gas market is to the liking of the largest gas 
companies, the transposition of the 2003 directive is slated to impose larger structural 
changes as the Verbändevereinbarung system has been deemed defunct.     
 
5.4.7 Bundeskartellamt  
The Bundeskartellamt is an independent organ allowing or denying fusions 
based on the German cartel laws of 1958 and 1999.  In comparison to other European 
cartel bodies, the Bundeskartellamt has little power over the gas industry, even 
though it had been considered a possible future national energy regulator in 2003.   It 
has the ability of working with the Commission in concluding decisions on mergers 
in the gas industry.  The Bundeskartellamt bases its conclusions not on price 
analyses, but after investigating for actors with dominant positions in the gas 
industry.  Although the Bundeskartellamt has allowed Ruhrgas to acquire 150 
Stadtwerke, it denied the fusion between Eon and Ruhrgas - which was overridden by 
BMWA minister Werner Müller.  The German regulator wants to increase its post-
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 ante power but has little binding authority in regards to governmental decisions.  The 
Bundeskartellamt has no ideal structural model for the gas market and believes that 
any amount of competition is conducive to economic growth as long as there exists a 
competitive market and a competent regulator is introduced through the transposition 
of the 2003 directive.  It argues that high prices have not produced better quality to 
consumers or lower prices.(Interview 12.01.2004)   
 
5.4.8 Monopolkommission 
The Monopolkommission’s statements and publications have had little impact on the 
German gas market and therefore will not be discussed. 
 
5.5 Analysis of Independent Variables. 
 At the national level, privatization in France and regulation and Germany had 
been the major tangible issues surrounding the liberalization of the gas market - 
enough to cause significant institutional transformation. 
 Reductionism: Key actors have been vital in effecting change at the national 
level - even more so than at the supranational level.  Key actors at the national level 
are closer to the legislative formation of laws and business strategies.  Key actors at 
the supranational level are buffered from effecting such direct institutional change 
because directives are guidelines towards direct legal implementation at the national 
level.  The strongest national-level actors are also present in effecting institutional 
change at the supranational level, showing correlating policy positions by actors at 
the supranational and national levels.  The shift in policy in France from 1998 to 2003 
was revealed by a positive sentiment to privatization by key actors.  In Germany the 
break down of the Verbändevereinbarung discussions between key actors in 2003 led 
to the introduction of regulated TPA and a regulatory authority.   
 Transaction Costs: The most relevant formal transaction costs forcing 
institutional transformation at the national level can be understood as regulated TPA 
and increased competition.  National-level transaction costs related to privatization 
discussions surrounding GDF in France, and the breakdown of the VV system and the 
creation of a regulated gas market in Germany.  The French market had been already 
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 regulated.  The German market had already been marked by large and independent 
private gas companies.   
 Property Rights: Shifting property rights in terms of the partial privatization 
of Gaz de France was discussed at the national level, but did not yet occur by 2003.  
It had however a long-standing impact on the national discussions regarding the 
transposition of the 1998 directive.  Nicole Fontaine decoupled the issue of partial-
privatization from that of the transposition of the 1998 directive.  Privatization was 
simply not a concern at the national level in Germany. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
As discussed in the chapter 4, in employing the Multi-Level Governance 
perspective I have found that the institutional dynamics have been caused by a top-
down movement from the bodies of European Union as catalysts to institutional 
change in the national gas policies of France and Germany.  This was embodied by 
the threat of court cases by the Commission at the European Court of Justice and 
decreased legitimacy of French and German policy negotiators in Brussels.   
The pure national dynamics causing institutional transformation at the national 
level were due to: GDF seeking independence in terms of its business strategies from 
the French government thereby weakening the state-dirigisme structure, and of the 
dissolution of the Verbändevereinbarung system in Germany formally signifying the 
dissolution of corporative discussions between governmental and gas companies.  At 
the national level independent ex-ante regulators represent the key organizations of 
the new institutional arrangements in France and Germany supplanting corporatism 
and state-dirigisme in the liberalized gas markets of the EU.  The new forms of 
institutional arrangements that I have empirically discussed in this chapter lead to 
common institutional arrangements in both France and Germany, which I term 
regulated neo-liberalism.  Regulated neo-liberalism responds to the qualitative and 
quantitative demands of being an EU member state responsible to EU liberalization 
policy in the gas sector. 
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 Chapter 6 Subnational Level 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The subnational level has been the misplaced level in terms of common EU 
gas policy; little institutional change has occurred at the subnational as the systems of 
state-dirigisme and corporatism have been left functionally intact in France and 
Germany from 1998 to 2003.  Although the subnational level is included in the 
provisions of directive 2003/55/EC, subnational actors expected little short- or 
medium-term change in the relationships between subnational governments and gas 
companies.  The only notable changes have been the expansion of CRE, French gas 
regulator, into communal gas markets, the free choice of gas suppliers to French 
communes and the privatization in the of Stadtwerke in Germany in the late 1990’s.  
Subnational actors expect little institutional transformations after the 1998-2003 
empirical scope of this comparative case study.   
 I begin this chapter with an overview of why little institutional transformation 
has occurred at the subnational level.  I then present my findings after brief 
background discussions of the subnational level in France and Germany.  I present 
the empirical material according to the independent reductionist variable as follows: 
French communes, GDF, the Länder, regional companies and Stadtwerke.   I end this 
last empirical chapter with a short analysis and conclusion. 
  
6.2 Overview 
 Directive 98/30/EC was directed towards liberalizing the long-distance 
transport market.  The only large-scale apparent transformations that have occurred 
between 1998-2003 that could have instigated institutional transformations in either 
France or Germany are the purchasing of regional and communal gas utility 
companies on the German market in anticipation of directive 2003/55/EC.  The 2003 
directive was the first gas market liberalization directive incorporating distribution at 
the subnational level.  The directive underscores that the separation of long-distance 
transmission and regional distribution systems must be legally enforced in order to 
exist in parallel of each other.  The distribution sector will undergo 100% market 
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 opening.  Only in rare cases will derogation be granted to small companies 
experiencing financial and administrative burdens.   
 Regions have had no direct impact on the formation of the 2003 directive and 
have clearly been marginalized during discussions of the text.  Regions in both 
France and Germany have traditionally had no competence in energy policy at either 
the national or the subnational levels.  The directive creates a gas market not 
contingent on administrative policies but on the corporative behaviors of competitive 
companies.  I claim that the most striking changes at the subnational level are 
apparent through the depoliticization of energy policy at the subnational level.  
Energy policy will no longer be contingent on administrative cooperation between 
communes and gas companies.  Local governments become only one of many 
potential gas costumers after the subnational gas market is opened to competition. 
 The subnational level is the weakest policy level in terms of the MLG 
paradigm, as all subnational governments portray disengagement from energy policy 
at the supranational level. The EU system has not involved subnational governments 
in terms of gas policy.  Appropriate institutional dynamics would require an entire 
reordering of the subnational system.  Subnational administrators have very little 
knowledge of other regions and are not powerful enough to bargain with their 
counterparts at the EU level.  Regional companies are also not able to influence 
transformations at the European market in opposition to the long-distance 
transmission companies.  Although the German Länder are well embedded into the 
German federal system, there exists no comparable space for them at the EU level 
(Jeffrey 1997; Balme 1998).  The French system is strongly characterized by a 
centralized national structure.  Attempts at defusing decision-making to other levels 
have failed to reach any considerable weight (Smith 1997; Benz 1998).   
 
6.3.1 France     
  The transposition of the 1998 directive was delayed until January 2003.  
However as discussed in the previous chapter, the national French law of January 4th 
2003 incorporated the 1998 directive and key aspects of the 2003 directive, leaving 
the specificities of legal unbundling and TPA for a later transposition of the 2003 
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 directive.  The idea of expanding the law to encompass key provisions of the 2003 
directive was embraced by all large French parties.  A parliamentary consensus 
believed that gas market liberalization was a necessary component of lower fuel 
prices leading to domestic industrial growth.  Eligibility was opened completely to 
electricity producers, distributors and end industrial consumers, but not to 
households.  The law gave customers the right to detail the quality, pressure, location 
and method of gas delivery.  The laws most ambitious result was the appointment of 
an independent regulator, CRE.  CRE was accorded the duty of ensuring transparency 
and justifiable TPA fees at the subnational level.  CRE could also aid in TPA fee 
calculations and end existing contracts by negotiating agreements between interested 
parties.   Through the CRE, clients could register themselves eligible through the 
Ministry of Energy and then be protected by standard contractual practice in addition 
to being warned of unjustifiable gas prices.    
 The French subnational level is not a system of regions.  The regions were 
created in order to fit into the EC Committee of the Regions during the eighties.  
Their duties lie in issues of regional economic development and environmental 
protection in terms of energy policy.  Gas policy has always been a matter for French 
communes.  The subnational level consists also of the mairies which represent the 
national government.  The mairies conduct civil duties such as issuing personal 
documents, conducting civil marriages and reporting political issues to the president.  
Mairies have no competence in energy matters.  In addition, French départments have 
no competency in energy matters.  Gas lies under the authority of communes and also 
various cooperative arrangements between communes known as communautés de 
communautés, intercommunautés, and régions urbaines.  
 
6.3.2 Communes 
 GDF was chosen to supply the French distribution net in 1946 as gas was an 
expensive commodity to supply in post-WWII France.  After 57 years of recognition 
of GDF as the national supplier of gas in France, the 2003 directive marked the end 
of its de facto cooperation with communes, thereby establishing a concessionary 
monopoly on the distribution market by default.  Even though GDF does represent 
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 more than 90% of the gas in the domestic market, it is incorrect to assume that 
communes are required to commit themselves to GDF.  GDF has been the national 
supplier of gas because of the financial and technical limitations of supplying gas 
service in France.  There are various grades and pressures of gas, which only a 
company with sufficient capital such GDF can exploit.  Communes cannot afford the 
building of a distribution net - which also requires constant supervision not served by 
the technical capacities of the French commune.  Therefore communes have 
traditionally concluded long-term contracts with GDF.  French communes transfer 
concessions to GDF for a period of 30 years.  During this period no other gas 
company is allowed to enter the commune's gas distribution net.  GDF is responsible 
for the entire distribution process and the technical supervision of the gas net.  
Communes merely act as accountants and request reports from GDF at biannual 
meetings to ascertain that gas distribution is functioning correctly.  GDF allows the 
nets to amortize themselves during the 30 year period.  After this period, GDF and 
communes decide whether they care to continue cooperation.  Even after the end of 
this concessionary agreement, communes are responsible for maintaining public 
service obligations for public buildings such as schools and other buildings owned by 
communes.  (Interview 5.6.2003)  
 Due to the 2003 directive, the communes have become customers just like any 
other industrial customer - thereby ending the de jure state-dirigiste model between 
the French state and the industrial sector.  After July 2004, communes are allowed to 
freely choose their supplier according to price and service in addition to public 
service matters.  Prior to TPA at the distribution level, companies were bound to the 
same supplier chosen by their commune.  Of the 36,000 communes, 10% have either 
no gas supplier or have their own local gas companies such as found in the large 
cities of Bordeaux and Grenoble.(Interview 6.6.2003)  150 companies or 4% of total 
consumption banded together in 2001 to access lower gas prices through TPA.  This 
collective purchasing is also practiced by conglomerates of communes interested in 
lowering gas costs.  This trend is ensured by the Law of Chevènement which 
concedes larger powers and national financial assistance to communes that band 
together to purchase gas.(Interview 6.6.2003)  In addition because GDF is in reality 
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 not a universal supplier, national French law No98-546 2 July 1998 gave GDF three 
years to serve communes that made service requests.  After 2001 these communes 
were allowed to search for other suppliers.  However little change in distributor has 
been requested by communes as of 2003.  This movement towards larger economies 
of scale is welcomed by overall EU gas policy.  GDF still retains its large presence in 
the French gas market even as communes are allowed to change suppliers.  Thus little 
de facto institutional change is currently expected in the relationship between 
governmental authorities and gas companies at the subnational level in France.   
 
6.3.3 GDF 
 The major transformation for GDF has been a loss in its distribution division 
to foreign competitors.  This loss has been balanced by GDF’s entry into foreign 
markets.  Since abiding by the TPA provisions of the 1998 directive, GDF has lost 
15% of the domestic market, particularly in the southwest.  The concessionary system 
will be largely unaffected by the 2003 directive.  Communes can still choose GDF as 
their distribution supplier.  The contractual relationship becomes then a pure contract 
of supply without infrastructure construction provisions, first with the transporters 
and secondly with the distributors.  Both transport and supply tariffs are to be 
controlled by the CRE regulator.  The commune is allowed to define the 
characteristics of the gas transported and how it is delivered.  The balancing between 
maximum and minimum delivery along with fair contracts of delivery are also 
ascertained by CRE.  (www.gazdefrance.com/collectivites/deregulation/achats.htm)    
 GDF has also positioned itself for partial-privatization by becoming more 
customer-oriented in order to minimize its image as a public enterprise.  Communes 
are now treated as customers - as any industrial or household customer.  Tariffs 
charged to communes have been simplified and are now readjusted in May and 
November.  Because French companies are no longer bound to accept communes' 
choice of supplier as their own, GDF must deal with a more complex market.  In 
order to meet increased competition, GDF has been building its distribution net to 
reach more companies and small communes.  The only other large companies on the 
French market, GSO and CFM operating in the southwest, are owned by GDF.  The 
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 other 17 non-nationalized distributors and the five new companies represent 4% of 
the French market.(Sénat rapport 03-075--6)  It is expected that the only companies 
with sizeable future prospects on the French market will be Belgium's Electrabel, 
Germany's Eon and GDF-EDF.  
 
6.4.1 Germany  
 Directive 98/30/EC was transposed as an amendment on May 20th 2003 
(BGB1 I S. 686), amending national German energy law of April 24th 1998 (BGB1. I 
S 730).  The amendment contained no clauses affecting the distribution level as it was 
an explicit move by the Bundesrat in avoiding prosecution by DG Tren at the ECJ.   
In comparison to the ten-page May 20th 2003 amendment, the one-hundred and four 
page amendment proposal to the 1998 energy law transposing directive 2003/55/EC 
contained key clauses affecting the distribution market.  Because of the failure of the 
Verbändevereinbarung arrangement, a currently unnamed national regulator, the 
Bundesregulierungsbehörde and regional regulators with authority over electricity, 
gas, telecommunication and mail have the authority to conduct checks on TPA, 
unbundling, gas pricing and monopolistic behavior of vertically integrated 
companies.  The Bundesregulierungsbehörde is entrusted with also protecting 
companies with less than 100,000 customers from unfair business practices by large 
companies.  These companies which tend to be the Stadtwerke are exempt from the 
market liberalization measures outlined in the 2003 directive.(Interview 1.3.2004)   
Therefore the regional suppliers that do not adjust their business practices to embrace 
larger markets are the gas companies most likely to suffer from increased 
competition.  Even though the Stadtwerke are exempt largely from market 
liberalization clauses of the 2003 directive, key changes have occurred as a result of 
policies of the Schröder government.  In addition, most new gas companies that have 
appeared in the German market after the 1998 directive have either disappeared or 
been merged into larger integrated energy conglomerates such as RWE and 
Eon.(Interview 18.6.2003) 
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 6.4.2 Länder 
 Although the Länder have had considerably more authority than their French 
regional counterparts at the national level, the Länder have not exhibited any 
considerable authority in terms of gas policy.  In the gas sector they have the duties of 
technical oversight, tariff control and protection of small consumers. The Länder can 
only exercise authority over companies with nets lying with in their boarders.  
Companies operating in the liberalized market with operations extending into several 
regions do not have any contact with the Länder.  Both Bavaria and Badem-
Württemburg, Länder that have traditionally had vested interests in the gas market 
due to long-distance pipelines crossing their territory, find that the 2003 directive 
further removes gas policy from their competencies along with the end of 
demarcation rights as outlined by the 1998 directive.  However because competition 
has functioned so well in the electricity market in lowering prices, the Länder are 
allowed under the amendment proposal of the 2003 directive to appoint regional 
regulators that collaborate with the Bundesregulierungsbehörde, the 
Monopolkommission and the Bundeskartellamt. (Interview 18.06.2003)    
 
6.4.3 Regional companies 
 The regional market is expected to disappear under increased competition as 
gas markets that have existed within the Länder have also disappeared.  Prior to the 
demise of the VV system in 2003, the contractual arrangements of the VV system 
sustained regional companies by promoting a point-to-point model in which the 
regional companies transported gas from the large transmission companies to the 
Stadtwerke.  Regional companies have attempted to band together to little avail.  
Even companies that have been fiercely acquiring Stadtwerke such as Tugar have 
been acquired themselves by the large transporters such as Ruhrgas, which in turn has 
further been acquired by E.on.   
 
6.4.4 Stadtwerke-Communes  
 The local gas market in Germany is the most complex in Europe as there are 
approximately 711 small gas companies and Stadtwerke.  Law 28 of the German 
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 constitution states that communes can organize themselves as they wish.  The 
national Federal state and the Länder have no authority in intervening in matters lying 
under the purview of the communes.  Communes usually have the responsibility of 
coordinating trash, water, electricity and gas services.  Most Stadtwerke have been 
traditionally owned by their communes, cities or other Stadtwerke and have had 
monopolies over their local markets.  In addition their accounts are tied up to other 
local services such as transportation, pools, energy.(Interview 27.5.2003)  Therefore 
Stadtwerke have been involved in local politics and have had close ties with SPD 
which has been attempting to protect Stadtwerke as an extension of local economies 
and employment in order to retain voters.  Employees in pure gas companies that 
have been acquired by larger companies have experienced layoffs.  For example, after 
being purchased by GDF, Berlin's GASAG laid off 1,400 employees.(Interview 
13.6.2003) 
Transformations have not occurred because both large and small gas 
customers in Germany have little incentive to change their supplier of gas.  
Stadtwerke have due to their closeness to local politics maintained monopolies in 
their localities.  Local gas prices have not fluctuated greatly as a result liberalization 
politics in Germany.  It was expected that many local gas companies would disappear 
as customers would be free to choose between suppliers.  However German 
customers exhibit little switching between gas companies.  The fragmented market 
and pancaking between large, regional and local gas companies have rendered TPA 
problematic.  Communes and Stadtwerke have been largely negative to gas market 
liberalization and prefer to maintain the established institutional arrangements as they 
cannot compete against the large gas transporters.  Also most Stadtwerke have not 
changed their own suppliers.(Interview 13.6.2003)   
 The greatest transformations have been rather a result of communes’ budgetary 
problems.  Due to new public management models in the nineties, communes had 
been given more duties but fewer resources.  Unemployment had risen in the public 
sector.  Communes sold their Stadtwerke during 1997 – 2002, demanding very high 
prices, as buyers thought the local gas sector a lucrative prospect.  After 2002 the 
spate of Stadtwerke privatization had subsided because the local gas market did not 
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 reap large profits for its owners in spite of gas market liberalization 
policies.(Interview 18.6.2003)  In 1990 66% of Stadtwerke were pure-publicly owned 
as opposed to 47% in 2001.(Interview 15.1.2003) 
 As companies with less than 100,000 will remain untouched by the 2003 
directive, most Stadtwerke will not be directly affected by gas market liberalization.  
The only transformations expected to continue are the acquisition of small companies 
by large integrated energy concerns such as Eon and RWE.  Lastly, due to the spate 
of Stadtwerke privatizations, small gas companies have become more attentive to 
customer service and their stockholders, while remaining responsible to their 
communes in terms of local utility responsibility.  Stadtwerke have pooled resources 
in order to collectively purchase gas deliveries and combine communal gas 
distribution.  Gas pricing and buying will be calculated on shorter-term bases and the 
small companies use VKU and BGW to further their political initiatives at the 
national level.  The largest competitors for the Stadtwerke are not other companies as 
much as other forms of energy such as oil.  Lastly, VKU believes that the subnational 
gas market will not be endangered as long as a regulated separation between 
distribution and transport exists between the large transporters and the local 
distributors.(Interview 1.3.2004) 
 
6.5 Analysis 
As discussed in the empirical presentation, there has been spurious 
institutional change at the subnational level from 1998 to 2003.  The 2003 gas 
directive has affected negligible transformational pressure on the distribution system.   
 
Reductionism:There have been no key entrepreneurial actors operating at the 
subnational level. 
 
Transaction Costs: No transactional costs have been placed on either regional 
governments or local gas companies.  The only noticeable changes have been 
privatizations of Stadtwerke from 1998 to 2002 in Germany, and the establishment of 
a supplier and client relationship between GDF and French communes along with the 
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 presence of the CRE regulator on consumer pricing and TPA in France.  However 
these changes have been so marginal as to constitute little institutional 
transformations in the relationship between governments and gas companies at the 
subnational level.   
 
Property Rights: The spate of Stadtwerke privatizations and acquisitions 
from 1997 in 2002 in Germany brought neither large profits to their owners nor 
institutional transformations to the subnational level.  Privatization had simply not 
occurred in France. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have discussed the lack of institutional change between 
subnational governments and the subnational gas industry.  Thus the institutional 
arrangements of state-dirigisme in France and corporatism in Germany remain 
constant at the subnational level.  Although directive 2003/55/EC included the 
subnational level into its provisions, the immediate impact has not been significant.  
However significant institutional transformations may occur after the 1998-2003 
empirical limits of this study. 
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 Chapter 7 Summary and General Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 I have employed the previous three empirical chapters in testing the theoretical 
and analytical framework of this comparative case study.  I have portrayed 
institutional transformations in Germany and France in light of EU gas market 
liberalization policies from 1998 to 2003.  I prepared the analysis by assessing how 
corporatism in Germany and state-dirigisme in France as institutional structures 
characterizing the relationship between governments and gas industries at separate 
supranational, national and subnational levels have been transformed.   I limited the 
empirical time period to 1998-2003 by studying the implementation of, Directive 
98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and the negotiation of, Directive 
2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC.  My three independent variables, Variable 1 reductionism, 
Variable 2 transaction costs, and Variable 3 property rights were culled as central 
aspects of New Institutional Economic Theory.  The three independent variables were 
tested empirically through my intermediate variable, Variable 4 MLG levels, at the 
supranational, national and subnational levels.   
 
7.2 Presentation of Analysis and Results 
7.2.1 Supranational Level 
 At the supranational level, the superior institutional capacity of EU bodies 
functionally eliminated the need to preserve the institutional structures of corporatism 
and state-dirigisme as state governments and gas companies no longer needed or 
could rely on their traditional policy-making structures in progressing their initiatives.  
Institutional change was the product of key policy-making entrepreneurial actors and 
secondly of the transaction costs of implementing the 1998 gas directive and 
negotiating the 2003 gas directive.  The issue of privatization or of any other property 
rights transfers was not mentioned at the supranational level.   
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 Therefore at the supranational the qualitative empirical presentation confirmed 
Variable 1 reductionism and Variable 2 transaction costs as significant and 
discounted Variable 3 property rights as spurious.   Independent Variable 4 MLG 
levels showed that institutional change had occurred at the supranational level as 
corporatism and state-dirigisme no longer apply.  I have characterized the new 
German and French institutional arrangement at the supranational level as anchored 
through the EU due to the EU’s superior institutional capacity.   
 
7.2.2 National Level 
Key entrepreneurial actors in both countries were considerable forces in 
pushing for legislation transposition of the 1998 and 2003 directives.  Both France 
and Germany were pressured by transaction costs originating at the supranational 
level to transpose the 1998 directive into national laws, thus avoiding loss of 
legitimacy in terms of European political and business negotiations and prosecution 
by EU bodies.  Pure national level transaction costs also imposed institutional 
transformation.  In Germany the ineffective nature of the corporatist structure in 
negotiating gas policy was dissolved as the Verbändevereinbarung system no longer 
achieved cooperative policy results.  In France the end of state-dirigisme was 
signalized by GDF’s interest in distancing itself from the government in the interest 
of operating as a competitive gas company.  Although the privatization of GDF was 
discussed at the national level, property rights transfers were not considerable issues 
in terms of institutional transformation at the national level. 
Therefore at the national level the qualitative empirical presentation confirmed 
both Variable 1 reductionism and Variable 2 transaction costs as significant and 
discounted Variable 3 property rights as spurious.  Independent Variable 4 MLG 
levels showed that institutional change had occurred at the supranational level.  These 
results were similar to those at the supranational level, as EU liberalization policy of 
the gas market has penetrated the national level after effecting institutional 
transformation at the supranational level.  State-dirigisme in France and corporatism 
in Germany have been replaced by regulated gas-markets in which gas companies 
and national governments must accept differing roles and positions in order to 
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 perpetuate the strength of their national gas sectors.  In chapter 5, I have discussed the 
new national level institutional arrangement present in both France and Germany 
regulated neo-liberalism. 
 
7.2.3 Subnational Level 
In the period 1998-2003 little institutional change had occurred at the 
subnational levels of Germany and France.  The EU gas liberalization policy through 
gas directive 1998 did not effect the distribution of gas at the local level.  By 2003, 
EU gas liberalization policy had not yet penetrated the subnational level in terms of 
institutional change.  No considerable key entrepreneurial actors or transaction costs 
forcing institutional transformation had been present.  The only noticeable changes 
had been the marginal privatization of Stadtwerke in Germany.   
Therefore at the subnational level, the qualitative empirical presentation did 
not confirm Variable 1 reductionism and Variable 2 transaction costs as significant.  
Variable 3 property rights was found spurious as the privatizations of Stadtwerke in 
Germany did little to cause institutional change.  Also independent Variable 4 MLG 
levels showed that institutional change had not occurred at the supranational level.  
Therefore state-dirigisme in France and corporatism in Germany still define 
institutional arrangements at the subnational level. 
 
7.3 Multi-Level Governance 
The Multi-Level Governance perspective has proven itself a useful analytical 
tool in understanding both the effects of institutional dynamics caused by EU policy 
disenabling the state-centric model and also how policy is distilled from one level to 
another creating a flexible policy-making apparatus.  Two points have been apparent 
throughout this case study.  The supranational level has tremendous influence over 
the entire MLG level structure while the regional level has been marginalized.  In 
sum, the MLG variable along with its hypothesis in section 3.4 has been proven valid.  
Thus, institutional decoupling of state-centric model into supranational, national and 
subnational levels have as a result of gas policy have been significant in effecting 
institutional transformations. 
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7.4 New Institutional Economic Theory 
The NIE Theoretical framework has also proven helpful in analyzing the 
empirical data.   
Variable 1, reductionism, has been the most significant variable in 
understanding causes towards institutional change and is therefore a valid indicator 
and explanation of institutional transformation in the French and German gas markets 
from 1998 to 2003 across all MLG levels.  Hypothesis one in section 3.4 is thus valid 
confirming that institutional transformations have occurred to state-dirigisme in 
France and corporatism in Germany as explained by key entrepreneurial actors who 
have exercised their policy-making capabilities.  These key entrepreneurial actors are 
the instigators of change as opposed to change caused by a multitude of negotiating 
actors.   
Variable two, transaction costs, has also proven itself a significant variable in 
identifying and charting institutional transformations in the relationships between 
French and German governments and gas companies in the gas market due to the 
liberalization of the gas industry at all MLG levels.  Therefore hypothesis 2 in section 
3.4 is valid, confirming that institutional transformations have occurred because 
transaction costs have become too costly for the existing institutional structures of 
state-dirigisme in France and corporatism in Germany.  Directive 98/30/EC and 
directive 2003/55/EC have imposed specific transaction costs on existing institutions 
forcing commensurate pressures on competitive gas markets and their embedded 
organizations effecting institutional change. 
Variable three, property rights, has proven itself across all MLG levels to not 
be a significant factor of institutional change.  The only property rights transfers have 
occurred in Germany at the subnational level, leading to no institutional 
transformations at that level.  Hypothesis 3 in section 3.4 is not valid; thus not 
proving significant that institutional change in the French and German gas sectors has 
been due to shifting property rights.  
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 7.5 Conclusion 
In responding to this study’s central research question,  
 
What transformations have occurred to the institutional structures between the gas 
industry and governments of the French and German gas sectors as a result of the 
European Union’s liberalization of the energy market in the period 1998-2003?  
 
I have arrived to four main conclusions.  First, the Europeanization of the French and 
German gas markets has caused similar corresponding institutional transformations in 
both countries at each particular MLG level.  Second, institutional model 
transformations are affected by policy lag.  Policy-related dynamics in the gas sector 
begins at the supranational level before penetrating the national level and then 
subsequently the subnational level.  Third, institutional changes are dependent on key 
policy-making entrepreneurs and transaction costs but not shifting property rights.  
Fourth, the holistic institutional structures of state-dirigisme in France and 
corporatism in Germany that have traditionally defined the relationship between 
governments and the gas industry in the French and German gas sectors have been 
dissected into three distinct levels.  At each of these three levels, institutional 
transformations with their own policy considerations, influences and ultimately, 
separate institutional structures are found.   State-dirigisme in France and corporatism 
in Germany no longer portray the unitary and unified institutional arrangements 
present in both countries.  The French and German supranational levels are now 
defined by the superior institutional capacity of strong EU organizations in opposition 
to national and subnational organizations operating in Brussels.  The gas sectors of 
the French and German national levels are characterized by institutional arrangements 
defined by the qualitative and quantitative clauses of the 1998 and 2003 directives.  I 
term this institutional arrangement apparent in the national gas sectors of France and 
Germany regulated neo-liberalism.  Because negligible institutional transformation 
has occurred at the subnational level, the traditional institutional structures of 
corporatism in Germany and state-dirigisme in France at the subnational have 
remained intact as of 2003. 
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